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Productivity, efficiency and competition of UK depository institutions 
In the thesis, a number of cost characteristics of the UK building society and retail 
banking sectors are estimated using econometric techniques. The cost characteristics 
considered broadly fall into the three areas of productivity, efficiency and 
competitiveness. The study was undertaken with the aim of considering both the 
magnitude and degree of change in these cost characteristics over time. This assessment 
is deemed to be important due to the wide-ranging changes in the regulatory, institutional 
and market environment of both these sectors. 
For reasons of structure and clarity, the thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of 
the thesis provides a broad discussion of the operating environment, the model 
specification, variable definition, the concept of efficiency, econometric techniques, 
previous literature and the form of the statistics used to measure the relevant economic 
characteristics. The second part of the thesis contains the empirical studies in which 
economic characteristics are estimated. Cost efficiency is measured for both the retail 
banking and building society sectors using differing model forms and distinct functional 
forms. Fixed effects panel data techniques are employed in both studies. Both model 
specification and functional forms are deemed to influence the estimates produced. It is 
discovered that both sectors experience a degree of cost efficiency dispersion. Measures 
of economies of scale and product mix are also estimated with positive economies of 
scale and constant returns to scale found in the retail bank and building society sectors, 
respectively. The findings from the analysis of economies of product mix are less than 
clear. Nevertheless, it may be stated that the re-regulation which allowed a greater degree 
of product diversification in the building society sector appears to be justified in terms of 
cost efficiency. Very low levels of technical change and total factor productivity growth 
are found for both sectors. The degree of competitiveness of the building society sector 
was assessed using a revenue function approach. The results suggest that both retail banks 
and building societies operate in markets characterised by a moderate degree of 
monopolistic competition. 
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Chapter I Introduction, thesis aims and framework 
1.1 Introduction 
In his seminal paper, Leibenstein (1966) suggested that " ... at the core of economics 
is 
the concept of efficiency, (but) ... empirical evidence 
has been accumulating which 
suggests that the problem of allocative efficiency is trivial. Yet it is hard to escape the 
notion that efficiency in some broad sense is significant" (p. 392). This thesis is an 
investigation of efficiency in UK depository institutions and attempts to ascertain 
whether cost efficiency can be considered to be in some way `significant' in this most 
important sector of the UK economy. Considerable change has occurred in UK 
depository institutions during the 1980s and 1990s. The ramifications of this change are 
still less than clear. An investigation of efficiency and the associated concepts of 
productivity and competition in the UK depository institutions sector is deemed, 
therefore, to be both timely and potentially very important. 
The economic analysis of depository institutions has taken many forms. In macro- 
economic analysis, depository institutions have been considered as " ... passive conduits 
through which monetary policy is effected" (Benston and Smith, 1976, p. 215). Many 
micro-economic approaches have emphasised specific aspects of bank production and 
operation. In this thesis, UK depository institutions are examined, employing techniques 
drawn from industrial and applied economics. Using this framework, assumptions of 
efficiency are tested and challenged. 
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This chapter introduces a number of issues that are central to the analysis of UK retail 
banks and building societies. In the next two sections, the aims and format of the thesis 
are outlined. 
1.2 Thesis aims 
The main aim of the thesis is to employ econometric methods and techniques to quantify 
the performance of UK depository institutions. When performance has been previously 
examined, an emphasis on cross-sectional analysis has nearly always been present. Such 
an approach, whilst providing a `snapshot' of present positions, may ignore potential dis- 
equilibrium positions and the dynamic nature of efficiency. The measurement of 
efficiency using a dynamic framework is introduced and examined in the thesis. A multi- 
product specification of productive technology is adopted. 
It is important to analyse depository institutions because of their central importance in the 
functioning of a modern economy and the potentially systemic effect of their failure. The 
elimination of regulatory barriers to expansion and product provision and the continuing 
removal of geographical restraints within the European Union (EU) are generally thought 
to have increased the prevailing levels of competition within depository institutions' core 
markets. The present form of banking institutions is also generally perceived to exhibit 
certain characteristics such as the " ... preponderance of scale economies across a 
broad 
range of bank output in the European banking market" (European Economy, 1997, p. 12). 
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Both these preconceptions and the effects of the significant change in the sector are 
assessed. 
Wheelock and Wilson (1995) suggest that the measurement of bank efficiency is essential 
for two central reasons: the quantification of the relative performance of firms; and the 
assessment of the effects of regulatory change. The level (or degree) of efficiency of a 
depository institution provides an indication of its relative `success' in production terms. 
This `success' deserves attention as institutions in competitive markets will be better able 
to maintain and develop their business when they operate efficiently. In essence, the 
efficient depository institution will be able to avoid the high costs of failure. Support for 
the view that inefficient production is associated with bank failure has been provided for 
the US commercial banking sector in the 1980s (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992a). 
The primary providers of deposit-taking services in the UK are the retail banks and 
building societies. These financial institutions are considered in the thesis and are viewed 
as `special' in terms of their high levels. of financial leverage, the significant macro- 
economic consequences of their collapse or failure and the correspondingly high level of 
regulation and supervision imposed by governments to direct their operation. These 
institutions, in common with most financial firms in the UK, are highly regulated. The 
analysis of the efficiency of production in retail banks should provide a clearer 
understanding of the ramifications of this regulation in terms of performance, where " ... 
the motivation for such regulation demands an understanding of the behaviour of these 
firms" (Hancock, 1991, p. 2). Empirical evidence is also important when attempting to 
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assess developments such as the continued external growth of depository institution and 
the future regulation of banking. 
Traditional banking business involves the making of long-term loans with short-term 
deposits. This activity has led to specialisation in the areas of credit evaluation, the 
monitoring of borrowers and the completion of transactions. The process of undertaking 
these activities may differ substantially between different institutions and confer 
differential rates of performance. Undertaking these activities may therefore affect the 
efficiency of production of individual institutions. Other aspects of production related to 
these activities may include factors such as risk and liquidity, which can be viewed as 
external or central to the production process. These aspects may be related to efficiency 
and could provide insight into the sources of efficiency 
The UK retail-banking sector is distinguished by its relatively early development and 
traditionally high levels of concentration. UK retail banks have for a long time competed 
with the broader financial markets as a source for funds. This situation is linked to the 
highly developed financial markets in London. An array of activities ranging from core 
deposit and loan activities to foreign exchange services and insurance provision are 
performed by retail banks. Building societies' behaviour is restricted by legislation that is 
separate from that imposed on retail banks. The Building Societies Act 1986 (Section 5) 
specifies that building societies are established " ... for the purpose of raising, primarily 
through subscriptions of members, a stock or fund for making them advances secured on 
land for their residential use". Conversely, the banks do not have a function specified in 
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law. Building societies principally act as intermediators of savings (term, share and 
investment deposits) into house purchase loans. As mutual firms, they have a tradition of 
supplying members (the de facto owners of the society) with mortgage loans for house 
purchase. 
Change in UK depository institutions has occurred concurrently with a re-regulation of 
the liability side of depository institutions' balance sheets. In response, depository 
institutions have broadened their activities and increased the number of products or 
services they provide. The external growth of some institutions, through mergers, has 
also continued. This shift, acting in tandem with the internal growth of institutions, has 
increased the degree of market concentration and reduced the number of institutions 
overall. Alteration of the form of supervision of many institutions has occurred at 
national, European and international levels. This transformation has been heralded under 
the banners of improved performance, globalisation, competition and de-regulation of 
financial markets. 
An exploratory econometric analysis of the performance of UK depository institutions is 
the ultimate goal of the thesis. The cost characteristics of UK depository institutions are 
estimated using different model forms and econometric techniques. This approach is 
viewed as pertinent in light of the lack of previous work relating to UK retail banks, the 
potential mis-specification of previous work and the mis-interpretation of results in 
isolation. The substantial shift in the industrial structure and behaviour of banking sectors 
observed in the USA and other nations has yet to be clearly quantified for UK depository 
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institutions. Empirical studies of the UK retail banking industry have previously been 
fragmented or absent. Indeed, this study is the first of this breadth to consider such 
fundamental issues within this most prominent and essential area of commercial activity 
in the UK. 
1.3 Thesis outline 
The thesis is divided into eleven chapters, which may be broadly divided into two 
sections. Section One comprises chapters 2 to 5, which outline the principal assumptions 
and approaches made in the empirical studies. Section Two comprises chapters 6 to 11, 
which incorporate the empirical studies of efficiency, productivity and competitiveness 
and present the conclusions of the thesis. The sequential development of the thesis is 
displayed in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. 
Chapter 2 introduces a number of environmental issues affecting the industry, including 
regulatory change and developments in technology. Chapter 3 considers the definition of 
the models of production employed in the thesis, in addition to the `book-keeping' 
definitions of the variables employed. Model forms suggested in the literature are also 
reviewed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive international review of 
previous studies of productive characteristics of depository institutions. A critical 
assessment of the econometric techniques employed for the measurement of efficiency 
and productivity, used within previous studies is made in chapter 5. Recommendations 
suggesting the use of the more flexible and widely applied statistics are made. 
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The chapters that constitute Section One are substantially inter-linked. Chapter 4, the 
review of previous studies, for example, provides a basis from which the model forms 
and variables, in chapter 3, may be considered. Equally, chapter 3 provides a framework 
through which the review of previous studies may be considered with greater clarity. 
In Section Two the related concepts of efficiency, productivity and competitiveness are 
assessed for the UK building society and retail banking sectors. All the studies in Section 
Two draw heavily on the assumptions and approaches recommended in Section One. 
The chapters in Section Two include the empirical studies of efficiency, productivity and 
competitiveness. Within these chapters a number of cost characteristics (discussion of 
which is developed in chapter 5) are estimated for both the UK retail banking and 
building society sector. Economies of scale, economies of scope, cost complementarities, 
technical change, total factor productivity growth and cost efficiency are estimated for 
both the retail banking and building society sectors. Due to the differing characteristics of 
the data samples employed and cost characteristics considered, a number of different 
estimation procedures are used in the studies. Chapter 6 is an analysis of the 
competitiveness of the mortgage market for building societies. Chapter 7 considers 
economies of scale, economies of scope and cost efficiency in retail banks between 1984 
and 1997. Chapter 8 quantifies technical change and total factor productivity growth in 
retail banks across the same time period. Estimates of cost efficiency and the influence of 
differing regulatory regimes in terms of cost efficiency for building societies are 
estimated and discussed in chapter 9 for the sample period 1990-96. Chapter 10 presents 
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estimates of economies of scale, economies of product mix, total factor productivity 
growth and technical change for building societies for the same sample period as used in 
chapter 9. A summary of the thesis and conclusions are drawn in chapter 11. 
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SECTION ONE 
Chapter 2 The operating environment of UK depository institutions 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the environment within which UK depository institutions operate. 
The sector to be investigated primarily consists of retail banks and building societies. 
Many features of the operating environment may have substantial implications for the 
performance of both these industries. In this chapter, the broader macro-economic 
environment, central regulatory and supervisory changes, the changing market structure, 
the growth of new products, the development of the technology of service provision and 
labour market changes are considered. 
2.2 The macro-economic environment 
The `headline' performance of retail banks and building societies in the last few years has 
been impressive. After extricating themselves from the bad debts incurred during the 
1989-93 recession, the retail banks and building societies have continued to move along 
the path of restructuring. During the sample period of 1984 to 1997, the broader 
performance of the UK economy may have had a significant effect on both the 
performance and the behaviour of the retail banking and the building society sectors. 
Between 1984 and 1988, the UK experienced a strong consumer boom, which 
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contributed to a significant rise in the price of housing property. This period was 
characterised by more intense competition between the building societies and the retail 
banks in the mortgage and savings markets, and by a number of other financial 
institutions entering the markets for the first time. The sharp decline in property prices, 
after the peak of the property boom in 1988, did not lead to a large reduction in lending. 
Instead, competitors, particularly within the mortgage market, loosened their restrictions 
on both security and income in the provision of mortgage loans, and the retail banks 
became involved to a greater degree in lending to the commercial sector. 
During the first years of the 1990s, the effects of the bursting of the property bubble 
created significant problems for depository institutions. An, unprecedented number of 
home-owners were removed from their properties. The spectre of `negative equity', the 
problem of losses on the realisation of assets when repossessed homes were sold, became 
a reality at this time. These circumstances, whilst forcing many issues of regulatory and 
structural developments in financial institutions to the fore, provided a less than 
sympathetic environment for change. This was a period of substantial losses across the 
sector. The building societies and banks suffered considerable losses on some activities, 
such as the investment in estate agency, which resulted in losses of approximately 
£O. 25bn (Barnes and Ward, 1997). The lending decisions of the retail banks have also 
been increasingly viewed as miscalculated, with lending made for major commercial 
projects, such as Canary Wharf, particularly criticised by some commentators. 
Significantly, some building societies suffered such large losses that they were taken over 
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(such as the Town and Country in 1992) or moved towards merger to replenish their 
reserves. 
As the economic position gradually stabilised towards the end of 1993, the profits of 
retail banks and building societies improved. These profits, from the increasing interest 
spread on the institutions' core business, were used to offset many of the previous losses. 
Barnes and Ward (1997) suggested that " ... building societies were able to do this 
because their competitors, the retail banks and specialised lenders who had also incurred 
heavy losses, either pulled out of the market (mostly the specialised lenders) or increased 
their own margins (the retail banks), thus sacrificing part of their market share to the 
building societies" (p. 21). 
2.3 Regulatory and supervisory changes 
A change in both the level of structural regulation and the re-regulation of supervision, 
including the level of investor protection and the conduct of business, has occurred at the 
national, European and international levels. Banks and buildings societies are in many 
ways regulated on similar lines. These institutions are regulated within a legislative 
framework enforced by a central regulator. During the sample period, the banking 
regulator, enfranchised in the 1987 Banking Act, was the Bank of England'. The building 
society regulator, enfranchised by the 1986 Building Societies Act, was the Building 
Societies Commission. Both regulators are duty bound to enforce the compliance of 
institutions to existing legislation and their own guidelines, including capital adequacy 
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requirements and a degree of depositor protection. It has been suggested by Miles (1994) 
that whilst the structure of regulation appears similar, the temper of such regulation does 
differ between the sectors. For example, the Bank of England had greater informational 
requirements for banks. Other regulatory differences in the sample period included the 
limitations on the proportion of funds raised from non-depositor sources by building 
societies, the restrictions on building societies relating to the proportion of funds that may 
be held that are not first mortgages, and the maximum level of unsecured lending. These 
restrictions have been altered over the sample period. 
Domestic re-regulation of depository institutions has enabled the provision of a wider 
range of services from both banks and building societies. The Building Society Act of 
1986 also allowed the demutualisation or conversion of building societies. This and other 
legislation effectively removed the restrictions on providing a wider range of savings 
products, such as insurance. The 1986 Building Society Act was introduced to improve 
the competitive position of building societies in relation to retail banks and other 
centralised mortgage providers. The market share of building societies in the mortgage 
market had been consistently eroding throughout the 1980s, as new mortgage providers 
exploited their relatively privileged regulatory position. The Building Society Act (1986) 
initiated a number of changes to building societies with the intention of amending this 
position. 
The Building Society Commission was established as a regulator to ensure investor 
protection, financial stability and to advise the government. This regulatory overhaul was 
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established with the dual objective of achieving the broader requirements of the European 
legislation. The scope of products that building societies could supply was increased with 
limited amounts of advances secured on land and unsecured advances allowed to 
customers. The provision of banking, insurance and investment products within this 
restrictive framework was enfranchised in the 1988 amendment to the Building Societies 
Act. Provision of corporate lending still remains limited, as does expansion in the 
ownership of insurers and European operations. The Financial Services Act of 1986 
loosened many restrictions related to the provision of investments. The regulation of such 
provision was gathered under the auspices of the Securities and Investment Board. 
Further revision of the 1986 Building Societies Act is still an area of speculation. Recent 
secondary amendments of the 1986 legislation have allowed societies to undertake life 
insurance business and have increased the size of unsecured loans allowed and the 
wholesale funding limit. The continued development of legislation concerning building 
societies seems inevitable, particularly in the areas of continued extensions to wholesale 
funding limits, improved accountability of society management to their members and 
amendments to the merger process. A Treasury draft building society bill review 
document for industry consultations was issued on 18 March 1996. The suggestion of 
`ring fencing' building societies from potentially hostile mergers was made. The review 
document includes a'variety of alterations to existing practice. The purpose of building 
societies was specified as the making of " ... loans that are secured on residential property 
and are funded substantially by members". This new legislation, it is hoped, " ... will 
remove barriers to what they (building societies) can do and strengthen bonds with 
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members" (Treasury Draft Building Society Review Document, March, 1996). A number 
of measures have been introduced to improve the accountability of the management to 
the membership. These have included a broadening of the membership, the expansion of 
potential activities and a clearer definition of mutuality. 
The primary aims of the legislation may be viewed as the increased accountability of 
societies. This has been sought through measures to improve the information received by 
members concerning elections to the board and new business ventures. The increased 
transparency of the rights of members, of the electoral process and the annual report has 
additionally been posited as an aim of the legislation. The funding of 50 per cent of 
activities through shares and a maximum 25 per cent of assets consisting of non- 
residential mortgages was proposed to assist in improving the viability of the mutual 
status and purpose of building societies. This change will allow an expansion into other 
areas of business both within the UK and Europe. The Building Societies Commission 
has also worked with the Treasury to produce a voluntary code of practice. Additionally, 
the rules relating to speculation by the public for payments from building society mergers 
have been tightened. 
In March 1997 the Building Society Act 1997, was introduced. This act had the explicit 
aim of amending the 1986 Building Society Act, particularly in relation to the 
amalgamation of depositor protection schemes. Under this Act, the Building Societies 
Investor Protection Board and Deposit Protection Board and the Building Societies 
Investor Protection Fund and the Deposit Protection Fund were combined. Also in March 
16 
1997, the Building Societies (Distribution) Act, 1997 was introduced. This Act had the 
specific aim " ... to amend the law in respect of distribution of assets on the take-over or 
conversion of a building society" (p. 1, Building Societies Act (Distributions) 1997). This 
Act introduced a number of changes including amendment of the rights of Trustee 
Savings Accounts2. The removal of the distinction between retail shareholders (members) 
and depositors (non-members) and voting rights for mortgagees were previously 
suggested as ways of expanding the membership of building societies3. 
Recently, regulation for both the retail banks and building societies has been shifted to 
the recently established Financial Services Authority (FSA). This new `super regulator', 
established by the government in October 1997, aims to bring regulation of financial 
service provision, including insurance and banking, under a single authority. The aims of 
the new institution have emphasised the importance of consumer protection and safe and 
sound conduct within financial markets. Of primary importance in this on-going reform is 
the merger of a number of financial services regulators. In justification of this move, it 
was stated that there " ... has been a blurring of the distinctions between different 
kinds 
of financial services business: banks, building societies, investment firms, insurance 
companies and others. This has added further to the complexity of financial regulation. 
The Government believes the current system is costly, inefficient and confusing to both 
regulated firms and their customers. It is not delivering the standard of supervision and 
investor protection that the public has a right to expect" (p. 8, The Financial Services and 
Markets Bill: A Consultation Document, 1998). To amend for this `complexity', the FSA 
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will take over responsibility from nine financial services regulators. This process is 
displayed in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 The combination of regulatory powers under the FSA 
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Bank of England 
Act, 1998) 
The Bank of England Act (1998) came into force on the 1st June, 1998. This act 
transferred the prudential supervision of banks from the Bank of England to the FSA. The 
draft Financial Services and Markets Bill lays the basis of other functions of the FSA by 
providing it with " ... the comprehensive and coherent set of powers needed to respond to 
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an industry that transcends geographical and sectoral boundaries. " (Brown, 1998, from 
the Financial Services and Market Bill, foreword). The bill is also responsible for the 
establishment of a single ombudsman, compensation scheme and appeals tribunal. 
The development of the internal market within the European Union has also potentially 
significant effects on the performance of UK depository institutions. The European Union 
aims to promote free movement of goods and services among 290 million consumers in 
15 countries. The expansion of the European Union also seems probable with talks in 
1997 concerning the incorporation of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. 
Loheac (1991) implies that the three principal aims of the European movement are 
minimum harmonisation, mutual recognition and home country control. The principal of 
minimum harmonisation indicates that legislation between member states is to be 
eventually brought into a common format. Progress towards this goal has been greatly 
complicated due to the distinct traditions and legislative frameworks of the member 
states. Mutual recognition puts forward the goal of overall acceptance of regulators. Such 
a shift has been criticised for introducing competition between national regulators at a 
European level. Home country control concerns the proposed single license system, 
which would be acceptable for trade in all member states. 
A raft of European legislation has been developed in the attempt to achieve the first goal 
of harmonising supervision and regulation. Molyneux et al (1996) outlines the principal 
European contributions of this re-regulation. It is suggested that the First Banking 
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Directive (77180/EEC) 1977,1985 EU White paper, the Second Banking Co-ordination 
Directive (89/646/EEC) 1988, the Own Funds Directive (89/299/EEC) 1989, the 
Solvency Ratio Directive (89/647/EEC) 1989, the Money Laundering Directive 
(91/308/EEC) 1991, the Large Exposures Directive (92/121/EEC) and the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme (1993) are of primary importance. Other legislative changes relating 
to the development of a single market for securities and investment have been developed 
over the sample period. In 1993, a range of legislation was phased in, including the 
Second Banking Co-ordination Directive, granting EU incorporated banks the right to 
establish branches and offer services within other member states. Other European level 
regulatory developments include the Solvency Ratio Directive, which established 
common reserve requirements. The definition of capital for regulatory purposes is 
imposed by the Own Funds Directive and the Large Exposure Directive. These changes 
have, in turn, led to the introduction of limits on banks' potential exposure from single 
sources. The Depositor Guarantee Scheme attempts to set minimum standards for deposit 
protection across the EU. 
A number of changes in the European regulation and supervision of banking and finance 
were either introduced or proposed in 1996. Of these changes, the international 
declaration on co-operation and supervision and the complementary Memorandum of 
Understanding and Agreement, the introduction of the EU Capital Adequacy Directive 
and the Investment Services Directive (1s` January, 1996) dominate. The Capital 
Adequacy and Investment Services Directives enable amendments to be made to the 
existing solvency and safety regulation of investments and banking in Europe. New rules 
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have also been introduced with the aim of limiting risk and bank exposure for a range of 
activities, such as foreign currency investment, domestic investment (with limited 
exceptions) and options trading. The early introduction of these rules in Britain continues 
with the Bank of England's policy of `super-equivalence'. However, the directive has not 
created a level playing field across Europe due to differing interpretations by central 
banks. The Capital Adequacy Directive, for example, was introduced in Germany in 
January 1997, a year later than the UK. These directives will require amendment with the 
introduction of the new Basle proposals in 1998. 
A number of influences have affected the international regulation of financial services, in 
general, and depository services, in particular. The development within the world of a 
number of trading areas, such as the EU, has continued apace. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement between Canada, Mexico and the USA, the Andean Pact, between a 
number of South American countries and ASEAN, within the eastern pacific region, 
emphasise the promotion of free trade between their member states. These free trade 
blocs could be viewed as part of a global shift towards greater regional control of trade. 
International legislation has emphasised the importance of increasing collaboration 
between national supervisors and the improvement of information transferral and sharing. 
The establishment of mechanisms for the sharing of information between market 
authorities has been proposed as a central goal of international co-operation. Co- 
operation is encouraged when triggered by events such as large exposures of banks and 
firms. Such developments all assist in reducing potential credit squeezes that have 
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followed re-regulation of financial sectors. This has been previously observed in Japan4, 
Italy5 and the Nordic countries6. 
The different regulatory and supervisory structures of banks and building societies 
support the suggestion that banks and building societies should be considered separately. 
Further, it is important that reference to the time both macro-economic and regulatory 
events occurred during the sample period be made when considering changes in 
productive technology and efficiency over time. 
2.4 Changes in market structure 
During the sample period, the processes of increasing concentration and de-mutualisation 
have continued. Concentration in retail banks and building societies has increased over 
the sample period. The processes of merger and take-over have led to contraction of 
depository institution numbers, particularly in the building society sector. This 
development is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
Concentration in the industry and the market power of individual building societies can 
also affect the motivation of individual societies to minimise costs. Concentration can be 
quantified with a number of differing measures; the Herfindal-Hirschman index (or HH 
index), for example, is an index of market share calculated as the sum of the squares of 
the market shares of individual depository institutions. This measure of concentration is 
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bounded by [0,1] with one indicating pure monopoly and zero indicating an industry 
with an infinite number of firms. 
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Source: Annual Reports of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies and Annual Reports of the Building 
Societies Commission. 
Another measure of concentration is the entropy measure. This is computed as the sum of 
individual shares multiplied by the natural logarithm of the reciprocal of market share. 
This measure varies from zero for an industry with just one firm to Ln(n) (here 
approximately 6.53) for a very low levels of concentration. The change in concentration 
for total advances and deposits, measured by the HH index and entropy measures is 
displayed in Table 2.1. The levels of concentration reported are low for both deposits and 
advances in banks and building societies. The degree of concentration is greater for retail 
banks than for building societies. This result is not unexpected due to the relatively small 
number of retail banks7. Over time, a slight increase in the level of concentration is 
recorded. 
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HH Entropy Entropy 
ces Deposits Advances Deposits 
0.17 1.94 1.97 
0.15 2.09 2.09 
0.15 2.10 2.09 
0.14 2.08 2.11 
0.14 2.11 2.13 
0.13 2.13 2.15 
0.14 2.10 2.14 
0.16 2.02 2.00 
Building societies 
HH HH Entropy Entropy 
Advances Deposits Advances Deposits 
0.11 0.11 2.85 2.87 
0.10 0.11 2.82 2.81 
0.11 0.10 2.78 2.79 
0.11 0.10 2.77 2.78 
0.11 0.10 2.76 2.76 
0.15 0.15 2.53 2.54 
0.13 0.16 2.32 2.50 
The literature on the causes of differing levels of concentration in a market is both 
extensive and diverse (see chapter 6 and Gilbert, 1984, for further discussion of some of 
these issues). The central features of both the advances and deposit markets for retail 
banks and building societies are the increasing level of concentration and the low initial 
level of concentration. The increasing level of concentration observed in both markets 
may have resulted from a number of possible factors, although the changing operating 
environment may be of particular importance. Depository institutions have undergone 
substantial changes both in the form and organisation of work and technology used in the 
workplace. These shifts during the sample period may have resulted in a movement 
towards more capital-intensive production. Such a technological shift may have resulted 
in both increasing economies of scale over time and acted as a motivation for the on- 
going merger and take-over of depository institutions. The presence of shifting levels of 
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economies of scale will be considered more closely in the empirical chapters in Section 
Two. 
Possible explanations for the initial low level of concentration may be closely linked with 
the development of the operating environment and past conduct of incumbent institutions. 
Both sectors have until recently been quite closely supervised in terms of the scope of 
operation. These restrictions may have represented a substantial barrier to entry allowing 
sub-optimal behaviour by incumbents. This sub-optimal behaviour may have materialised 
as scale inefficiencies, where small incumbents may have been able to survive in an 
industry characterised by economies of scale or production inefficiencies or both. 
Clarification of and reference to both these eventualities will be made in the empirical 
chapters in Section Two. Coles (1992) and Hardwick (1996) have also provided 
discussion of concentration in the building society sector. 
In the USA, the Department of Justice merger guidelines (1992) explicitly enabled 
mergers of financial institutions to proceed unchallenged when there were possible or 
potential efficiency benefits, that may not be gained from other means (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992b). Across the globe, such `efficiency' criteria have been used as strong 
justification for mergers and take-overs involving depository financial institutions. It is 
clearly important to review the evidence at both an institutional and at a societal level. 
Commenting on the existence of economies of scale in large banks, Berger and 
Humphrey claim that " ... contrary to the claims made in the trade press and elsewhere, 
the extant academic literature on scale efficiencies in banking suggest that there are little 
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or no cost savings to be made simply by increasing bank size through mega-mergers" 
(p. 546). 
Demutualisation, either through conversion to bank status or by take-over by a bank, is a 
shift from mutual ownership to proprietary ownership. Whilst the retail banking and 
building society sectors are similar in many respects, their ownership form has been 
proposed as a possible reason for their differential performance. This view has led to 
differing approaches to both the regulation and operation of these institutions. 
2.5 The growth of new products 
The loosening of restrictions on the products that depository institutions may provide has 
increasingly blurred the distinction between banks and building societies. The regulatory 
authorities swiftly identified the beginnings of this shift. The governor of the Bank of 
England declared in 1984, " ... you will of course be well aware of the move by banks 
into the housing market, previously very much the domain of the building societies. The 
banks have also started - but with limited success - to seek to attract funds much more 
vigorously from individual savers. The building societies have responded by forays into 
what might earlier have been considered the preserve of banks, in some cases with the co- 
operation of the banks themselves". These moves occurred simultaneously with longer- 
term changes. Customers of depository institutions, including households, corporations 
and other financial institutions, may have increased their sensitivity to the differentials in 
yields from investments over time. Increasing awareness of rates of return on investments 
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after the fluctuations of interest rates in the UK since the 1970s may have driven this 
process. 
The greater awareness of the costs of other sources of finance has increased demand for 
products, such as commercial paper, mutual funds and securitised loans that are provided 
by depository institutions and by other institutions. The effect of this dis-intermediation, 
as personal investors have increasingly made use of pension funds and life insurance, has 
been a movement of savings away from traditional sources such as deposit accounts or 
building society share accounts. For example, pensions and life insurance assets as a 
percentage of total household assets increased from 39.9 per cent in 1980 to 49.9 per cent 
in 1985 and 53.7 per cent in 1990. More aggressive competition for deposits and an 
expansion of the range of products available is thought to have resulted. 
A response to dis-intermediation and economic re-regulation has been the expansion by 
banks into a broad range of non-core product areas. Banks with extensive experience and 
organisational knowledge in the sphere of assessing an individual's risk have prospered 
in a range of new markets, especially mortgages. Measurement of success in other 
product areas, such as life assurance, remains problematic, though the considerable gain 
of market share8 provides some indication of success. Assessment of performance in this 
area is further complicated by the substantial alteration in the levels of market share for 
certain products held by banks, building societies and other financial institutions. For 
example, diversification into some areas such as estate agencies turned out to be 
temporary in many cases. Change of this magnitude may be driven by a number of cost 
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considerations. In the provision of new and many more services, differing productive 
technologies may be emerging. Additionally, the provision of more services may provide 
economies of product-mix. It is important in a study of depository institutions, therefore, 
to consider both the potential economies of product-mix and changes in productive 
technology. 
2.6 Changes in the technology of service provision 
The introduction of innovations, particularly in the area of distribution, has been 
widespread. Long-term aims of this change include the establishment of unmanned 
branches, the improvement of customer information and increased quantities of customer 
services handled either through automated machinery or centralised call centres. The 
success of these innovations will very much depend on whether they are technology 
driven, like the ill-fated Prestel system of the 1980s, or market driven, like the successful 
First Direct telephone banking system. 
Branch networks have been substantially rationalised over the sample period. The 
provision of a full range of services in a broad catchment area has been posited as an aim 
of such change. Such a strategy would aim to create a hierarchy of branches defined 
through their level of service provision. This differs from the previous strategy of full 
provision of services at most branches. As part of this change, many functions previously 
performed at branches have been transferred to larger centralised and specialised centres 
of operation. Cost cutting may also be viewed as a motive for such change. 
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Rationalisation has resulted in the re-location of staff as well as increasing responsibility 
and autonomy of those within the lower-tier branches. The rationalisation of branch 
services from a network geared towards serving customer and company requirements for 
transactions and administration towards a service and more `sales' orientated approach 
has continued. This has led to the closure of branches for all the banks, which may be 
observed in Figure 2.3. 
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A similar process has occurred for most building societies with a substantial rise in the 
number of building society branches until the mid-1980s when an equally large decline in 
branch numbers was recorded. This is displayed in Figure 2.4. Rationalisation of branch 
numbers has occurred in tandem with programmes of refurbishment of branches. 
Institutions have attempted to improve the sales environment to accommodate changing 
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customer service and corporate requirements. This change is mirrored by the equally 
significant rise of alternative outlets from which banking services are provided. The rise 
in the number of automatic cash dispensers and automated teller machines (ATM's) is 
illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.4 Number of branches in UK building societies 
Source: Annual Reports of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies and Annual Reports of the Building 
Societies Commission 
The growth and greater availability of information technology has substantially reduced 
the costs of certain information-intensive activities. Traditional banking activities of 
credit rating and transactions have been particularly affected with both changes in the 
organisation and practice of work. Whilst the most information-intensive activities may 
not be within the capabilities of many competitors, the growth of computing capacity and 
statistical tools for activities such as credit rating has increased the potential for entrance 
into core product provision. 
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Figure 2.5 Number of cash dispensers and ATM's in UK retail banks 
20000 
18000 Q Yorkshire Bank 
16000   The Co-operative Bank 
14000   Clydesdale Bank 
12000 Q TSB 
10000   The Royal Bank of Scotland 
8000 ® National Westminister 
6000   Midland 
4000 Q Lloyds 
2000 Q Barclays 
0 
  Bank of Scotland 
q)" Cý Cý Cý Cý qb   Abbey National l0 ý^ b qp 
Source: Abstract of Banking Statistics The British Bankers Association: various editions. 
These changes in the technology of service provision indicate a significant change in the 
productive technology of depository institutions. The analysis of total factor productivity 
growth and technical change is deemed therefore to be important in the light of such 
developments. 
2.7 Changing labour markets 
In the early 1990s, banking was described as " ... the steel 
industry of tomorrow" due to 
its dis-equilibrium position of over-manning within an expanded branch network. An 
overall reduction of staff and the fragmentation of internal labour markets have occurred. 
The implications are widespread with a notable resurgence in re-training, particularly for 
the provision of more specialised services. Banking and building societies were until 
31 
ý: ý _. 
recently characterised by tightly defined internal labour markets and `stand-up' 
recruitment policies. In the sample period, movement towards a sector-wide labour 
market for a range of distinct skills has occurred. As functions within the institutions' 
operations become increasingly centralised, labour is increasingly recruited for specific 
functions, such as computing or insurance sales, or on an increasingly casual, part-time 
basis, working just in peak hours. The external labour market for the banking and finance 
sector has also expanded greatly. Recruitment of personnel from outside the areas of 
banking and building societies has increased, as many skills have become transferable 
across the range of financial services. 
O'Reilly (1992) bleakly elaborates the implications of such a transformation. For 
employees, " ... banking has traditionally been associated with permanent employment 
and the possibility of career progression through well-established internal labour 
markets". The previous " ... stable comfortable atmosphere 
in the banks has been shaken 
up by increasing competition and deregulation, (as) ... the introduction of 
information 
technology has had serious consequences for the restructuring of employment practices 
and the services banks, and other financial services firms, can offer. The heavy burden of 
mundane paper-work has been replaced by the use of information technology and 
computer terminals" (p. 45). 
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2.8 Conclusions 
In conclusion, changes in the market environment are likely to have had a significant 
effect on the performance of depository institutions over the sample period. The effects of 
increases in concentration, changes in market structure and differing ownership forms 
suggest that the separate treatment of retail banks and building societies is correct. 
Economies of scale and cost efficiency will be measured to assist in the assessment of 
whether increasing concentration across the sector has been driven by cost considerations 
or other criteria. Further growth of new services, shifts in labour markets for this sector 
and changes in the technology of service provision suggest that depository institutions 
have altered their productive technology. Testing for economies of product-mix, technical 
change and total factor productivity growth within the sector is therefore important. The 
macro-economic environment and regulatory and supervisory changes are significant 
exogenous effects over the sample period. Thus, it is also important to assess the 
competitiveness of depository institutions in their core markets, in light of the re- 
regulation of depository institutions. 
1 The responsibility for banking supervision was moved to the Financial Services Authority in 1998, 
following the Bank of England Act 1998, see p. 17. 
2 Trustee Saving Account holders were previously disenfranchised when building societies converted to 
bank status and paid compensation to their membership. 3 This amendment was initially suggested in the Treasury Draft Building Society Review Document, 
March, 1996. 
4 Japanese banks announced $86bn of provisions for bad and doubtful debts on March 21st, 1996. 
s The Italian government issued a $2bn rescue package for Banco di Napoli also in March, 1996. 
6 IMF estimates suggest that rescuing ailing banks has cost between 2.8 per cent and 4 per cent of the 
Nordic countries' GNP. 
7A sample of 11 retail banks was considered for all years. A sample of 99 societies was used in 1990. The 
number of societies declines over the sample period due to wastage. The number of building societies 
operating in 1996 was 76. 
8 14 per cent of the life assurance market was held by bancassurers in 1994. 
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Chapter 3 Model and variable definition 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the approaches that have been previously employed in the 
modelling of production in depository institutions. Recommendations as to what model 
forms and variables are deemed appropriate for use in the empirical studies are made. 
This chapter is also closely linked to chapters 4 and 5 where the model forms referred to 
here will be developed. In the following sections, a broad range of studies are considered. 
These studies have examined many different forms of depository institutions, including 
banks, building societies, credit unions and savings and loan associations (S & L's). 
These studies are discussed in a review of the general approaches to modelling 
production, efficiency and productivity in depository institutions. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides an introduction to the principal 
issues involved in the modelling of production in depository institutions. Sections 3.3 to 
3.8 consider model forms that have been employed in previous studies of depository 
institutions. Section 3.3 introduces and outlines the intermediation model of production 
and section 3.4 examines the principal features of the production model. Sections 3.5 and 
3.6 consider the delegated monitoring and national accounting approaches to modelling 
depository institutions, respectively. Other approaches that have been employed to model 
depository institutions are assessed in section 3.7. A summary of the differing variable 
definitions used in these models is presented in sections 3.8 to 3.11. This summary 
includes consideration of labour, deposits, loans and capital variables. Possible 
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difficulties encountered when using accounting data are discussed in section 3.12. 
Section 3.13 provides a summary of the chapter and proposes recommendations for 
model and variable definitions in the empirical chapters of the thesis. 
3.2 Production in depository institutions 
Micro and macro views of depository institutions differ. In the micro sense, a depository 
institution produces services that are sold in a marketplace. In the macro sense, 
depository institutions act as a producer of money itself. These conflicting properties 
have led to difficulties in the modelling of a depository institution's production. In an 
economy, many institutions accept or borrow funds from the public, firms and money 
markets. These funds are then essentially transformed and re-lent to borrowers at a rate of 
interest. This process, termed financial intermediation, is very widespread and performed 
by a broad range of financial institutions, firms and specialist government agencies. This 
form of intermediation is a principal and defining aspect of the production process of 
depository institutions. 
Production in depository institutions creates services as opposed to recognisable goods. 
Depository financial institutions use both physical and non-monetary inputs (i. e. physical 
capital and labour) and monetary inputs (i. e. funds from a number of sources) to produce 
services. Similarly, output consists of non-monetary services, such as the manipulation 
and administration of customers' accounts, and monetary services, such as loans 
(Hancock, 1985). 
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Due to the distinct nature of inputs and outputs and the absence of clear variable 
definitions, a wide range of approaches to modelling this production process have been 
suggested. A number of issues have arisen in the modelling of production. These include 
the lack of directly applicable data and the distinction between the depository institutions' 
functions at a micro and macro level. These issues present difficulties in the 
quantification and pricing of variables where " ... a substantial part of their (depository 
institutions') costs are incurred in providing services as partial payment for an input" 
(Sealey and Lindley, 1977, p. 1254). 
The objective function of depository institutions in most studies has been the provision of 
a range of non-monetary and monetary services at minimum cost, maximum profit or 
with the most productive use of inputs. In some studies, the objective function of certain 
institutions has been considered differently. The objective function of credit unions, for 
example, has been viewed as the maximisation of the level of service provided to 
depositors and loan holders (Fried, et al, 1993). The objective function of a depository 
institution has also been viewed as providing service and convenience to customers, 
where production is " ... the transformation of financial assets suited to the needs of 
savers into a different set of financial assets suited to the (needs of) borrowers" (Nelson, 
1985, p. 177). The objective function may also be constrained by the necessity to hold risk 
at an acceptable level. This is often achieved through the devices of loan portfolio 
diversification and minimum capital requirements. 
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3.3 The intermediation or asset approach 
In the intermediation approach to modelling production, depository institutions are 
assumed to borrow funds (deposits), which are transformed into loan funds (advances). 
The depository institution uses deposits as a raw material or intermediate product, in 
combination with non-monetary inputs (e. g. capital and labour). This input is then 
transformed into the final product. Outputs from an intermediation model could include 
loan funds and ancillary business. The model thus consists of factors of production or 
non-monetary inputs, such as labour and capital, and borrowed funds that are then re-lent. 
Thus, costs include both production costs and the attraction costs, which include interest 
costs and the costs of non-price competition. 
In a simple intermediation model, production might be viewed as a transformation of 
three input groups (capital, labour and deposits; Xl, X2, X3) into one output group (loans; 
Yl). A production correspondence could be written as: 
. 
f(yl X1. X2, X3) (3.1) 
The dual cost function would then be: 
C= 8(Y>> P1, P2, P3) (3.2) 
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Where P., is the price of capital inputs, P2 is the price of labour inputs, and P3 is the price 
of deposit inputs. This approach includes the effects of both non-monetary and monetary 
inputs. Monetary output is included (loans), whilst non-monetary output is omitted. A 
classical emphasis on the macro and dynamic changes in assets is therefore imposed. The 
definition of monetary inputs and outputs ignores the effect of retaining liquidity. 
Including the level of liquid assets in some form may be a way of overcoming such a 
problem. 
3.4 The production, value added or portfolio approach 
The intermediation approach implies that the processes used in the transformation of 
funds drive production in depository financial institutions. The production approach 
specifically incorporates the functions of the depository financial institutions. These 
functions are viewed from an operational, `technical' or `economic' perspective (Sealey 
and Lindley, 1977). Researchers who have placed a greater importance on what 
depository financial institutions directly produce have adopted this approach. Benston, 
(1972) suggested that " ... financial institutions produce services rather than readily 
identifiable physical products" (p. 320). Sealey and Lindley, stated that the " ... financial 
firm's output in a technical sense is thus a set of financial services to the firm's depositors 
(creditors) and borrowers. " (p. 1252). The provision of depository services is viewed as a 
form of production in its own right and is therefore defined as an output. 
A simple production model might be viewed as the transformation of two input groups 
(capital and labour; X1, X2) into two output groups (loans and deposits; YI, Y2). 
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Production or non-interest costs would represent total cost in such a model. A production 
correspondence could then be written as: 
f(yl, Y2,, Xj, X2) (3.3) 
and the dual cost function would be written as: 
C= 8(Yl, Y2,; PI, P2) (3.4) 
This approach uses non-monetary inputs and ignores the effect of monetary inputs. 
Monetary and non-monetary outputs are included. The relationship between the 
production and intermediation approaches to modelling depository institution production 
is outlined in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 The relationship between the production and intermediation approaches 
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3.5 National accounting measures 
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Colwell and Davis (1992) propose the use of national accounting measures to model the 
production of depository institutions. These accounts " ... seek to measure the value 
added by different sectors of the economy, reflecting in turn the profits and income from 
employment arising in each sector" (p. 112). Significant problems with this approach 
include the movement of the focus of analysis away from the firm to the sector and not 
fully incorporating the costs of attracting funds. Both these omissions could result in 
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significant model mis-specification. Other criticisms could include the difficulties of 
variable definition and the use of aggregate data. The use of aggregate industry level data 
commonly produced by national accounts may also be open to criticism. By comparing 
industries to gain relative efficiencies only very general structural measures of efficiency 
are approximated. Such measures are limited for intra-industry and firm level analysis. 
3.6 Delegated monitoring 
The delegated monitoring framework for incorporating risk in the measurement of 
production characteristics is attributed to Diamond (1984). A depository institution 
making loans has to monitor debtors both at inception and for the duration of the contract 
to reduce the potential for loan default. As intermediation is victim to imperfect 
information about potential customers, the costs of monitoring a debtor are real. The 
production of depository services allows for the collection of information on both 
individual debtors and a large number of debtors in the broader economy. The gross costs 
of assessing risk and acquiring information may be reduced through the use of deposit 
provision to assess potential customers before the provision of loans (i. e. by holding 
records of a customers' deposit account, their future behaviour may be assessed more 
clearly). Thus a"... financial intermediary must choose an incentive contract such that it 
has incentives to monitor the information, make proper use of it and make sufficient 
payments to depositors to attract deposits" (Diamond, 1984, p. 395). The process of 
intermediation, therefore, necessitates the viability and continued provision of deposit 
services by the financial institution. Important aspects to be included in the modelling of 
41 
this conception of the production process of depository institutions include the analysis of 
incentives to depositors, expected returns from debtors beyond monitoring costs and the 
presence of `dead-weight penalties' in production. 
Attempts to incorporate aspects of delegated monitoring in studies of production in 
depository institutions have been fragmented and piecemeal. Aspects of depository 
institution behaviour include the level of diversification of loan providers. Diversification 
reduces the risk of individual contracts and for the institution as a whole. This capture of 
information allows a cheaper provision of loans and a reduction in the amount of 
resources dedicated to monitoring individual contracts. This conception of a depository 
institution suggests a model in which loans and deposits are joint products or at least 
strong cost complements. Loans and deposits are thus viewed as outputs from the 
production process, with similarities to the production approach. McAllister and 
McManus (1993) include aspects of such an approach in their study. They suggest that 
the reduction of risk is an integral part of the bank production process. Proxies for risk 
include the size of the institution, the financial portfolio and the level of diversification 
displayed within the balance sheet of individual banks. Deposit pricing improvements 
have been assisted by the work of Barnett (1978) and Fixler and Zieschang (1992) who 
have focused upon the development of opportunity, rental or `user' costs of deposits. 
These measures contain an element, which incorporates the costs of adapting to risk. 
Monitoring of the firm and the development of relationships between groups involved in 
depository institution production are generally long-term. Such time effects may 
therefore have real ramifications for contemporary costs. 
42 
3.7 Other models 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) assume perfect capital markets, thereby disputing the 
raison d'etre of depository institutions and emphasising their lack of importance within 
the wider economy. This approach assumes that the " ... average costs of capital to any 
firm is completely independent of its capital stream and is equal to the capitalisation rate 
of a pure equity capital stream of its class" (p. 268). The capital asset pricing model 
assumes that maximising their portfolios' rates of return and minimising variance 
determine the financial firms' optimal outputs. Saunders and Ward (1976) used such a 
model to analysis British banks between 1965 and 1975. Normality in the distribution of 
rates of return was assumed. Inputs were viewed as exogenously determined in a perfect 
capital market, reducing the expected performance to a calculation of the utility function. 
3.8 Variable Definition: deposit pricing 
In the following section, the definition of variables used in models of production are 
considered, with emphasis placed on the definition of variables for use in cost functions. 
The rationale for this decision is discussed in greater detail in chapter 5. Variable 
definitions to be used in Section Two will be made on the criteria of what appropriate 
model formats require, the function of the variable within the production process, 
approaches that have been adopted in previous studies and what is practical considering 
issues of data availability and format. 
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Different model forms have considered deposits both as inputs and as outputs. To 
represent deposits as an output, a number of differing variables have been used. These 
definitions have often emphasised the role played by deposits in the production process. 
Deposits are often viewed as a service the depository institution performs to attract funds 
and potential customers and are frequently offered as a free service or at a nominal price. 
Deposits are also essential for depository institution production, enabling both fund 
creation and the assessment of customers for potential lending. The benefits of deposit 
provision for the bank may therefore be seen as a source of funds and the improved credit 
rating of individuals to assist in the bank's lending business. 
These perspectives of the role of deposits enable two definitions to be suggested. First, 
the value of deposits would provide an output measure that would emphasis the 
importance of deposits as a source of funds. Secondly, by considering the number of 
deposit accounts the function of deposits as a screening device for customers would be 
stressed. Both these definitions have been used as output proxies in previous studies. 
The benefits customers gain from deposits may differ from those gained by depository 
financial institutions. A customer uses deposits for purposes of safely holding money. 
Deposits are used as convenient platforms from which transactions are made. Since the 
1950s, a concerted shift has occurred towards making payments of salaries and wages 
through bank current accounts. This has reinforced the broader social function of this 
form of banking service. The provision of records to customers is a principal form of 
asset and liability accounting for individuals with huge benefits for customers. A limited 
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amount of research has attempted to incorporate these broader social benefits. Deposit 
services have been measured as the quantity of depositors serviced. This approach 
considers deposit output as a distinct `activity' relating to what the bank does in terms of 
providing for customers. Other aspects that have been considered include the individual 
product characteristics or hedonic attributes to provide a measure of customer-related 
output from deposits. 
As previously stated, deposits have also been used as an input in production and cost 
models. To model the price of deposits, a number of definitions have been employed. 
Murray and White (1983) suggested the interest paid on demand deposits divided by the 
average dollar quantity of demand deposits as an `effective' interest rate or price of 
deposits. Clark (1984) suggested that interest on deposits measured in terms of total 
interest paid on deposits divided by the asset sum of loan funds produced would be an 
appropriate measure. The use of the deposit interest rate as a measure of deposit price has 
been used by a number of researchers. 
A range of other amendments may be proposed that incorporate features of deposits such 
as product diversity and the relationship between deposits and other outputs. Mester 
(1991) uses the interest rate paid on deposits net of service charges for a range of specific 
savings products, NOW accounts, passbook accounts and accounts earning in excess of 
the normal rate for deposits to represent the costs of deposits. This approach attempts to 
accommodate the differing cost structures and distinct turnovers of different types of 
savings products, which may be affected by distinct benefits, regulations and conditions. 
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Yue (1992) breaks the costs of bank deposits into costs that are considered `transactional' 
and `non-transactional'. Transactional deposit costs include interest expenses (for federal 
funds, the purchase and sale of securities, interest on demand notes and other borrowed 
funds). Non-transactional deposit expenses relate to the provision of depository services. 
Mester (1996) in a study of US banks includes the costs of loan capital (subordinate 
liabilities) and federal funds as additional components of deposit cost. The approach 
attempts to accommodate for funds provided from a number of sources. 
Other measures of deposit cost have focused upon the opportunity costs of money. The 
US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) defines the opportunity cost of money as the 
effective interest charged on loans. This crude statistic was developed by the United 
Nations Statistical Office (UNSO) to consider the opportunity cost of money. This is 
viewed as the average of the rate charged for loans and paid for deposits (Fixier and 
Zieschang, 1992). 
3.9 Capital prices 
The definition of the cost and price of capital has been problematic principally due to a 
lack of directly applicable data. The differing formats of data sources for different types 
of institutions have produced a broad range of distinct measures. This has led to 
inconsistencies and difficulties in the comparison of studies of both distinct types of 
depository institutions and depository institutions operating in different countries. 
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In defining the price of capital, many studies have used a crude division of the total 
capital expenditure of the institution by a measure of scale for the institution. This 
measure has been the basis for most capital price measures used in the literature, with 
many variants of this measure proposed. A potential problem with this definition is that 
the price of capital is related to the scale of the institution. This can result in bias, as 
larger firms tend to produce relatively lower capital prices. 
The most `common' measure of the price of capital used in previous studies may be 
written as: 
Price of Capital = cost of capitalltotal fixed assets (3.5) 
Studies of UK building societies have employed a number of proxies to represent the 
price of capital. Hardwick (1989,1990) used annual expenditure on office 
accommodation and equipment, plus a measure for depreciation, divided by mean assets. 
Drake (1992) considered the charge for office accommodation and other expenditure, 
including depreciation, as the measure of capital cost, divided by the net book value of 
fixed assets. 
For the savings and loan sector, a similar range of measures has been used. Mester (1987, 
1991) suggested the sum of the costs of rent, depreciation, utilities and expenditure on 
equipment and furniture (the sum of capital expenditure) divided by the average dollar of 
deposits held within the study year. Le Compte and Smith (1990) followed a similar 
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procedure by dividing capital expenditure by the total fixed assets held by the firm. 
Hermalin and Wallace (1994) used the number of branches or the average value of equity 
capital for the denominator in place of total fixed assets. Such a measure is limited to use 
in proprietary or branching institutions. 
US banking studies have also provided a broad array of measures. Grabowski et al (1993) 
suggested capital expenses divided by the book value of the banks' total assets as an 
appropriate measure of capital price. Clark (1984) defines the capital price as capital 
expenses divided by the banks' net book value of total assets minus a level of 
depreciation of physical capital. The rented cost of a square foot of office space for a 
specified geographic area of operation was used by Gilligan et al (1984). Lawrence 
(1989) suggested that the average retail cost per hour for use of a central processing unit 
(CPU) multiplied by the average number of weekly CPU hours used by the bank, 
multiplied by fifty-two, provided an original annual figure for the capital price. 
Studies of non-US banking differ in the measure of scale used as a denominator of 
physical capital expenses. Kim and Weiss (1989) use the area of office space used by the 
institution as a measure of institution scale. Dietsche (1993) considered the quantity of 
borrowed funds, and Mulder and Sassenou (1993) proposed the size of `physical capital' 
as an appropriate measure of scale. Further developments were suggested by Glass and 
McKillop (1991) who used the book value of net bank premises, furniture and fixtures as 
a scale measure in their definition of a capital price. A distinctive feature of the time 
series study by Glass and McKillop (1992) was the use of a capital expense measure 
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derived for the analysis of the Canadian telecommunications sector over time by Denny 
et al (1981). This measure views capital expenses as the aggregation of occupancy and 
equipment costs, deflated by a weighted average of prices for buildings and equipment. 
The definition of this weighted average of prices attempts to accommodate for the 
opportunity costs of capital in relation to other forms of investment. 
3.10 Labour price 
The definition of the price of labour is an area of consensus in most of the studies 
reviewed. The most commonly used measure is an aggregate of wages, salaries and 
benefits paid to employees of the institution divided by the number of full-time 
equivalent employees. This measure has been used by most of the studies reviewed, 
although a number of minor amendments to this definition have been proposed. This 
measure again is defined with reference to what variable definition is possible in relation 
to the data available. 
Building society studies have predominantly used wages, salaries and other benefits 
divided by the number of full time equivalent employees (see Hardwick, 1989,1990, 
Drake, 1992, Drake and Weyman-Jones, 1996). Non-US banking studies (e. g. Dietsche, 
1993 and Muldur and Sassenou, 1993) have also used this proxy. Kim and Weiss (1989) 
included the cost of computer services in addition to labour costs in their measure. US 
banking studies have used similar measures. 
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Some savings and loan association (S & L's) studies have used proxies, which are 
distinct from those previously suggested. Mester (1987,1991) employed a weighted 
average of wage rates within counties of operation of the S& L's as a measure of labour 
price, though Mester (1993) does not use this approach, employing instead the quarterly 
average labour expense divided by the number of full-time equivalent employees. All 
these measures exclude any distinctions between types of workers. 
3.11 Output measures 
Output definition has been a primary problem in the analysis of depository institutions. 
Previous attempts to define output have often been steered as much by the limitations of 
the tools of analysis and data availability as by theoretical considerations. Initially, single 
output production measures were employed in empirical studies. As the sophistication of 
the tools of analysis developed, the use of multiple output measures has become 
common. Examples of single product models include output proxied by an overall 
measure such as total assets or earning assets. These measures are reliant on assumptions 
of homogeneity and the rejection of real differences in costs between distinct outputs in 
multi-product production. Benston (1972), employing an alternative approach, recognised 
the multi-product aspects of bank production by estimating separate production functions 
for the principal products produced by the bank. 
A third approach has been to create output indices enabling a number of outputs to be 
incorporated within the measure. Longbrake and Haslem (1975) employed a weighted 
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index of output, constructed from the number of accounts, the account size and the 
number of offices of the bank. These three factors were aggregated to represent aspects of 
firm or `plant' size, the type of customer and individual firm structure. Clark (1984) 
describes such a procedure where the " ... weights employed are usually 
determined by 
the regressing of bank revenue from interest earning assets against the composition of 
earning assets, ... thus the resulting index represents total revenue from earning assets 
adjusted for any inter-bank price differences which may arise from the existence of 
imperfect markets for bank output" (p. 54). This approach moves closer to modelling 
multi-product behaviour. Clark creates three such derived measures. The first measure is 
produced by regressing revenue on the gross sum of earning assets held by individual 
banks. The second approach measures output by regressing revenue on lending and non- 
lending income. This measure is therefore comparable with the first measure plus the 
difference between total operating income and operating income from lending. The third 
measure of output proposed by Clarke is the sum of total earning assets. 
The definition of output in a multi-product cost study is related to our previous discussion 
of model definition. The actual variables used in previous studies do vary significantly in 
terms of the number of outputs considered and the measure used to represent the quantity 
of this output. In practice, the number of outputs is a function of model specification and 
the access to data. Whilst some databases provide breakdowns of quantities of products 
produced or services provided (such as the Functional Cost Analysis programme in the 
USA), most data is presented in an aggregated form from company accounts. Availability 
is affected by the nationality of the study and the sector considered. For example, Hunter 
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and Timme (1995) used a FCA data set in a study of US banks: the outputs included 
wholesale loans, average dollar balances of commercial loans, industrial loans, security 
loans, the average dollar balance of credit cards and personal loans, real estate loans to 
agriculture and other real estate loans, and off-balance sheet activities proxied by the 
income produced from loan sales, letters of credit, securitisation, swaps and clearing 
services received on transaction and non-transaction accounts. Hardwick (1990), using 
UK building society accounts data, employed the number of outstanding mortgage loans 
and the number of share deposit accounts. This difference in the level of detail is a major 
difference of the non-US bank studies, conducted in countries where data is less freely 
available. This difference is compounded by the greater degree of contractual 
heterogeneity observed in loan products, where variation in output may also occur due to 
the format of data. 
As previously stated, the definition of output, in common with the definition of capital 
and labour prices, has been an area where development has been severely restrained by 
limitations in the data availability and construction. In contrast to the definition of input 
prices, a significant development in the definition of output has occurred. 
The hedonic attributes approach to modelling depository institution production 
emphasises possible differences that may exist between the individual productive 
technologies of firms. As the activities that depository institutions undertake may incur 
differing costs, it is assumed that the quality of the outputs produced may vary or be 
heterogeneous. 
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The measurement of different qualities and attributes for depository and loan products 
has been incorporated in a range of studies. Fried et al (1993) uses a variety of proxies to 
represent hedonic attributes, Flannery (1983) employs the public consideration of 
services and Nelson (1985) applies the location of branches relative to customers. Shaffer 
(1993) considers hedonic attributes as qualitatively determined differences in bank 
operations which include differing funding strategies, deposit mix, average deposit size, 
off-balance sheet activities, asset quality, target clientele, asset mix and average loan size. 
Thus the potential hedonic attributes that could be considered are both numerous and 
diverse in form. Overall, in previous studies, most attributes considered are related to the 
type of service provided, the provision of liquidity by a product, observable by the 
provision of withdrawal services, and the terms and conditions of the product. Such 
attributes should have a noticeable effect on the costs of operation for depository 
financial institutions. 
Fried et al (1993) in a study of US credit unions provides a good example of this 
modelling approach. The hedonic attributes used in this study include the number and 
level of services provided. Proxies are used to measure components of quantity, price and 
variety of service relating to both loan and deposit services. Variety aspects are quantified 
through consideration of a range of factors. Other attributes used in similar studies have 
included the number of loan or deposit products offered by individual institutions, the 
number of products or services offered or combinations of the above. Nelson (1985) 
includes the costs of transportation for the customer to the nearest branch, the time taken 
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to cash and clear cheques and the amount of information required for customer decision- 
making. Such aspects of production may affect the true cost function of the institution. 
Branch level cost functions are defined to amend for these potential difficulties. This 
approach can be seen to be increasingly applicable for output definition for cost functions 
in depository financial institutions. 
3.12 Problems with accounting data 
The information taken from company accounts, as used in this thesis and most non-US 
studies, poses certain difficulties. The changing regulation of accounting practice and 
difficulties in the translation of `true and fair' may reduce the accuracy, objectivity and 
consistency of data. Other problems could include the shifting data format and 
regulations affecting information disclosure. More generally, the form of data produced 
by accountants places its primary emphasis on bookable, tangible, concrete historical 
values. This emphasis may conflict with the economic interpretations of models 
employing this data. Annual accounts may place a greater degree of emphasis on the 
legal, as opposed to economic, position of the firm, often for `cosmetic' reasons. Such 
information is produced according to regulatory requirements and as a method of 
quantifying explicit, verifiable, market transactions. This formulation of value is 
divergent from the broader conception of value accorded and desired by economists who 
require information on both explicit and implicit market transactions. The emphasis on 
historical values as opposed to opportunity cost and market values of activities and 
resources could possibly produce problems. 
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3.13 Conclusions 
In this chapter, basic model forms and variables applied in previous studies have been 
reviewed. The discussion of the different approaches to modelling bank production is 
central to providing a broader understanding of efficiency and productivity. The 
production and intermediation approaches appear to represent most clearly, an economic 
interpretation of production. Both these approaches provide a relevant economic and 
distinct representation of production. As no substantial advantage may be seen in 
employing one of the model approaches in isolation, both will be employed in the 
empirical study of economies of scale and product mix in UK retail banking (chapter 7). 
By determining the level of fit and compliance with established cost and production 
theory, a choice between these models will be made for use in other empirical studies, 
acknowledging the limited breadth of these criteria for choosing between models. 
Drawing from some of the other approaches outlined, risk and liquidity are included in 
some of the empirical chapters to investigate their potential impact on the depository 
institution production process. 
A measure of the price of capital should quantify how much it costs a depository 
institution to employ an amount of capital in the production process. A number of issues 
surround this definition. First, why should the price of capital vary between institutions 
and secondly, what are the factors that determine this variation, if it exists. A third issue 
is what would be an appropriate model for representing differences in capital prices in the 
UK. 
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The UK is quite small geographically and fairly homogeneous in terms of prices. Whilst 
it could be assumed that a constant value for the price of capital could exist for such a 
market, a number of factors could influence capital price. Small but noticeable variation 
in capital prices exists in the UK. For example, land and building prices for a building 
society located in the South East, a prosperous and highly populated area, would be 
expected to be higher than those in mid-Wales, a sparsely populated area with an 
emphasis on primary production. The cost of funding capital projects may also vary 
between institutions where larger institutions may be able to gain better terms for 
financing capital investments. A degree of capital price variation is therefore expected. 
The derivation of an appropriate model for representing the price of capital raises a 
number of issues. What factors should be included in such a model? Will the estimated 
price of capital represent only this price and not, for example, display the variation in the 
efficiency of capital use across the industry? Additionally, an optimal model would 
consider the price of capital as a current economic cost or opportunity cost, as opposed to 
a historical accounting cost. To conclude, the use of appropriate and developed models to 
estimate the price of capital, for models of production in depository institutions, has been 
limited. The study by Glass and McKillop (1992), which considered a user cost measure 
of capital, is one of the few studies to consider the capital price on the lines outlined. In 
common with the more advanced methods of deposit pricing, such as the user cost 
methods outlined by Barnett (1978), this approach emphasises the opportunity cost of 
- capital. 
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The price of labour has been represented in most other studies of depository institutions 
as the total labour cost divided by the number of employees. This measure may mis- 
represent the `true' level of labour price amongst depository institutions and through 
considering the aggregate cost of labour removes any consideration of the distribution of 
wages amongst employees. This approach thus removes any analysis of who is being paid 
what to do a certain task. Such a generalisation may again lead to the possible mis- 
specification in the final model as a blunt definition of labour price may pick up what 
could be deemed inefficiency if a `better' or alternative proxy of labour price was 
employed. 
A problem with all price proxies that use a measure of assets or institutional size is that 
price may be affected by the size of the institutions considered. As the size rises, the 
denominator grows and the proxied price may fall, resulting in possible mis-specification. 
Lower prices for larger firms are a particular problem in the analysis of holding 
companies. While the entire holding company may be required for analysis to reduce 
local mis-specification of efficiency, the additional activities undertaken by a larger firm 
may skew the price measures. 
Another general problem that presents difficulties in the definition of variables has been 
the rapid expansion in the number of products offered by depository institutions. As re- 
regulation has continued throughout the 1990s, depository financial institutions in many 
countries have offered an expanded range of services. This phenomenon of increasingly 
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differentiated products produced by multi-product depository financial institutions has 
been deemed to be of importance to the US Congress. The Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve system is required to report annually on the availability of retail banking 
services and fees provided and charged by S& L's and commercial banks (US Congress, 
1989, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, section 1002). 
Analysis of these reports (Hannan, 1994) has suggested that not only do the services 
provided and fees charged vary significantly between S& L's and commercial banks. 
Significant variation also occurs between individual S& L's and commercial banks in the 
range of services provided. 
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Chapter 4 Previous studies of efficiency and productivity in depository institutions 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews a number of empirical studies of cost efficiency, technical change 
and productivity in depository institutions. The chapter is closely linked with chapters 3 
and 5. In chapter 3 the model forms referred to in this chapter are considered in more 
depth. In chapter 5, many of the approaches and assumptions made by the studies 
reviewed here are outlined in detail. In this chapter, previous studies on the 
characteristics of efficiency and measures of productivity and technical change are 
reviewed. Data sets, methods of estimation and model specifications are surveyed and the 
empirical evidence is assessed in light of the approaches and methods used. 
The chapter is structured in the following manner. Section 4.2 reviews studies of the UK 
building society sector. Sections 4.3,4.4 and 4.5 outline the principal studies of non-US 
banks, savings and loan associations (S & L's) and credit unions respectively. Studies of 
US banking, which provide the bulk of the literature on depository institutions, are 
reviewed in section 4.6. A summary of the chapter and conclusions are presented in 
section 4.7. 
4.2 Building society studies 
The building society studies included in this survey are all from the UK and Australia 
and, as with most studies of different countries, variations in the regulatory systems make 
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direct comparisons of the results difficult. The main function of building societies in both 
countries is to smooth the passage of funds from household savers to borrowers who wish 
to acquire long-term mortgage loans for house purchase secured on property. In the UK, 
since the Building Societies Act (1986), some of the mutual building societies have been 
engaging in new activities, such as money transmission services, unsecured lending, and 
estate agency and insurance business, and have been allowed to raise a proportion of their 
funds from wholesale sources. As discussed in chapter 2, some UK societies have also 
taken up the option provided for in the 1986 Act to convert to PLC status and so become 
banks. Indeed, the industry has been characterised by two interrelated structural 
developments: a decline in the number of societies (through mergers and conversions) 
and an increase in the degree of market concentration. These changes have acted as a spur 
to research into the efficiency of UK building societies. In Australia, research into the 
performance of permanent building societies has been undertaken under quite different 
industrial conditions. During the 1970s permanent building societies operated within a 
fairly relaxed state-based regulatory system. These regulatory conditions placed 
permanent building societies in an advantageous position relative to Australian banks, 
which were subject to quite strict central bank control. Re-regulation of banking in 
Australia in the early 1980s helped to eliminate this advantage. This process of equalising 
the regulatory conditions of Australian banks and building societies continued with 
stricter building society regulations introduced in 1990. 
Of the UK studies, a number of approaches have been used to estimate inefficiencies. 
These include simple linear regression (Gough, 1979); the estimation of a translog cost 
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function and its variants (Hardwick, 1989,1990, Drake, 1992 and McKillop and Glass, 
1994); non-parametric DEA techniques (Field, 1990, Drake and Weyman-Jones, 1992 
and Piesse and Townsend, 1995) and a comparison of DEA and stochastic frontier 
techniques (Drake and Weyman-Jones, 1996). Data were obtained for all of these studies 
principally from annual reports and accounts, with some additional statistics provided by 
the Building Societies Association and the Building Societies Commission. In general, 
variations in the datasets and the models used have led to a mixed set of results. 
An early UK study was undertaken by Gough (1979) who used data for 1972 and 1977 
and found no significant relationship between assets and average management expenses 
to test for evidence of economies of scale. However, Hardwick (1989,1990) did find 
evidence of economies of scale. Using an intermediation model with a single output 
variable, Hardwick (1989) used a sample of 97 building societies in 1985 to estimate a 
translog cost function jointly with derived input cost share equations and found 
significant `augmented' economies of scale for societies with assets of less than £280 
million and significant augmented diseconomies of scale for societies with assets in 
excess of £1,500 million. In a later paper, but using the same dataset, Hardwick (1990) 
undertook the first multiproduct study of UK building societies, using the production 
approach and estimating a translog cost function with two outputs (measured by the 
number of outstanding mortgage accounts and the number of outstanding share and 
deposit accounts) and two inputs (labour and capital). This time, significant overall 
economies of scale were found for societies with assets up to £5,500 million with 
constant costs for larger societies. Hardwick (1990) also found evidence of product- 
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specific economies of scale for both outputs and diseconomies of scope for societies with 
assets up to £1,500 million. In both studies, Hardwick found that economies attributable 
to the employment of labour were greater than those attributable to the employment of 
any other input. 
Drake (1992) also estimated a multiproduct translog cost function for 76 building 
societies with 1988 data using an intermediation approach. He found only small 
economies of scale for one asset group (societies with assets of between £120 million and 
£500 million) and constant returns to scale elsewhere. Further, he found no evidence of 
economies of scope. Using the same data, Drake (1995) developed an expense preference 
model and this time found no evidence of either economies of scale or scope in the 
industry. Clearly, the question of whether economies of scale and scope exist in the UK 
building society industry is an issue still to be resolved. 
McKillop and Glass (1994) estimated a hybrid translog cost function with an 
intermediation approach. The data, used in the study was taken from annual reports for 89 
building societies in 1991. The average cost function estimated suggested constant 
economies of scale and diseconomies of scope were present. McKillop and Glass also 
developed their cost model to test for the impact of the geographic focus of branch 
networks on economies of scale and scope. A variable was employed to represent the 
differing geographical focus in operations of individual building societies. The building 
society sample was subdivided into three groups, which had either a national, regional or 
local branch network. It was reported that the geographic focus of the branch network has 
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a significant influence on both the economies of scale and economies of scope of UK 
building societies. 
The three DEA studies of UK building societies (Field, 1990, Drake and Weyman-Jones, 
1992, and Piesse and Townsend, 1995) all used separate datasets and produced very 
different results. Field used a sample of 205 building societies in 1981 in a production 
model and estimated that only 14 per cent of the societies in the sample were 
productively efficient: it was concluded that the disparities in inefficiency levels between 
societies were attributable to differing levels of managerial incompetence, rather than 
scale. Drake and Weyman-Jones used the same sample as Drake (1992,1995) in an 
intermediation model and found that about 37 per cent of the societies were efficient, 
with about 61 per cent exhibiting pure technical efficiency and 41 per cent exhibiting 
scale efficiency. Piesse and Townsend constructed five separate models with different 
objective functions for a sample of 57 building societies in 1992. In their first model, 
which followed the production approach (unusually using profit as a single output 
measure), only six societies were on the efficient frontier and for those not on the 
frontier, the major factor was scale inefficiency: 77 per cent of the sample were found to 
be operating with decreasing returns to scale and 14 per cent with increasing returns. The 
other models followed the intermediation approach, but differed in respect of the 
included output and input variables. In these models, a much higher proportion of the 
societies were found to be both technically and scale efficient. 
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Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996) used both, non-parametric DEA techniques and a 
translog stochastic frontier approach to estimate scale, technical and allocative 
inefficiencies. They used 1988 data for 46 UK building societies and employed an 
intermediation model. Using the non-parametric DEA technique, they found considerable 
variability in inefficiencies across the building societies in the sample, with allocative 
inefficiency dominating technical and scale inefficiencies. The cost frontier results, on 
the other hand, suggested very little allocative or technical inefficiency and constant 
returns to scale at the mean. However, the efficiency ranking provided by the two 
approaches were found to be remarkably similar. 
Of the three Australian studies of building societies, Crapp (1982) estimated a series of 
separate Cobb-Douglas (log-linear) cost functions for each year from 1976 to 1980. The 
more recent study by Esho and Sharpe (1995) used pooled time-series and cross-section 
data (for 20 building societies from 1974 to 1990) to estimate a dynamic multiproduct 
translog cost function with an associated input share equation. Worthington (1998) used a 
stochastic frontier model of building society production. 
Crapp found evidence of economies of scale in New South Wales permanent building 
societies, but observed marginal decreases in the magnitude of the scale economies over 
the period of the study. Esho and Sharpe's pooled model had the advantage that it 
allowed technical change to be incorporated into the analysis. They estimated a dynamic 
cost function, which allowed the adjustment costs incurred in moving from one 
equilibrium position to another, to be taken into account. Their results indicated that the 
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adjustment of costs to their long-run levels was in fact quite fast, with over 80 per cent of 
the total adjustment occurring in the first period. Finally, they found evidence of small 
economies of scale for small building societies and diseconomies of scale for large 
societies. 
Worthington (1998) estimated a translog stochastic frontier for 22 Australian building 
societies between 1992 and 1995. Quarterly data from the Australian Financial 
Institutions Commission was employed with an intermediation model specification. A 
truncated normal distribution of firm-specific inefficiency is assumed. Six explanatory 
variables were included in the model, including total assets, total capital, the number of 
branches and agencies, a time trend dummy and total commercial loans held. Average 
inefficiency was shown to decline throughout the sample period from 0.239 in 1993 to 
0.120 in 1995. Worthington suggested that both the number of branches and agencies and 
increased asset size had a substantial effect on the level of prevailing inefficiency 
Some preliminary conclusions may be drawn from this review of building society studies. 
It is suggested that the model form employed in efficiency studies appears to have a 
substantial effect on the results estimated. The sample period also appears to affect the 
estimates. Studies employing cross-sections of data from different years yield different 
sets of results, as would be expected in a developing commercial sector. Finally, the size 
and market share of building societies may have an effect in the determination of 
efficiency characteristics. 
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4.3 Non-US bank studies 
Cost efficiency studies of non-US banks include studies of Australia (Edgar et al, 1971); 
Israel (Kim and Weiss, 1989); Japan (Tachibanaki et al, 1991; Fukuyama, 1993; and 
McKillop et al, 1994); Ireland (Glass and McKillop, 1991 and Lucey, 1993); France 
(Dietsche, 1993); the Nordic countries (Berg et al, 1993); Germany (Lang and Welzel, 
1996); Italy (Resti, 1997, Favero and Papi, 1995); Canada (Nathan and Neave, 1992); 
Greece (Pavloppoulos and Kouzelis, 1990, Karafolas and Mantakis, 1996); Finland, 
(Kolari and Zardkoohi, 1992, Zardkoohi and Kolari, 1994); Allen and Rai (1996) 
estimated a global cost function from banks operating in fifteen countries; and a 
comparison of European countries was provided by Altunbas and Molyneux (1996). The 
majority of the researchers have estimated multiproduct translog cost functions. 
Exceptions are Edgar et al (1971) who estimated a Cobb-Douglas cost function, Berg et 
al (1993), Fukuyama (1993) who used a non-parametric DEA technique, Lucey (1993) 
who estimated a translog profit function, and McKillop et al (1994) who estimated a 
composite cost function. 
For Australia, Edgar et al (1971) estimated a single-product Cobb-Douglas cost function 
using a sample of 8 banks over the period 1947-68 and found evidence of economies of 
scale for seven of the banks. In a later study for Israel, Kim and Weiss (1989) estimated a 
multiproduct translog cost function for 17 banks between 1979 and 1982 and found 
evidence of large and statistically significant economies of scale for both small and large 
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banks: these economies were considered to be the main causes of total factor productivity 
growth observed during the period. 
For Japan, the three studies, that were reviewed, gave similar results. Using a sample of 
61 banks between 1985 and 1987, Tachibanaki et al (1991) estimated a two-output 
translog cost function and found evidence of economies of scale for all banks in all three 
years, but evidence of cost complementarities only in 1986 and 1987. Fukuyama (1993) 
employed an intermediation model, in a DEA study of 145 banks, found average 
technical inefficiency equal to 0.86, and evidence of slight economies of scale but no 
evidence of economies of scope. McKillop et al (1994) used a composite cost function 
model, originally suggested by Pulley and Braunstein (1992), which combined a log- 
quadratic input price structure with a quadratic output structure. Following an 
`intermediation' approach in a three-output, three-input model, they found evidence of 
economies of scale, but no evidence of economies or diseconomies of scope. 
For Ireland, Glass and McKillop (1991) used a multiproduct translog model with two 
outputs and two inputs for the period 1972-90. They found no evidence of economies of 
scale, and while diseconomies of scope were reported in the earlier part of the time 
period, significant economies of scope were found in the late 1980s. Lucey (1993) used 
17 Irish banks over the period 1988-91 to estimate a profit function to measure technical 
and allocative inefficiency. Technical inefficiency was reported to be 0.83 or 83 per cent, 
dominating allocative inefficiency which was estimated to be 0.18 or 18 per cent. Lucey 
also reported evidence of economies of scope. 
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For France, Dietsche (1993) estimated a four-output, three-input translog model using 
data for 345 French banks in 1987. Evidence of economies of scale for both small and 
large banks, and cost complementarities between deposits and loans, long-term 
investments and inter-bank activities, and loans and inter-bank activities were reported. 
For the Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland and Norway, Berg et al (1993) used samples 
of 126 Swedish, 503 Finnish and 130 Norwegian banks in a non-parametric DEA study. 
The authors compared the relative efficiency of the three countries' banks using two 
models, one with constant returns to scale and one with variable returns to scale. In both 
models, they found that most banks in Finland were relatively inefficient, but they 
reported similar efficiency results for Swedish and Norwegian banks. Of the banks on the 
efficiency frontier, the greatest proportion were resident in Sweden. 
The study of German co-operative banks by Lang and Welzel (1996) used both fixed and 
random effects one-way component panel data models (panel data models are considered 
in more detail in chapters 5,7 and 9). A translog functional form specification of 
productive technology is applied with a sample of 757 Bavarian co-operative banks from 
1989 to 1992. Statistically significant economies of scale and product mix are reported 
for both the fixed and random effects models. Product mix economies were reported with 
both economies of scope and expansion-path sub-additivity measures. Negative technical 
change and significant cost efficiencies are observed over the sample period. 
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Resti (1997) used a panel sample of 270 Italian banks to estimate cost efficiency with 
both econometric and non-parametric methods. A production model was employed. Resti 
suggested that inefficiency in Italian banks may exist at levels of approximately 68 per 
cent for a non-parametric constant returns model and 75 per cent with a non-parametric 
variable returns model. The econometric model also indicated that a high level of 
inefficiency existed. These levels of efficiency reduced slightly over time (from 69.4 per 
cent in 1988 to 69.8 per cent in 1992), across geographic area (the highest and lowest 
efficiency scores are recorded for the north-west and centre of Italy respectively) and 
across asset size. A high correlation existed between the results from the econometric and 
non-parametric models. Favoro and Papi (1995) used a non-parametric DEA approach 
with a number of models, including production and intermediation specifications, to 
analyse a sample of 174 Italian banks from 1991. Large banks were seen to be more 
efficient than smaller banks, whilst banks from southern Italy were less efficient than 
those from outside this area. 
Nathan and Neave (1992) used a translog cost function to analyse economies of scale and 
cost complementarities with both production and an intermediation models. Data was 
used from the Federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions on 
approximately 60 Canadian banks was used for the sample period 1983 - 87. Slight 
economies of scale were found with the production model and constant economies were 
estimated using the intermediation model of bank production. It was suggested that these 
findings implied that " ... Canada's concentrated banking system exploits and exhausts 
available sources of scale economies and cost complementarities. Hence mergers and 
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acquisitions that lead to concentrated financial systems may not imply any substantial 
increases in costs" (p. 272). 
Pavloppoulos and Kouzelis (1990) employed a translog cost function approach to 
estimate long-run marginal costs of deposit and loan production for a single Greek bank. 
Branch level data was used (data for 362 branches) from 1983. Following the techniques 
forwarded by Mullineaux (1978), U-shaped marginal cost curves were estimated for both 
loan and deposit production. Karafolas and Mantakis (1996), using a time-trend translog 
model, considered a sample of 11 Greek banks between 1980 and 1989. Significant 
economies of scale were reported with a production approach. The levels of technical 
change over the sample period were positive, yet statistically insignificant. 
Kolari and Zardkoohi (1992) used an intermediation model with a reduced, translog cost 
function model to assess the efficiency characteristics of Finnish co-operative and 
savings banks. Sample data for 1983-84 was employed for 369 co-operative and 255 
savings banks. These results suggested that cost curves tend to be L-shaped at the plant or 
branch level and U-shaped at the firm level. This finding was considered to be a result of 
" 
... the widespread use of branch facilities (as a method to) pay an implicit service 
return" (p. 450) when the financial sector was tightly regulated. Diseconomies of scope in 
the joint production of bill and advances were also suggested. Zardkoohi and Kolari 
(1994) estimated economies of scale and scope for 615 bank branches from 34 Finnish 
savings banks for 1988. An intermediation model with a translog functional form was 
used. It was reported that relatively large bank branches tended to be more efficient than 
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smaller bank branches and cost efficiency was improved by membership of a larger as 
opposed to smaller branch network. It was further suggested that economies of scope 
were not significant at the branch level. 
Using a sample of 194 banks from 15 countries Allen and Rai (1996) estimated a global 
cost function with a translog cost function specification of an intermediation approach. 
Significant dis-economies of scale were found for the larger banks, whilst smaller banks 
displayed economies of scale. Average input efficiency was observed to exist at 27.5 per 
cent and average cost efficiency was recorded at 15 per cent of total costs. The global 
cost function was estimated with a fixed-effects panel data model. 
Finally, in a comparative study of European banking, Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) 
estimated translog cost functions in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. They employed 
the intermediation approach and, for each country, included two output variables (total 
loans and total securities) and two input prices. Unfortunately, the same input price 
variables were not available for all four countries so that the comparisons made may not 
be valid. They found some evidence of economies of scale in all four countries (though 
these were not statistically significant for Spain and Germany) and mixed evidence of 
economies of scope. Clearly, more research is called for in comparing cost inefficiencies 
among countries. 
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4.4 Studies of Savings and Loan Associations 
A large number of cost efficiency studies of saving and loan associations (S & L's or 
thrifts) have been undertaken in the USA since the late 1970s. S& L's are financial 
institutions that traditionally have provided finance for residential loans in addition to 
offering investment and deposit accounts. They have taken on both mutual and 
proprietary (stock) ownership forms with a large number of conversions from the mutual 
to the stock form since 1980. The early studies of S& L's were motivated mainly by the 
large number of mergers in the industry during the 1970s and early 1980s, while later 
research has been largely a response to the serious crisis in the industry in the later 1980s 
precipitated by financial re-regulation, a crisis described by many commentators as the `S 
&L debacle' and by Hermalin and Wallace (1994) as a `mass extinction'. It was a period 
during which over 600 thrifts failed, over $300 billion in real estate investments had to be 
liquidated and over $110 billion was paid to bail out the S&L insurers, the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board. The causes and serious effects of the US S&L deregulation 
experience are discussed fully in White (1991). 
Cost studies in this area have all used similar data sources: the quarterly reports from the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board and semi-annual reports from the S& L's, with 
additional information from the Office of Thrift. A variety of approaches for estimating 
efficiency have been adopted. These include a single-product linear regression model 
(Brigham, 1964); a Cobb-Douglas cost function (Benston, 1972); a single-product 
translog cost function (McNulty, 1982 and Dowling and Philippatos, 1990); a multi- 
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product translog cost function (Mester, 1987,1991 and Le Compte and Smith, 1990); a 
stochastic cost frontier approach (Mester, 1993); and a multi-product, non-parametric 
approach (Hermalin and Wallace, 1994). 
One of the first studies of economies of scale in S& L's was provided by Brigham 
(1964). Brigham used linear regression techniques to estimate a cost model for a number 
of individual data cross-sections for the sample period, 1956-62. The dependent variable 
was average cost (measured as total operating costs divided by average assets) and the 
main independent variables were the asset size of the institutions and their annual rate of 
growth of assets. Brigham concluded the S&L industry did not appear to be subject to 
very significant economies of scale. Benston (1972), on the other hand, did find evidence 
of scale economies in the industry. He used data for a sample of 3,159 S& L's in 
California from 1962 to 1966 to estimate a Cobb-Douglas cost function, using three 
separate output measures (the average number of loans serviced each year, the number of 
loans made, and the average number of service accounts serviced). He calculated the 
average elasticity of total expenses with respect to the three output measures over the five 
years to be 0.923, implying that, on average, a 10 per cent increase in asset size would 
raise costs by 9.23 per cent. 
McNulty (1982) and Dowling and Philippatos (1990) both estimated single-product 
translog cost functions using total assets as a measure of output. McNulty used a sample 
of 117 S& L's in Florida in 1980 and found significant economies of scale for 
associations with less than $500 million in assets, confirming his findings reported in an 
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earlier study (see McNulty, 1982). Dowling and Philippatos used cross-section data for 
each of the years of the period 1973-83 and also found evidence of cost reductions 
through asset expansion for associations up to a certain size: this `minimum efficient 
scale' was estimated to have declined from about $2,500 million in 1979 to about $2,000 
million in 1983. 
Mester (1987) was the first researcher (to the author's knowledge) to estimate a 
multiproduct translog cost function for S& L's. Data for 149 associations operating in 
California in 1982 were used to estimate an `intermediation' model, which had three 
outputs (mortgage loans, other loans, and cash, securities and real estate investments) and 
four inputs (labour, capital, demand deposits and term deposits). A growth variable and 
the number of branch offices were also included as explanatory variables. The research 
found only small cost reductions were possible from increasing the scale of operation and 
no evidence was provided concerning economies or diseconomies of scope. However, in 
a later study using the same dataset, but running separate regressions for stock and 
mutual companies in a two-output, three-input translog model, Mester (1991) found 
evidence of significant economies of scale. She also found that while the stock S& L's 
tended to operate with an efficient output mix, mutuals operated with significant 
diseconomies of scope. Le Compte and Smith (1990) estimated both a multiproduct 
translog cost function and a multiproduct miniflex Laurent translog cost function to 
investigate scale economies and cost complementarities. Using data for 431 S& L's in 
1978 and 1983, they found evidence of economies of scale for small associations and 
diseconomies of scale for large associations. They also found evidence of significant cost 
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complementarities for each pair of outputs (mortgage loans, consumer loans and 
investments) in 1978, but no significant cost complementarities in 1983. 
More recent studies have investigated general inefficiency in S& L's. Mester (1993) 
employed the stochastic cost frontier approach, and estimated separate translog cost 
frontiers for 807 mutual and 208 stock S& L's in 1991. The model had three outputs 
(mortgage loans, other loans and investments) and three inputs (labour, capital and 
deposits). The results suggested nearly constant returns to scale in the industry, but 
significant economies of scope between the three outputs for both types of organisational 
form. The measures of inefficiency indicated that stock associations were on average less 
efficient than mutuals. 
Hermalin and Wallace (1994) provided a significant development to the literature 
through considering the both the measurement of inefficiency and the sources of 
inefficiency and insolvency. A WAPM (weak axiom of profit maximisation), non- 
parametric methodology from Varian (1985) is used for efficiency measurement. All data 
is taken from semi-annual reports for 1982 and quarterly financial reports for 1986 to 
1988. In this study, the ownership form of the S&L (either mutual or proprietary), the 
amount of foreclosed property held by the S&L, the area of operation, the institutions 
current activities and total assets are considered to be potentially determinants of 
efficiency. It was found that the ownership of the S& L's (whether the association was 
mutual or proprietary) and the portfolio of assets, held by the S&L were influential in 
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the determination of efficiency. Hermalin and Wallace estimated an average saving and 
loans association is operating nearly thirty per cent below the efficient level. 
Gropper (1995) considered economies of scale and economies of scope for S& L's in 
1988. A generalised quadratic flexible functional form is applied with an intermediation 
model specification. Gropper found small, yet statistically significant economies of scale 
and scope for the S& L's in 1988. 
Finally, in a recent study of efficiency characteristics in S& L's, Stiroh (1997) adopted 
an intermediation approach, estimated a translog cost function, including a time trend 
variable, to provide estimates of economies of scale, economies of scope and technical 
change. Data was taken from financial reports for 899 S& L's in the eastern US states 
between 1990 and 1995. Significant technical change was reported in the early 1990s, 
until a sudden halt in 1993. This was deemed to be the result of substantial association 
defaults. Constant economies of scale were reported for S& L's over the sample period. 
Economies of scope appeared to exist in the joint production of mortgage and consumer 
loans, although their magnitude reduced over the sample period. 
To conclude, the analysis of the efficiency characteristics of the savings and loans 
association industry has employed a number of approaches that have been influential in 
considering the broader literature considering depository institutions. The study by 
Hermalin and Wallace (1994) on the determinants of inefficiency and insolvency 
extended both the breadth and focus of the literature. A number of later studies (e. g. the 
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analysis of US commercial banks by Berger and Mester, 1997) have expanded on this 
general approach. The use of distinct `Diewert' functional forms by Le Compte and 
Smith (1990) showed that the choice of functional form may be another aspect of the 
modelling process that can lead to distinct efficiency estimates. Preliminary conclusions 
are generally supported by the review of S&L studies. 
4.5 Credit union studies 
Cost inefficiency studies of credit unions are complicated by the peculiarity of this type 
of depository institution. Credit unions are often established by employers or friendly 
societies, with the aim of providing a cheap source of funds and depository services for 
specific groups, such as employees or residents within a particular geographical area. 
Basically, they are non-profit-maximising co-operatives whose members are both lenders 
(i. e. shareholders) and borrowers. The co-operative nature of credit unions leads to a 
possible conflict between new and existing members as the influx of new members can 
affect the return to existing members in various ways. For example, extra saving by new 
members may cause the dividend rate to fall; similarly, extra demand for loans by new 
members may cause the loan rate to rise. This potential conflict between new and existing 
members would be lessened by the existence of economies of scale and worsened by the 
existence of diseconomies of scale. This was one of the principal motives for 
investigating scale economies in credit unions. 
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The credit union studies reviewed concern the US, Canadian and UK credit union sectors. 
Five approaches of measuring efficiency have been used in the reviewed studies 
including a multiple regression model applied by Taylor (1972), a Cobb-Douglas cost 
functions used by Koot (1979) and Wolken and Navratil (1980), a translog cost function 
employed by Murray and White (1983) and Kim (1986), a non-parametric approach 
adopted by Fried et al (1993) and a paired difference analysis used by McKillop et al 
(1995). 
The earliest studies (by Taylor, 1972, Flannery, 1974, Koot, 1979 and Wolken and 
Navratil, 1980) mainly concerned credit unions in the USA. Taylor (1972) concentrated 
on large credit unions (those with assets over $1 million) and developed a model in which 
average cost (defined as total cost divided by the total value of assets) depended on the 
squared logarithm of the total value of assets, together with a number of other 
explanatory variables intended mainly to capture the influence on costs of subsidies and 
the average size of shares and loans. The set of explanatory variables, however, did not 
include factor prices. Taylor's results indicated the presence of significant economies of 
scale in the credit union industry. But when Flannery (1974) estimated a number of cost 
functions for credit unions (not just large ones), he found evidence of decreasing returns 
to scale. However, Flannery's cost functions did not make any allowance for the 
subsidies provided to credit unions (mostly in the form of voluntary labour services from 
members and donated office space and equipment from sponsors), and Flannery himself 
believed that once these were taken into account, it would be likely that increasing 
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returns to scale would be found. This would follow, he argued, because in general smaller 
unions benefit more from subsidies than larger unions. 
Koot (1979) estimated a log-linear cost function in an attempt to test this hypothesis. A 
sample of 380 credit unions from all size groups and four alternative physical output 
measures (the number of loans granted during the year, the number of outstanding loan 
accounts, the number of outstanding share accounts and the number of outstanding loan 
and share accounts) was used. In spite of including subsidies in the analysis (by including 
subsidies provided by sponsors in the definition of total cost and adding the annual 
number of hours supplied by voluntary workers as an explanatory variable), Koot 
obtained essentially the same result as Flannery, i. e. strong evidence of decreasing returns 
to scale. 
Wolken and Navratil (1980) criticised the methods employed by Koot and Flannery and 
showed that, when an input price was included as an independent variable and when all 
subsidies were included in the measurement of total cost, the empirical evidence did 
support the hypothesis of increasing returns to scale in the credit union industry. The 
main lessons to be learned from these early credit union studies include the desirability of 
using as representative a sample as possible and the importance of including all the 
relevant influences on cost (including input prices) as explanatory variables in the cost 
function. 
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A more recent study of US credit unions was undertaken by Fried et al (1993) who 
developed a model of credit unions in which the institutions were assumed to aim for 
maximum benefit for their members. These benefits were defined to include the saving 
and loan services which credit unions supply and, in each classification, three types of 
services were identified: the number of accounts, interest rates and `convenience' features 
offered to lenders and borrowers. Thus, output consisted of six services altogether. In 
addition, two categories of resources (labour and other resources) were included in the 
model. Non-parametric, non-stochastic DEA techniques were used to construct the `free 
disposal hull' of the data (i. e. the production possibilities set of the credit unions in the 
sample). This was then used to estimate the degree of productive inefficiency; it was 
found that, on average, inefficient credit unions were supplying about 20 per cent less in 
terms of services than the `best practice' credit unions. Finally, a regression analysis was 
used to investigate whether the variations in inefficiency were related to twenty 
environment characteristics of credit unions. It was found that overall efficiency was 
generally higher for credit unions having common bonds, sponsorship, a state charter, no 
branch offices, a high investment to loan ratio and few real estate loans. 
Studies of non-US credit unions include Murray and White (1983), Kim (1986) and 
McKillop et al, (1995) who analysed Canadian and UK credit unions. Murray and White 
(1983) estimated a translog cost equation with a multiproduct specification. The 
multiproduct specification enabled them to test for economies of scale, economies of 
scope and factor substitution. Output was represented by three variables: mortgage 
lending, non-mortgage lending and investments in excess of the minimum liquidity 
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requirement. The inputs were assumed to be capital, labour, demand deposits and term 
deposits and the prices of these four inputs were included as explanatory variables. The 
results reported by Murray and White were, first, that the Cobb-Douglas and CES 
functional forms were rejected in favour of the more general translog specification; 
secondly, that there was no evidence to support homotheticity, unitary elasticity of 
substitution or constant returns to scale in credit unions; thirdly, that there was evidence 
to support the existence of economies of scale for most of the credit unions in the sample; 
and finally, that there was strong evidence for economies of scope between mortgage and 
other lending activities. 
Kim (1986) replicated Murray and White's study and additionally computed estimates of 
product-specific economies of scale. Kim's study confirmed Murray and White's 
findings of overall scale economies and found product-specific economies of scale 
associated with mortgage loans and investment activities, but product-specific 
diseconomies of scale associated with non-mortgage lending. 
McKillop et al (1995) due to limited data availability used paired difference analysis to 
estimate whether economies of scale were prevalent among UK credit unions. Strong 
evidence of economies of scale among UK credit unions was reported. A sample of 
nearly 500 credit unions for 1992 was used, with data was taken from annual reports and 
accounts. 
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A consideration of the differing regulatory structures and histories of the US, Canadian 
and UK credit union sectors may assist in the explanation of national differences in 
results recorded. Other differences between studies are perhaps a function of the breadth 
of approaches, techniques, time periods and model specifications used within the 
individual studies reviewed. 
4.6 US banking studies 
Studies of economies of scale and scope and technical and allocative efficiencies in US 
commercial banking have been by far the most numerous and have provided most of the 
innovations in the area. In general, the studies tend to support the view that there are 
economies of scale for small banks and diseconomies of scale for large banks, but are not 
in such agreement concerning the existence of economies or diseconomies of scope. With 
regard to technical and allocative efficiencies, most studies agree that such inefficiencies 
exist and differ significantly between banks, but there is no agreement on the best 
technique for estimating these inefficiencies or the average level of banking inefficiency. 
The principal data sets employed in the reviewed studies are the Functional Cost Analysis 
programme (FCA) and the Reports on Condition and Income Tapes, or call reports. The 
FCA data is produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and provides 
voluntarily forwarded results on predominantly small and medium sized banks. The 
Reports on Condition and Income Tapes are produced for all banks and held by the 
Comptroller of the Currency. 
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These data sets through their emphasis have been associated with the two main model 
specifications: the production model and the intermediation model respectively. The, 
production specification studies (e. g. the studies by Gilligan et al, 1984, Berger et al, 
1987, Lawrence, 1989, Pulley and Braunstein, 1992, Ferrier et al, 1993, McAllister and 
McManus, 1993, and Jagtiani et al, 1995) have principally used the functional cost 
analysis programme data sets to emphasise the cost differences on a range of bank 
activities. Alternatively, the call reports emphasis the static and dynamic asset positions 
of banks and have been employed more with an intermediation specification (e. g. the 
studies by Berger et al, 1987, Noulas et al, 1990, Aly et al, 1990, Berger and Humphrey, 
1991, Gropper, 1991, Shaffer and Edmond, 1991, Yue, 1992, English et al, 1993, 
Grabowski et al, 1993, Pi and Timme, 1993, Elyansiani et al, 1994, Karaparkis et al, 
1994, Hunter and Timme, 1995, Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995, Jagtiani et al, 1995, 
Mester, 1996, Millar and Noulas, 1996, Jagtiani and Khanhavit, 1996 and Mahajan et al, 
1996). 
Functional forms adopted in econometric US commercial bank studies have also varied 
greatly. Functional forms employed have included the Cobb-Douglas cost function 
(Benston, 1972, Longbrake and Haslem, 1975), the translog cost function (Flannery, 
1983, Gilligan et al, 1984, Berger et al, 1987, Noulas et al, 1990, Gropper, 1991, Shaffer, 
1993, Evanoff and Israilevich, 1994, Karaparkis et al, 1994, Hunter and Timme, 1995, 
Jagtiani et al, 1995 and Mester, 1996, Mahajan, et al, 1996, Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 
1996, DeYoung, 1998), Box-Cox generalised functional forms (Clark, 1984, Kilbride et 
al, 1986, and Lawrence, 1989), and flexible Fourier functional forms (McAlister and 
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McManus, 1993, Mitchell and Onvural, 1996, Berger and DeYoung, 1997, Berger and 
Mester, 1997, DeYoung and Hasan, 1998). Non-parametric methods have been also 
adopted in a number of studies (Berger and Humphrey, 1991, Yue, 1992, English et al, 
1993, Ferrier et al, 1993, Grabowski et al, 1993, Elyansiani et al, 1994, Elysiani and 
Mehdian, 1995, and Millar et al, 1996). To summarise, difficulties in the comparison of 
studies are exaggerated by the use of differing model specifications, functional forms, 
differing sample periods, the scope of data both in quantity and area of analysis and a 
multitude of variants in the estimated functions. 
Among the earliest studies were the classic papers of Benston (1965) and Bell and 
Murphy (1968) who used data from the FCA programme to estimate separate cost 
functions for the various operations of a bank, using Cobb-Douglas functional forms. The 
banking operations identified in the two studies were demand deposits, time deposits, 
mortgage loans, business loans and instalment loans. Both studies found evidence of 
small economies of scale for the main banking operations and higher costs for branch 
banking compared with unit banking. Longbrake and Haslem (1975) also estimated a 
Cobb-Douglas cost function, but for demand deposits only, using a three-component 
measure of output (consisting of the number of demand deposit accounts per branch 
office, the average size of account and the number of offices). Their main conclusions 
were that the number of offices had little effect on average costs, but that an increase in 
the number of demand deposits per office would lead to a decline in average costs for all 
banks. 
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Linear and log-linear cost functions have been criticised for being too restrictive, and it 
was for this reason that attention was directed in the 1970s to the development and 
application of flexible functional forms. By far the most popular of these in studies of US 
banking has been the translog cost function. One of the earliest applications of the 
translog function in a study of economies of scale in US banking was undertaken by 
Benston et al (1982). They used data from the FCA programme and applied a 
`production' model to four separate years (1975-8) with cross-section data for a sample, 
which varied from 747 to 852 banks. Whilst five main bank services were identified 
(demand deposits, time and savings deposits, real estate loans, instalment loans, and 
commercial and industrial loans) only a single output variable was included (obtained by 
aggregating the outputs of the five main banking services using a Divisia index). A 
translog cost function was then estimated. No attempt was made to estimate the cost 
function simultaneously with the cost share equations. In defence of this decision, the 
authors referred to Monte Carlo experiments by Guilkey and Knox-Lovell (1980) which 
showed that while there are gains in efficiency through joint estimation, these gains are 
relatively small. In addition to calculating a measure of scale economies, Benston et al 
calculated an `augmented' scale economy measure to make an allowance for the fact that 
branch banks are able to expand by opening new offices rather than by adding new 
customers and accounts to existing offices. Their results indicated that economies of scale 
were experienced by small branch state banks and diseconomies by large unit state banks. 
In both cases, either U-shaped or upward-sloping average cost curves were derived. The 
minimum cost size was achieved by bank offices with between $10 million and $25 
million of deposits. 
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The study by Benston et al (1982) was followed in quick succession by Flannery (1983) 
and Gilligan et al (1984). Flannery used an approach similar to that of Benston et al, but 
included correspondent service costs (i. e. the costs incurred by banks in purchasing 
services from other banks) in the definition of total cost. Flannery obtained results similar 
to those of Benston et al, but concluded that studies which omit correspondent service 
costs tend to overestimate the extent of branch bank scale economies by a small but 
statistically significant amount. To the authors knowledge, Gilligan et al (1984) was the 
first published study to estimate a multiproduct translog cost function for US banks. In a 
two-output `production' model with the number of deposit accounts and the number of 
loan accounts as the output measures, they found evidence of overall economies of scale 
for small banks and overall diseconomies of scale for larger banks. They also found 
significant positive economies of scope, but product-specific diseconomies of scale for 
both outputs. 
Many other studies using the translog cost function followed. These included a single- 
product study of large banks by Hunter and Timme (1986), who found evidence of scale 
economies across a broad range of bank sizes, and a study by Noulas et al (1990) who 
used data for 308 large branch banks (with assets over $1 billion) taken from-the 1986 
Call Report. Noulas et al estimated a four-output, four-input `intermediation' translog 
cost function jointly with the derived share equations and found evidence of small 
economies of scale for banks with assets between $1 billion and $3 billion, and small 
diseconomies of scale for banks with assets between $3 billion and $6 billion. Thus, they 
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found no evidence based on cost analysis for the emergence of `megabanks' in the USA. 
This conclusion was supported by Shaffer (1993) who used a fitted translog cost function 
to simulate mergers between pairs of large banks and found cost savings in only half of 
the cases considered. More recent studies which also used the translog functional form 
have considered the effects of different organisational forms on cost efficiency (Newman 
and Shrieves, 1993); the effects on economies of scale and scope of introducing quasi- 
fixed inputs (such as core deposits and physical capital) into the cost function (Hunter 
and Timme, 1995); and the effects of introducing off-balance-sheet activities into the cost 
function (Jagtiani et al, 1995). 
Some studies attempted to use generalised functional forms to test for the underlying 
technology. For example, Clark (1984) used Call Report data for the period 1972-77 for 
1,205 banks to estimate a Box-Cox function and test the assumption of an underlying 
Cobb-Douglas technology. Clark was unable to reject the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas 
technology and found that economies of scale estimates were insensitive both to the 
choice of log-linear or generalised functional form, and to the choice of bank output 
measure. He reported evidence of small economies of scale for the industry. Kilbride et al 
(1986) also used Call Report data, but for a sample of 1,858 banks between 1979 and 
1983. Using Clark's Box-Cox generalised model they found that they were able to reject 
the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas technology for samples of unit banks, independent 
banks and holding company affiliates. They reported evidence of economies of scale, 
which decreased as the level of output increased for all three samples. Lawrence (1989) 
estimated a more general version of the Box-Cox function in a multiproduct model, 
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which had the Cobb-Douglas and translog functions as special cases. He was also able to 
reject the Cobb-Douglas function, mainly for failing to capture cost complementarities in 
the multiproduct model, and he concluded that translog equations do provide an " ... 
adequate fit of the banking cost data" (p. 377). 
Following quickly on from these studies of economies of scale and scope in US banks 
were a number of econometric studies of technical and allocative inefficiencies. These 
studies also tended to use translog functional forms in estimating stochastic cost frontiers. 
Possibly the most important of these studies were Berger and Humphrey (1991) and 
Kaparakis et al (1994). Berger and Humphrey (1991) developed a `thick frontier' 
approach. Using the authors' words, " ... the thick 
frontier is estimated using data from 
banks in the lowest average cost quartile and then is compared to an estimated cost 
function for banks in the highest average cost quartile" (p. 118). Differences in fitted 
costs which cannot be explained by the exogenous variables in the model are assumed to 
represent the `inefficiency residual'. This residual consists of both technical and 
allocative inefficiencies and in separate `intermediation' studies of 7,653 branch banks 
and 6,298 unit banks, they found that these inefficiencies were approximately 25 per cent 
of average costs and dominated the scale and product mix effects. Kaparakis et al (1994) 
estimated an `intermediation' model with four outputs, four variable inputs and one 
quasi-fixed input, using data for 5,548 banks taken from the 1986 Call Report. A translog 
cost frontier was specified with a composite error term in which the one-sided 
inefficiency disturbance was assumed to have a truncated normal distribution. They 
found that banks tended to become less efficient with increasing size: for example, for 
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banks with over $10 billion in assets, average inefficiency was 17 per cent, which was 70 
per cent higher than the average of 9.8 per cent for all banks in the sample. 
In spite of its wide use, the translog functional form does have serious drawbacks. These 
are principally concerned with its failure to be well behaved globally. These potential 
problems, which are discussed by McAllister and McManus (1993) and within chapter 5, 
have undoubtedly encouraged bank efficiency studies based on non-parametric DEA 
techniques. One of the first non-parametric programming studies of US banks was 
undertaken by Aly et al (1990) who used a five-output, three-input `intermediation' 
approach with data from the Call Reports for 322 banks. They found " ... relatively 
low 
levels of overall efficiency" (p. 218), with most inefficiency being technical, rather than 
allocative or scale. This result, that technical inefficiency dominates scale inefficiency, 
helped to confirm the findings of Berger and Humphrey (1991) and was also reported by 
Ferner et al (1993) who estimated " ... a large degree of technical 
inefficiency, a lesser 
degree of scale inefficiency, and diseconomies of diversification" (p. 248). 
English et al (1993) employed a sample of 473 small banks in 1982 to estimate a translog 
output distance function using linear programming techniques and found evidence of " ... 
considerable technical inefficiency" (p. 363). Comparisons of the relative inefficiencies 
of small and large banks using DEA were undertaken by Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995) 
and Miller and Noulas (1996). Miller and Noulas found that larger banks had higher 
levels of technical efficiency in the period 1984-90. Elyasiani and Mehdian also found 
that larger banks were more efficient using 1986 data, but reported no significant 
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efficiency differences between small and large banks using 1979 data. Thus, it seems that 
larger banks may have become more efficient during the 1980s. 
More recently, Mahajan et al (1996) quantified both radial and non-radial measures of 
economies of scale. The study attempted to ascertain whether there were differences in 
terms of cost inefficiency and economies of scale and non-radial expansion-path sub- 
addivitity between multinational and domestic banks. A pooled data set of 1987 to 1990 
of US multinational and domestic banks was considered. Significant diseconomies of 
scale were found for domestic and multinational banks for all asset classes at plant level. 
At the firm level, domestic banks exhibited economies of scale for all but the smallest 
banks. Multinational banks exhibited diseconomies of scale, increasing with their asset 
size at the firm level. Domestic and multinational banks were therefore viewed as having 
significantly different cost functions. Mahajan et al, (1996) found that both multinational 
and domestic banks had negative expansion-path sub-additivity. These diseconomies 
seemed to depreciate with increases in the size of the institution. Mahajan et al (1996) 
further found that allocative inefficiencies seemed to dominate both sample sets. The 
efficiency of multinational banks appears to be greater than domestic banks. 
Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) used a sample of 120 large US banks with significant off- 
balance sheet activities over the period 1984-1990. A translog cost function specification 
of an intermediation approach was used to measure radial and non-radial economies of 
scale and the change in radial and non-radial economies of scale. The change in 
economies of scale was viewed as a measure of technical change over the sample period. 
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Overall, significant structural change was identified. Diseconomies of scale seemed to 
exist for a range of banks in the latter part of the 1980s. The reaction to such a change 
was not to reduce output as would be expected. Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) find 
significant cost complementarities between off-balance sheet activities and balance sheet 
activities. Cost complementarities between individual balance sheet activities were not 
evident. This result contradicted previous work by Gilligan et al (1984). Jagtiani and 
Khanthavit (1996) measured both expansion-path sub-addivitity and the change in 
expansion-path sub-addivitity with respect to time. Indications of economies of product 
mix were viewed to move within the sample period (the 1980s) from economies to 
diseconomies. Overall, a significant shift in the cost structure or productive technology 
was observed. 
Using the translog functional form, Evanoff and Israilevich (1991) considered the 
difference between measures of scale efficiency and measures of scale elasticity used to 
proxy economies of scale. Data from 1987 for 164 banks held by holding companies and 
in the top 500 banks for the last 20 years was used. The holding company affiliation and 
the number of branches were assumed to be exogenously determined. Economies of scale 
(from elasticity measures) were found for smaller banks. Dis-economies of scale are 
observed after banks reached approximately $3.3 billion in output. Evanoff and 
Israilevich suggested that a major under-estimation of potential scale inefficiency is 
possible whenever the elasticity measure differs from one. Further discussion of the 
differences between local and global measures of `economies of scale' are contained in 
chapter 11. 
91 
Hunter and Timme (1995) incorporated aspects of both the equilibrium distribution of 
inputs (in which inputs were assumed to be fully utilised and variable) and a 
disequilibrium distribution of inputs (in which core deposits were assumed to be quasi- 
fixed inputs to the system and thus may not be fully used due to adjustment lags) in their 
model of banking production. The model therefore attempted to account for the dramatic 
changes occurring in this industry which might have resulted result in over-supply or 
under-utilisation of particular resources. This approach was developed from a technique 
proposed by Flannery (1983). Call report data from 1983 to 1990 for 317 banks was 
employed and the banks had at least $1 billion in assets. A multi-product translog cost 
function with a production specification was estimated. Economies of scale were found 
for both models, with the variable model indicating economies of scale for banks with up 
to $10 billion in assets. Banks with over $10 billion in assets were seen to exhibit dis- 
economies of scale. Employing the quasi-fixed model, constant returns to scale were 
found for banks with assets between $2 billion and $25 billion. Banks with assets above 
and below this level experienced slight economies and dis-economies of scale, 
respectively. 
DeYoung (1998) used a translog functional form with an intermediation approach to 
estimate a `thick' cost frontier. Data for 39 banks were extracted from the Report of 
Condition and Income for 1993. The efficiency results from this study were used to 
identify the possible relationship between cost efficiency and the exam results of 
managers working in these banks, i. e. to test the hypothesis that good managers run their 
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banks efficiently. It was found that banks deemed to be poorly managed, in terms of their 
managers' exam results, were 29 per cent less efficient than those banks associated with 
better managers, supporting the hypothesis posed. 
Previous studies of depository institutions employing flexible Fourier functional forms 
have been limited in number. The earliest study (to the author's knowledge) to employ 
this form for analysis of depository institutions was McAllister and McManus (1993) 
using the example of US commercial banks. Other studies, which have used this 
functional form, have also analysed US commercial banks, including Mitchell and 
Onvural (1996), Berger and DeYoung (1997), DeYoung and Hasan (1998) and Berger 
and Mester (1997). Mitchell and Onvural and McAllister and McManus, both compared 
the performance of the flexible Fourier functional form with that of the translog 
functional form. 
McAllister and McManus (1993) suggested that the inconsistent results presented on 
bank efficiency were caused by " ... a combination of econometric mis-specification and 
faulty model logic", where the " ... choice of technique is the main cause of the puzzling 
result" (p. 390). Particular criticism is made of the global application of locally defined 
translog models. McAllister and McManus used call report data on 4,550 banks for the 
sample period 1984 to 1990. A production model specification was adopted. After 
amendment for the cost of capital to incorporate some element of risk (this is discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 3), scale elasticities were estimated. The model was estimated 
employing two distinct functional forms, the widely applied translog functional form and 
93 
the relatively under-used flexible Fourier functional form. Using a combination of the 
flexible Fourier function form and kernel estimation, the results showed that banks with 
assets greater than $10m had average scale efficiency of 65 per cent. An average scale 
efficiency of 98 per cent was reported for banks with $500 million in assets. These results 
were markedly different from previous studies. 
Mitchell and Onvural (1996) used both production and intermediation models to estimate 
cost efficiency characteristics for US banks between 1986 and 1990. Data was taken from 
the Call and Income reports for 306 large banks. Both radial and non-radial measures of 
economies of scale and product mix were estimated. Constant returns to scale were found 
with slight diseconomies of scope recorded for the joint production of real estate, 
consumer and commercial and industrial loans. The authors suggested that "... the 
industry cost function for large banks does not have a Translog form for either the 
production or intermediation approaches to bank production ... (and) ... estimated 
Translog and FF (flexible Fourier) cost equations lead to different conclusions about 
scale and scope economies" (p. 197). 
Berger and Mester (1997) used data for 6,000 commercial banks over the sample period, 
1990-95. An intermediation model was employed to measure cost, profit and 
`alternative'2 profit functions. These functions were all estimated using a flexible Fourier 
functional form and a fixed-effects panel data model. The level of off-balance sheet 
activities, physical capital and financial equity capital were incorporated into the 
functions as fixed quantities. The levels of non-performing loans and the weighted 
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average of the proportion of loans issued by banks were included as environmental 
variables. The addition of these variables was made to accommodate the substantial 
operating heterogeneity in the data set employed. Additionally, output quantities and 
costs were deflated by fixed capital equity, to control for heteroskedasticity and scale bias 
in the measurement of firm-specific efficiency. The efficiency estimates were then 
compared with a range of potential determinants of efficiency to determine which may be 
significant. Overall, substantial levels of inefficiency were reported with all functions, 
although far lower levels of cost efficiency (0.868) appear to exist. Reported profit 
efficiency was 0.549 and `alternative' profit efficiency is 0.463, suggesting 54.9 per cent 
and 46.3 per cent profit efficiency respectively. Substantial scale economies were 
reported, and were suggested to be a result of regulatory change, technological 
improvement and lowering of the interest rate levels. The analysis of the potential 
correlates or determinants of efficiency was less successful, leaving most inefficiency 
unexplained. This study is considered in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) employed a flexible Fourier functional form to analyse the 
relationship between asset quality, denoted by problem loans, and cost efficiency. A data 
set of commercial banks operating between 1985 and 1994, including in total 69,742 
observations, was used. Ten separate cost frontiers were estimated employing a 
production approach. The relationship between the estimated cost efficiency and asset 
quality was assessed using Granger causality tests. Average cost efficiency fell-over the 
sample period from 0.947 to 0.878 indicating 94.7 and 87.8 per cent cost efficiency 
respectively. The analysis broadly indicated that rises in the level of problem loans lead 
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to reductions in cost efficiency. This decline in cost efficiency, in turn, leads to a decline 
in asset quality. This finding therefore suggested that cost efficiency may be viewed as an 
important indicator of problem banks and the level of provisions for bad and doubtful 
loans may be viewed as important in the estimation of cost efficiency. 
DeYoung and Hasan (1998) used a flexible Fourier `alternative' profit function to assess 
the profit efficiency of 5,435 small, urban commercial banks for '1988,1990,1992 and 
1994. Banks were included that had less than $500m in total assets, had headquarters in a 
metropolitan area, had been in existence for more than a year and provided both loans 
and deposit services. An intermediation model of bank production was applied with non- 
performing loans included in the model to control for asset quality. Overall, low levels of 
profit efficiency were estimated. These measures of efficiency improved over the sample 
period, rising from 0.477 in 1988 to 0.545 in 1994, suggesting 47.7 and 54.5 per cent 
profit efficiency respectively. These firm-specific profit efficiency measures were then 
used in an analysis of the determinants of efficiency. Overall it was suggested that small, 
urban banks "... do not exploit multiple branch locations or purchased fund financing as 
well as established banks" (p. 585) and profit efficiency of small urban banks levels of 
between 9 and 14 years of operation. 
A number of U. S. studies investigated technical change in the banking sector. Previous 
studies may be broadly delineated into studies performed using econometric estimation 
techniques and studies employing non-parametric index number methods. Previous 
econometric studies have fairly consistently estimated very low levels of technical 
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change and similarly low or negative levels of total factor productivity growth. Hunter 
and Timme (1986) reported both significant levels of positive technical change in US 
banking and emphasised the importance of economies of scale in determining the levels 
of technical change. A sample of 91 large US banks, between 1972-82 were considered in 
this study. Criticism of this study has focused upon the use of total assets and total 
deposits combined as the single measure of output. Humphrey (1993) analysed the 
technical change in US commercial banks between 1977 and 1988 reporting an array of 
findings. Between 1977-80, positive technical change was reported for the US 
commercial banking sector. This progress was reversed as negative technical change was 
reported for the 1980-82 period. Between 1983 and 1988 minimal technical change was 
reported. This study also considered the technical change of banks with different asset 
sizes. Smaller banks, defined as those between $200 and $300m in assets, experienced 
substantial negative technical change over the sample period relative to larger banks. 
Elyasiani and Median (1990) employed a non-parametric analysis of large (banks with 
assets in excess of $300m) US commercial banks. A significant level of positive technical 
change was observed within the sample period of 1980-85 for the 191 -large commercial 
banks in their sample. Wheelock and Wilson (1996) discovered that some US 
commercial banks had experienced both technological improvement and productivity 
gains between 1984 and 1993. In this study, smaller banks, with assets less than $300 
million, experienced lower levels of technical change. Daniel and Tirtiroglu (1998) 
quantified total factor productivity growth for US commercial banks between 1935 and 
1991. This study initially calculated total factor productivity growth employing an index 
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number approach, with a non-parametric Tornquist index, and then attempted too 
determine what components of total factor productivity growth may be attributed to trend 
and cyclical components through employing a Kalman filter technique. A declining trend 
of total factor productivity growth was observed over the sample period, averaging 2.27 
per cent. 
In this review of efficiency studies of US banks, a number of issues and innovations seem 
to appear. Overall, technical inefficiency seems to dominate allocative inefficiency, 
particularly in the US commercial banking sector. Larger US banks also appear to be, on 
average, more efficient than smaller US banks. Estimates of economies of scope appear 
to be both contradictory with a variety of results reported. Other more general results 
include the rejection of Cobb-Douglas functional forms in modelling bank production 
and evidence that questions the use of translog functional form for modelling bank 
productive technology. Also, new methods such as expansion path economies, thick 
frontier estimation techniques and the inclusion of off-balance sheet outputs are 
suggested in this substantial literature. None of the previous conclusions relating to 
functional form, model specification, estimation technique and the sample period appear 
to be rejected by this review of US bank efficiency studies. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Overall, a broad range of studies are reviewed. A number of significant conclusions may 
be drawn. The use of differing model specifications and variable definitions and methods 
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of estimation have all had a considerable effect on the efficiency results produced. 
Depository institutions operating at different times, in different countries and under 
different regulatory regimes are also likely to display quite distinct efficiency 
characteristics. 
More research is called for to investigate the factors that may influence or bias estimates 
of efficiency. Whilst most studies have attempted to measure the extent of inefficiencies 
and to rank institutions in order of inefficiency, there has been little work on what could 
be the possible sources of inefficiencies or forms of bias that may influence the 
estimation of efficiency. Thus, more research into the main causes of economies of scale 
and scope and technical and allocative inefficiencies in depository institutions would be 
useful. 
Although this survey has covered a large number of non-US depository institutions, it is 
still true that work in the USA dominates the field and there remains scope for the 
application of the available techniques to some institutions for the first time. A 
particularly useful research project would be one, which attempted more international 
comparisons of inefficiency, such as those undertaken by Allen and Rai, (1996), and 
Molyneux et al, (1996). 
Finally, the analysis of the differing functional forms used to model depository institution 
production has also been illustrative. The use of constrained functional forms, such as the 
Cobb-Douglas, has been rejected. Many of the later studies that employ the flexible 
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Fourier functional form have strongly criticised the use the `Diewert' functional forms, 
such as the translog. Discussion of all these factors will be continued in both chapter 5 
and in the empirical studies of Section Two. 
It is clear that, although an enormous literature has developed concerned with the 
investigation of production and cost inefficiencies in depository institutions, there 
remains much work to be done in defining the theoretical underpinnings of the research3, 
refining old techniques, devising new techniques and comparing methods and results. In 
short, many avenues remain to be explored. 
1 The model is reduced through dropping both the squared and interaction terms within the translog 
functional form. This reduction was made to reduce approximation error and multicollinearity. 
2The profit function considers that profits are dependent on levels of output prices and input prices. The 
`alternative' profit function differs in that it considers that profits are dependent on output quantity and 
input prices. 
3 For example the monograph by Hancock, (1991). 
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Chapter 5 Measuring efficiency 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines a range of measures that may be used to quantify economic 
efficiency and productivity. In chapters 3 and 4, it was pointed out that a range of 
different approaches had been used in many studies to estimate efficiency and 
productivity. Principal differences between these studies include the efficiency 
concept used, the method of estimation, the functional form employed and the 
individual measures of efficiency to be estimated. In this chapter, these differing 
approaches will be assessed. Recommendations will be made to determine what 
estimation methods, efficiency concepts and efficiency and productivity statistics will 
be employed in the empirical studies of efficiency (chapters 7 and 9) and productivity 
(chapters 8 and 10). 
The chapter is organised as follows. The choice of efficiency concept is introduced 
and discussed in section 5.2. Section 5.3 outlines the advantages and disadvantages of 
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the two principal estimation methods employed in the literature. The choice of 
functional form used to represent productive technology is discussed in section 5.4. 
Econometric methods of measuring of economies of scale and economies of product 
mix are reviewed in section 5.5. A critical review of the differing econometric 
methods of cost efficiency estimation is provided in section 5.6. The definition of 
productivity is discussed in section 5.7 and section 5.8 provides an assessment of two 
productivity models for use in the empirical chapters. A summary of the chapter and 




5.2 The efficiency concept 
Before deciding what methods to use in the measurement of efficiency, it is important 
to consider the definition of efficiency employed. Previous studies (see chapter 4) 
have used a number of different definitions of efficiency, including productive 
efficiency, cost efficiency and profit efficiency. Assumptions of totally transferable 
productive technology and firm objectives of output maximisation, cost minimisation 
or profit maximisation for production, cost and profit functions, respectively, are 
made. These assumptions are discussed further in chapter 11. 
Productive efficiency or technical efficiency is defined as the distance, in terms of 
output produced, between an individual institution and the `optimal' or `best practice' 
institution. This hypothesised `best practice' institution is defined with reference to all 
the institutions in the sample set. Such an `optimal' institution would exist on the 
production function or frontier. The distance a sample institution is from this 
`optimal' institution or the production function is viewed as productive inefficiency.. 
A production function assumes that the level of output of an individual institution is 
dependent on the amount of inputs employed in production, plus random error and 
any other variables that account for the environment or the particular circumstances of 
individual institutions. Productive efficiency is therefore limited in its extent to 
considering the input quantity that may be reduced to produce a specified quantity of 
output. 
Cost efficiency studies estimate how far the production costs of an individual 
institution differ from the production costs of a best practice institution operating 
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under similar conditions and producing the same outputs. This measure is defined 
with reference to a cost function constructed from the observations of all institutions 
in the sample set. This cost function assumes that the total production costs of 
individual institutions are dependent on the prices of variable inputs, such as capital 
and labour, the quantity or value of outputs produced, random error and any other 
variables that account for the environment or the particular circumstances of 
individual institutions. A cost function allows the measurement of the least-cost 
proportions of inputs in terms of input prices. Cost efficiency is dual to productive 
efficiency allowing measurement of both productive efficiency and the optimal 
proportion of inputs in terms of input prices or allocative efficiency, also known as 
price efficiency. 
Studies of profit efficiency attempt to quantify the degree to which an institution is 
yielding maximum possible profit. Profit efficiency measures are derived from a 
profit function or frontier, which assumes that profits are dependent on the level of 
variable output prices, variable input prices, random error and other variables that 
account for the environment or particular circumstances of individual institutions. 
Researchers adopting this efficiency concept attempt to measure the degree to which 
output prices may be varied. This variation is expected to influence revenue, 
assuming that output prices are determined by factors outside the boundaries of the 
model. A profit efficiency measure may therefore be defined as the ratio of actual 
profits achieved to the estimated maximum profits attainable for a `best practice' 
institution. 
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In the thesis, the cost efficiency concept is employed for four central reasons. Firstly, 
it is deemed preferable to view efficiency in its broadest sense, incorporating both 
productive and allocative efficiency. Secondly, profit efficiency measures assume that 
institutions maximise profits. Whilst this assumption may appear to be reasonable for 
many firms, the objective function of a depository institution may not be as clear-cut 
compared to other industries. Thirdly, there exists a substantial quantity of anecdotal 
evidence that banks both in the UK and globally have emphasised the need to manage 
costs more closely. For example, a study by Salomon Brothers (cited in Molyneux et 
al, 1996, pp. 4-7) suggested that " ... cost management was now a 
dominant strategic 
theme throughout the banking world" (Molyneux et al, 1996, p. 4). Through adopting 
a cost efficiency approach in the thesis, it is hoped that the performance of UK 
depository institutions may be examined in a form more closely representing that 
favoured within the industry itself. Lastly, most previous econometric studies of UK 
depository institutions (see chapter 4) use cost efficiency concepts. The use of cost 
efficiency concepts therefore improves the degree of comparability of analysis in this 
thesis with other studies. 
5.3 Estimation methods 
The estimation methods used in the studies considered in the literature review 
(chapter 4) broadly fall into econometric and non-parametric approaches. The 
difficulty of choosing an appropriate estimation method is compounded by the fact 
that different methods appear to produce different estimates. 
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A limited number of studies have used simulation analysis to assess which technique 
provides the `better' estimator. For example, Banker et al (1988) estimated production 
frontiers from a data sample of known characteristics using a translog production 
function and non-parametric DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) model. It was 
suggested that whilst the DEA techniques provided more reliable estimates of both 
technical and scale efficiency than the translog, this reliability was only achieved 
under certain conditions. It was reported that the non-parametric DEA model 
performed poorly with a small sample size and where the true production function did 
not concur with established production theory. 
Econometric estimation methods are favoured for use in this thesis for three reasons. 
Firstly, econometric methods allow for the accommodation of random error in the 
estimates. Conversely, non-parametric methods do not account for random error, 
potentially allowing random error to be measured as technical inefficiency'. Berger 
and Humphrey (1997) report that on average non-parametric studies of efficiency in 
US banking indicate lower levels of efficiency. This could be consistent with the mis- 
specification of random error as technical inefficiency. Secondly, Berger and Mester 
(1997) suggest that efficiency measures estimated using econometric approaches 
correspond more closely to the economic understanding of efficiency. This greater 
degree of agreement between economic concepts and econometric approaches occurs 
due to the inclusion of more information, such as input prices, and the incorporation 
of a range of related efficiency aspects, such as allocative efficiency. These features 
are not always fully accounted for in non-parametric approaches. Berger and Mester 
in developing this point indicated that " ... non-parametric techniques typically 
focus 
on technological optimization rather than economic optimization and do not 
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correspond to the cost and profit efficiency concepts" (p. 905). Lastly, this thesis 
employs a relatively small sample of institutions with an unknown technology. These 
features combined with the high level of dispersion over asset size may pose 
problems. According to Banker et al (1988), small samples with unknown 
technologies are poorly accommodated by DEA techniques. For example a small 
sample with a high level of dispersion in terms of asset size may lead to a high 
proportion of observations being defined as efficient and effectively being self- 
identifiers, reducing the validity of the overall analysis. 
5.4 The choice of functional form 
In this section, the choice of functional form to represent productive technology in the 
empirical studies is discussed. In previous studies, a considerable number of 
functional forms have been used, but by far the most frequently used has been the 
transcendental logarithmic or translog functional form (Christensen et al, 1971,1973). 
In this brief discussion, the translog and the related flexible Fourier functional form 
are considered. A broader review of functional forms used in such studies is provided 
by Molyneux et al (1996). 
In selecting a functional form, researchers face a choice between greater flexibility 
and better global behaviour across a spectrum of observations. Simple functional 
forms, such as the Cobb-Douglas form, satisfy many conditions or properties of a cost 
function over a broad range of observations. Their simplicity enables properties 
within the function to be consistently, if bluntly and robustly, applied. Difficulties 
with the use of simple forms centre on the limited scope of productive technologies 
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that may be represented. Modelling a more sophisticated productive technology, as 
envisaged in UK depository institutions, requires a greater degree of flexibility; this in 
turn enables a wider range of productive characteristics to be represented. This 
flexibility may be obtained by employing a more complex functional form, such as 
the translog functional form. 
It was previously stated that the translog has been the most frequently employed 
functional form. This Diewert flexible functional form provides a cost function that 
can accommodate a second-order differential approximation to an arbitrary twice 
continuously differentiable cost function. However, such a cost function will exhibit 
linear homogeneity in input prices only within certain parameters or an `admissible 
domain' (Diewert, 1971). Thus the translog, whilst thought by many researchers to be 
appropriate for the analysis of depository institutions, may only be quantified or 
estimated consistently within a certain range of observations or within a `specified 
domain', leaving the possibility of specification error in estimation. 
There have been a limited number of studies that have considered the workings of the 
translog functional form in applied work. Wales (1977) and Caves and Christensen 
(1980) have undertaken investigations into the viability of approximation, as the 
number and variability of observations is increased. Wales (1977) found the 
behaviour of the translog to deteriorate substantially as the true substitution elasticity 
departs from unity. Caves and Christensen (1980) found the translog to be better 
behaved over a broader range of observations than the generalised Leontief function. 
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Guilkey (1980) and Guilkey et al (1983) undertook Monte Carlo tests to assess the 
performance of different functional forms. These tests examined the ability of the 
translog functional form and other functional forms to represent properties or 
characteristics of productive technology using pre-defined test data. Guilkey (1980, 
1983) examined the productive characteristics, such as economies of scale and factor 
substitution, of the translog and other Diewert flexible forms. Tests were performed 
with data representing varying degrees of technology. Guilkey (1980) found that the 
translog functional form performed well over a broad range of technologies. Guilkey 
et al (1983) found that the translog behaved better globally than other Diewert 
flexible forms such as the generalised Box Cox and the generalised Leontief, where " 
... the translog form provides a dependable approximation to reality provided that 
reality is not too complex" (p. 614). 
Ivaldi et al (1996) in a comparison of the translog and the flexible Fourier functional 
forms with a panel data model employing data from French farms, indicated that 
although both functional forms provided equivalent descriptions of the productive 
technology, the flexible Fourier functional form was able to represent a wider range 
of cost structures. Whilst it may be concluded that use of the translog form may be 
appropriate when substantial dispersion of data is not present, the potential for 
specification error when considering a diverse data set may present difficulties. 
The flexible Fourier functional form (see Gallant, 1981,1984) is a second-order 
polynomial in the explanatory variables together with a combination of sine and 
cosine functions in the explanatory variables. This form is Sobelev flexible (see 
Gallant, 1981) and therefore can estimate elasticities consistently and has negative 
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prediction bias, thus removing the potential for specification bias in the representation 
of productive technology. The flexible Fourier form has the translog form nested 
within it and should provide a similar interpretation of productive technology whilst 
reducing the potential for specification error. The expansion of the functional form to 
fit the scale of the data set is performed through the inclusion of additional 
trigonometric terms. Eastwood and Gallant, (1991) suggested that the total number of 
parameters should equal the number of observations raised to the two-thirds power. 
This novel approach of fitting the size of the functional form to the sample size differs 
from the method employed when using Diewert flexible forms, such as the translog, 
where the functional form is assumed to provide a prori a representation of the true 
cost function. 
Both the widely used translog and flexible Fourier functional are used in the empirical 
chapters. The possibility of mis-specification with the translog functional form is also 
discussed in the pertinent empirical chapters and in the conclusions (chapter 11). 
5.5 Econometric measurement of economies of scale and scope 
In the studies reviewed in chapter 4, a number of efficiency measures were employed. 
The most frequently employed measures include economies of scale, economies of 
product mix and measures of cost efficiency. As we saw in chapter 4, most studies 
concerned with investigating the existence of economies or diseconomies of scale and 
scope in depository institutions have employed statistical cost analysis. In these 
studies, it is assumed that depository institutions operate like manufacturing firms in 
the sense that they attempt to minimise the cost of using various inputs to produce an 
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output or set of outputs which is then sold to consumers. Thus, the total cost function 
facing these firms relates minimum cost to the firms' outputs, input prices and other 
independent variables. In general terms, such a cost function may be written as: 
c=c(Y, P, z) (S. 1) 
where y is a vector of outputs, p is a vector of input prices, z is a vector of other 
explanatory variables and C is the minimum cost of producing y for given values of p 
and z. The cost function is normally assumed to be linearly homogeneous, 
monotonically increasing and concave in input prices. These conditions then ensure 
that it is dual to the transformation function T (x, y) where x is a vector of inputs. 
Early economies of scale studies estimated single-product functions only, either by 
assuming that a depository institution's outputs could be aggregated into a single 
product or by estimating separate functions for the different products. The theoretical 
groundwork developed by Panzar and Willig (1977), Brown et al (1979) and Baumol 
et al (1982) soon led to the estimation of multiproduct functions and the calculation of 
multiproduct production/cost characteristics, such as overall economies of scale, 
product-specific economies of scale and economies of scope. These measures are 
considered in turn. 
Ray economies of scale are cost savings resulting from proportional increases in the 
quantities of all outputs produced. The extent of overall economies of scale (OES) at 
any particular output combination is usually measured by the elasticity of total cost 
with respect to composite output. This measures the proportionate change in total cost 
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as all outputs are changed by the same proportion. Thus, for a firm producing m 
outputs, we can write, using natural logarithms (Ln): 
OES = (arc/aLn y; 
) (5.2) 
1 
i=1,2,..., m. According to this radial measure, there are overall economies of scale 
(and therefore decreasing ray average cost) if OES < 1, overall diseconomies if scale 
(increasing ray average cost) if OES >1 and constant ray average cost if OES = 1. 
Berger et al (1987) devised a measure, known as expansion path economies of scale, 
calculated as the elasticity of incremental costs with respect to incremental outputs, 
which takes into account changes in the composition of output as firms grow. 
Expansion path scale economies incorporate both scale costs and costs of distinct 
production technologies adopted at different scales. Emphasis is placed on the 
difference in operating costs between two institutions. The difference in output 
between the banks is divided by the difference in costs between the two outputs. 
EPSCE4B = (I[(yiB- yA)/yjB][ C(RYB)I blnyi]i/(I C(RYB) - C(P. 
y")]/C(P. YB)i 
(5.3) 
where y1B and y4 are the quantities of the i`h output at banks A and B respectively and 
C(p, y4), C(p, yB) are the operating costs at banks A and B respectively. Measures are 
interpreted in a similar manner to the radial measures previously outlined. 
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Measuring overall or expansion path economies of scale is appropriate only as long as 
the other explanatory variables included in the cost function remain unchanged as 
outputs vary. A measure of `augmented' overall economies of scale has occasionally 
been computed to take into account the indirect effects of induced changes in other 
explanatory variables. For example, Benston et al (1982) used the following measure 
of augmented economies of scale (AGES) to allow for the induced change in the 
number of branch offices (B) as banking outputs changed: 
AOES = (a Ln c /a rn y; ) + (a Ln c/a Liz B) (1: (a Ln B /a Ln y, )) 
(5.4) 
In general, there has been very little work on the sources of economies or 
diseconomies of scale. Some researchers (see, for example, Hardwick, 1990) have 
attempted to identify the main sources by measuring the cost saving attributable to the 
jh input as the firm expands. This can be done by writing the logarithm of the cost of 
employing the jt' input (Ln Cj) as: 
Ln Cj = Ln Sj + Ln C (5.5) 
where Sj is the j`h input's cost share. Input-specific overall economies of scale (DESK) 
may then be written as: 
OES; _ (a's; /i a Ln yi) + OES (5.6) 
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While this formula can indicate whether cost savings are attributable to the 
employment of any particular input, it can give little guidance as to the real reasons 
for the existence of economies or diseconomies of scale. This is clearly an area where 
more research is called for. 
Product-specific economies of scale measure the effect on the i`h product's 
incremental cost of a change in the quantity of product i, with the quantities of the 
other products remaining unchanged. Assuming that a reasonably wide-ranging data 
set is available so that accurate estimates of incremental cost can be obtained, the 
extent of scale economies attributable to product i can be measured by the elasticity of 
the i`" product's incremental cost with respect to the output of the i`h product. 
Unfortunately, data sets relating to depository institutions rarely allow accurate 
estimates of incremental costs (which require an estimate of total cost when the 
quantity of product i is zero) to be calculated. Some researchers, therefore, have 
investigated local product-specific economies of scale by examining the behaviour of 
the i`h product's marginal cost. In particular, the value of d 2C/a yj2, the gradient of 
the i`h product's marginal cost, has been used to judge whether local product-specific 
economies or diseconomies of scale exist. A negative gradient suggests the existence 
of product-specific economies of scale, while a positive gradient suggests - the 
existence of product-specific diseconomies of scale. 
The ray economies of scale (OES) measure will be employed in the empirical studies. 
This statistic is the most frequently used statistic for estimating economies of scale. 
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Through employing this statistic, increased comparability with other studies may be 
possible. 
Economies of scope may be defined as cost savings achievable from the joint 
production of two or more goods or services within a single enterprise, compared with 
their separate production by specialised firms. In other words, they are economies, 
which arise from the range of products produced, rather than the scale, of a firm's 
operations. For a firm producing two outputs, y, and y2, the magnitude of scope 
economies (ESC) may be measured by: 
Esc = [C (y,, 0) +C (o, Y2) -C (y,, Y2)1 C (y,, Y2) (5.7) 
ESC measures the relative increase in cost that would result from a separation of the 
firm into two specialist firms. There are economies of scope if ESC >0 and 
diseconomies of scope if ESC < 0. Unfortunately, this formula requires estimates of 
total cost when the quantity of each of the products in turn is set equal to zero and, as 
we saw above, such estimates are not easy to obtain. An alternative way of 
investigating the existence of local economies of scope is to test for cost 
complementarities by checking whether the second derivative, a2C /d yj 42, is 
significantly less than zero. If it is, so that the marginal cost of one good decreases as 
the output of the other good increases, then there are cost complementarities and 
therefore (local) economies of scope. Another approach was suggested by Berger et al 
(1987); they devised a formula for expansion path subadditivity which measures the 
extent to which lower costs result from the joint production of an output bundle at a 
depository institution (whose output composition is representative for its size) 
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compared with specialised production by two smaller institutions (whose combined 
outputs are equal to those of the bigger institution). 
A more general measure, known as economies of diversification, was developed by 
Ferrier et al (1993) to allow for the situation in which at least one output is produced 
by all firms, while the production of other outputs is disjoint. Thus, for two firms, A 
and B, and three outputs, 1,2 and 3, economies of diversification would be said to 
exist if: 
C(y, A, o, Y3 A) + c(o, Y2B' Y3B) > C(y1A, Y2B. y3A + y3B) (5.8) 
Although there have now been a large number of studies of economies of scope and 
subadditivity in depository institutions, none have addressed the issue of the sources 
of these cost savings and so this" represents another important area where more 
research is required. 
The economies of scope statistic will be employed as a measure of economies of 
product mix in the empirical studies. This statistic is the most frequently used statistic 
for estimating 'economies of scope in the broader literature. Through employing this 
statistic, therefore, increased comparability with other studies may be possible. Cost 
complementarities will also be estimated as a further `test' of local economies of 
scope. 
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5.6 Econometric measurement of efficiency 
In the previous section, approaches to measuring economies of scale and economies 
of product mix were reviewed. The measurement of these characteristics involves the 
consideration of the characteristics of a function or frontier. Efficiency measurement 
differs from the measurement of economies of scale and product mix in that the 
efficiency of an individual institution is viewed to be a distance from the `best 
practice' function or frontier. In this section, the development of both econometric 
frontier techniques and panel data methods to measure both overall and then firm- 
specific efficiency are reviewed. Recommendations for the empirical chapters are 
made. Following previous recommendations on the definition of efficiency to be used, 
the discussion is stated in terms of cost efficiency. 
The evolution of econometric frontiers to measure technical, allocative and overall 
efficiency was initiated by the development of deterministic frontiers. These frontiers 
considered all distance from the frontier (both random error and inefficiency) to be 
inefficiency. Such measures have been criticised due to the absence of any statistical 
properties and the high degree of sensitivity to outliers and mavericks in the data. 
Attempts to amend for this have included the development of probabilistic frontiers. 
Timmer (1971) developed a probabilistic frontier by excluding a proportion of the 
data set where " ... the frontier is estimated 
in probabilistic fashion by constraining X 
per cent of the observations to fall outside the frontier surface" (p. 778). 
Aigner et al (1977) and Meeusen and van de Broek (1977) have both been attributed 
with the development of the stochastic frontier for the measurement of technical and 
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allocative efficiency. Stochastic frontiers are distinguished from probabilistic and 
deterministic methods by their statistical estimation, as opposed to calculation of the 
frontier where " ... it seems preferable to incorporate the possibility of measurement 
error and of other unobservable shocks, in a less arbitrary fashion. " (Aigner et al, 
p. 23). A cost function frontier is considered where the disturbance term is split into 
two components. This may be represented as: 
c=c(y, p;, ß)+e (5.9) 
where y denotes outputs, p represents input prices, 8 are the parameters to be 
estimated and e is the error term. The error term may be subdivided into 
E=u+v (5.10) 
The components of the error term include v, a symmetrical two-sided term, which 
includes the effects of data outside the control of the model. The other component, u, 
is a one-sided disturbance included to represent all the effects of the data that are in 
the control of the model and may be used to derive measures of inefficiency. 
The two-sided residual term v is assumed to be symmetrical and independently and 
identically distributed. This may be estimated with familiar statistical methods. For 
example, the normal distribution, may be imposed upon the error component, such 
that v-N(O, ov). The one-sided disturbance term u is assumed to be distributed 
independently of v and must satisfy E(u) =0 for a cost frontier. The non-negative 
disturbance u reflects the positioning of all institutions on or above the cost function 
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frontier. The modelling of this disturbance has inspired a debate on what is the most 
appropriate distribution to apply. 
Several one-sided distributions have been used to model the inefficiency component. 
The most popular is the half-normal distribution suggested by Aigner et al (1977). 
Others include the exponential distribution (also suggested by Aigner et al, 1977), the 
truncated normal distribution suggested by Stevenson (1980) and the two-parameter 
Gamma distribution proposed by Greene (1990). Evidence suggests that the choice of 
distributional assumption has only a small effect on the inefficiency estimates and 
hardly any effect on the efficiency rankings of firms. For example, Kaparakis et al 
(1994) obtained very similar inefficiency results using the half-normal and truncated 
normal distributions. Greene (1990) reported similar rankings using the half-normal, 
truncated normal, exponential and Gamma distributions, but suggested that 
applications of the single-parameter distributions may yield higher overall estimates 
of inefficiency than the two-parameter Gamma distribution. 
These results suggest that the choice of the one-sided distribution may have a minor, 
albeit significant, effect on the inefficiency results. The impact of differing 
distributions compounded with the use of potentially inappropriate flexible functions 
(such as the translog functional form) suggests that results from econometric 
stochastic frontier models need to be interpreted with care as the use of any one-sided 
probability distribution (for estimating firm-specific inefficiencies) has been criticised 
by some commentators. For example, Berger (1993) suggested that the distribution of 
inefficiency in US banks was similar to a symmetrical normal distribution where " ... 
if, in fact, inefficiencies do have something close to a symmetric distribution this 
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raises questions about any single period, composed error method that tries to separate 
inefficiency from random error, since random error is also generally believed to 
follow a symmetric distribution" (p. 290). 
Another criticism levelled at the estimation of firm-specific inefficiencies from 
econometric frontier models has been that the actual dispersion of costs within the 
`raw' data and the distributional assumptions imposed on the error term often do not 
concur. For example, the one-sided normal distribution imposes a structure in which 
inefficiency is assumed to be clustered around the frontier. This structure suggests 
that only a limited deviation in costs is possible from the hypothesised most efficient 
level. This a prori assumption has been criticised as the dispersion of costs for 
financial institutions may often be quite large. This problem has been termed the 
`Greene" problem within the literature. Potential suggestions to ease this problem 
have included the use of other distributions to represent the error term or the use of a 
thick frontier as proposed by Berger and Humphrey (1992b). Surveys of many of the 
distributions adopted for the error components are considered by Stevenson (1980) 
and Greene (1993). 
To overcome the strong a priori distribution assumptions made by stochastic frontier 
models, alternative measures of efficiency have been proposed. Distribution-free cost 
efficiency is a relative measure of firm-specific efficiency. The efficiency of a sample 
of institutions is`'derived through reference to the efficiency of the most cost efficient 
depository institution in the sample. The theoretical advantage of this approach is that 
it removes many of the strong distributional assumptions used in stochastic frontier 
analysis. Efficiency is derived directly from the individual effects produced by the 
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fixed-effects model, where the individual effects, v, would include the " ... 
unobservable entrepreneurial or managerial skills of the firm's executives" (Baltagi, 
1995, p. 9). This is a development of the approach initially forwarded by Berger 
(1993) who employed the average residuals from cross-section regressions for a ten- 
year period to provide estimates of relative and distribution-free efficiency. The 
approach assumes that efficiency is constant over time and bias in efficiency may be 
removed through averaging over time. The individual effects (v) may be employed as 
an indicator of non-negative cost efficiency. Thus distribution-free efficiency may be 
written: 
Efficiency = exp (min[Lnv]-Lnv) = min[v]l v (5.11) 
For the ih institution, where min(n) is assumed to be the individual effect of the most 
efficient institution in the sample. For further discussion of this measure, see Allen 
and Rai (1996,1997) and DeYoung (1997). Overall, due to the strong a priori 
assumptions imposed with econometric frontier techniques, distribution-free cost 
efficiency measures are selected for use in the empirical studies. 
5.7 What is productivity? 
The definition of productivity is fraught with difficulties. The term has been 
considered synonymous with labour productivity in manufacturing; similarly, 
productivity is generally associated with yields in agricultural economics. 
Productivity measures the dynamic relationship between the use of inputs for the 
creation of outputs. The quantification of the amount of resources or inputs required 
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for the production of a specified bundle of outputs provides a numeraire for the 
measurement of productivity. Productivity, in this context, is a relative concept in that 
the productivity of a firm only exists in relation to other time periods. The 
measurement of productivity growth over time is deemed to be associated with the 
change in productive technology for individual firms. Productivity may also be 
viewed as a generalised index containing a range of components. The relationship of 
productivity to these components may be observed in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 Components of total factor productivity growth 
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Technical change has been defined as the change in the productive technology of the 
firm over time or over a homogeneous group. Solow (1957) viewed technical change 
to be any shift of the production function or productive technology. Technical change 
may therefore be viewed as the common rate of input reduction whilst outputs are 
held constant. Thus the effect of technical progress is to shift the productivity curve to 
the right, where " ... every change in technology displaces the production frontier (of 
a given capital stock); every gain in technical knowledge displaces it outwards", or " 
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... conversely for a dual cost function a shift to the left would be expected" (Hicks, 
1939, p. 271). 
In this thesis, the total factor productivity growth of institutions is estimated. Total 
factor productivity growth is total in that all factor inputs are included in its 
formulation. The productivity measures used in the thesis will model productive 
technology both in a multi-input and multi-output form. Partial measures are not 
considered due to the high possibility of their mis-interpretation. Total factor 
productivity growth is viewed as the change in productive capability or productivity 
resulting from a change in the factors of production. Aggregate factor intensity 
growth refers to the change in the capability of the productive system caused by 
factors outside the firm or the productivity growth ultimately determined by factors 
exogenous to the firm. Scale effects are viewed as the influence of scale factors on the 
efficiency of production. These factors may in turn influence productivity, a measure 
of efficiency over time. Allocative change is inefficiency that results from a less than 
optimal allocation of inputs to produce a specified amount of outputs. 
5.8 Productivity models 
This section outlines two productivity models, which are compatible with the 
econometric cost function approach. The main aim is to select appropriate models for 
the empirical studies of total factor productivity growth in chapters 8 and 10. 
A number of methods for measuring productivity growth have emerged within the 
literature. These methods fall into the econometric and index number approaches. 
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Diewert (1992) further categorised approaches to measuring technical change into 
four groups, which include the econometric estimation of cost and production 
functions, Divisia indices, exact number indices and non-parametric methods using 
linear programming. 
Most research work in productivity measurement has been carried out either by 
estimating cost and production functions or by calculating index numbers of either 
Divisia or exact varieties. The development of these index number measures has 
emphasised the need for fewer assumptions in the measurement of productivity and 
technical change. The development of broader index-based measures through a range 
of measurement and estimation techniques has also been attempted to loosen the taut 
theoretical impositions inherent in the index number approaches. 
The production and cost function approaches to measuring efficiency may be used to 
estimate the technological possibilities in an industry. The technological possibilities 
in period T may then be compared with those in period T+1 to provide a relative 
measure of productive capability. Causes of technical change are diverse. Unit costs 
in an industry can change over time as technical innovations shift the minimum cost 
frontier. The levels of cost dispersion may be an indicator of the variability of market 
conditions and alter average efficiency. Regulatory change and other exogenous 
phenomena may be reflected in both shifts in the frontier and changes in the 
dispersion in costs. For a further discussion of the possible causes and sources of 
technical change, see chapter 11. 
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The most frequently used method of econometric productivity analysis for depository 
institutions is the time-trend model (e. g. Stiroh, 1997, Lang and Welzel, 1996, Esho 
and Sharpe, 1995, Humphrey, 1993, Baltagi and Griffin, 1988). The time-trend in this 
model is quantified through the inclusion of a variable to represent the relevant time 
period. The level of technical change for a multi-product framework may be 
represented by the partial derivative of the logarithm of total cost with respect to time. 
A production relation could be represented as: 
Y= .f 
(L, K, t), i. e. y(t) = f(L(t), K(t), t), (5.12) 
where L represents labour, K represents capital and t represents time. Time is 
incorporated in a time trend model through the use of a time specific dummy (i. e. t for 
0,1,2, ..., T years). This approach has been developed to 
incorporate both quadratic 
time terms and to incorporate the relationships between both time and input prices. 
For example, employing a translog functional form and an intermediation model, with 
three inputs and two outputs, the time-trend cost model (for simplicity the t subscripts 
are omitted) may be written: 
LnC = ao + I: ß1Ln y; +Y tziLn Pi + IJT + 112 ý t)2 + 
1/2( ynLny; Lny, )+ 1/2(j: 1wjkLnPJLnPk)+ 
1! jk 
(x; t LnY; ) +I (A,. tLnPj )+ 61 
I S; ýLn y; Ln pj+E 
1j 
(5.13) 
for l= 1,..., 2andj, k=1,.., 3. 
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where C represents total costs, Y represents outputs, P represents input prices, T 
represent time, c represents the error term and a, x', tp, 77 and Co are 
parameters to be estimated. From this model, both estimates of technical change and 
its components may be derived. 
Average technical change is viewed as the (negative) first derivative of the logarithm 
of total cost with respect to time. The average technical change from the translog cost 
model, may be written as: 
-(17+ cpT+ EK; LnY, + EAjLnP; ] (5.14) 
Average technical change can be decomposed into radial (or neutral) technical 
change, non-neutral technical change and scale augmenting technical change. Radial 
change ( -[17 + cpTJ ) is equivalent to Hick's neutral technical change where the 
marginal substitution between factors is unchanged. Radial technical change 
quantifies the shifting of the cost function geometrically towards the origin. Non- 
neutral or dis-embodied technical change (- I A,; LnPP) represents the change in the 
i 
efficiency or quality of the factor inputs in the production process. This would 
represent a shift towards the cost function or homogenisation within the sample. Scale 
augmenting technical change (-j: K; LnY, ) quantifies the technical change linked to 
changes in the scale of institutions in the sample. 
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An associated measure which may also be derived from a time-trend model is the 
`bias, of technical progress' (see Stiroh, 1997). This measure quantifies how technical 
change influences the cost shares of inputs in the production process. Using 
Shephard's lemma (see Shephard, 1970) the `bias of technical progress' may be 
written as: 
£' Bias of technical progress = DS; l aT = a2 LnC/aLn pi aT (5.15) 
where S1 is the cost share of input j for j=1, ..., 3. The value of the bias of technical 
progress indicates that the technical progress employs more or less of the input in the 
production process when the value is greater or less than zero respectively. 
From the time-trend model, the percentage total factor productivity growth may be 
viewed as the negative technical change plus one minus the elasticity of cost with 
respect to outputs multiplied by the change in outputs. This may be written as: 
Total Factor Productivity growth = -Technical change + (1- C gate) Q (5.16) 
This measure is an approximation to a total factor productivity growth index (for 
further, discussion of this measure see Nelson, 1990). Assumptions implicit in the 
measure include perfect competition in the input and output markets and constant 
returns to scale. Additional problems include potential mis-specification if input 
prices or outputs are correlated with time. When this occurs, the distinctions between 
neutral and non-neutral technical change may be ambiguous. For example, when 
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outputs are correlated with time, scale-augmenting effects and neutral technical 
change may be blended. 
Dissatisfaction has also emerged with time-trend models due to the slowing changing 
form of productivity implicitly assumed by this measure. This may not accurately 
represent change year on year due to an inherent averaging process. This approach 
may therefore mis-specify the degree of variation in technical change over time 
presenting a smoothed increase or decrease through interaction with the time dummy 
employed to capture the effect of change over time (Humphrey, 1993). Despite the 
wealth of information that can be obtained from such a model, it is suggested that this 
model be used only where data constraints rule out the use of alternative models. 
Another econometric cost approach to estimating productivity growth and its 
components is the cost function shift model (Humphrey, 1993). This model examines 
how the differences between cross-sectional cost functions or frontiers can illustrate 
changes in productive technology over time. The model relies on a number of cost 
functions estimated for specified time periods, which are then used to construct 
hypothesised measures of average cost. Average cost, in this context, may be viewed 
as total (fitted) cost divided by some measure of institution scale. Once estimated, 
average cost may be used in the estimation of technical change. Technical change 
may 
. 
be viewed as the proportional decrease in predicted average cost. This may be 
written as: 
Technical change = -[ AC, +I -AC, ]/ AC, (5.17) 
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Once a value for technical change has been calculated, total factor productivity 
growth may be estimated in a similar manner to the time-trend model (equation 5.15). 
Whilst this measure overcomes many of the problems of smoothing faced by the time 
trend model, the cost function shift approach also faces a number of potential 
problems. To estimate such a model, a sector needs to have a substantial number of 
observations or incumbents for the estimation of a number of cost functions over 
time. Conversely, the time-trend model may be used for industries with a far lower 
number of incumbents as the cross-sectional and time-series observations used in the 
estimation of this model are pooled. Additional disadvantages are that the cost 
function shift model provides far less information about the components of 
productivity and may provide more volatile results. 
5.9 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a number of issues have been addressed. First, the different methods 
of estimation, the choice of functional form, efficiency concepts and measures of 
efficiency identified are discussed and reviewed. The cost efficiency concept, whilst 
being less flexible than the profit efficiency concept, is adopted for use in the 
empirical chapters, due to both the breadth of efficiency considered and to improve 
comparability with previous studies. Econometric estimation techniques rather than 
non-parametric (DEA) methods of estimation are considered to be more appropriate 
for use in the empirical chapters. Theoretical, statistical and practical considerations 
are all forwarded in support of this choice. 
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To'amend for potential mis-specification in the translog functional form, both this 
form and the flexible Fourier functional forms will be employed in the thesis. The 
flexible Fourier functional form is limited in application due to the requirement of a 
substantial data set (approximately 300 observations are considered to be a 
minimum). This functional form will be employed in chapter 8 where the building 
society data set will accommodate the practical requirements of this form. In other 
empirical studies, (chapters 7,8 and 10) the translog functional form will be 
employed, although both acknowledgement of, and testing for, possible mis- 
specification will be undertaken and reported. 
A range of statistics used to estimate economies of scale, economies of product mix 
and cost efficiency were used in the studies reviewed in chapter 4. It is proposed to 
estimate both measures of cost efficiency, overall economies of scale (OES), 
economies of scope and cost complementarities will be estimated in the empirical 
studies to test for the presence of economies of scale and economies of product mix. 
Distribution-free techniques will be used to estimate cost efficiency due to the less 
restrictive assumptions imposed by these techniques. 
Finally, in this chapter, two models of productivity measurement are suggested, the 
time-trend model and the cost function shift model. Due to the differing data 
requirements of these models, the productivity study of retail banking (chapter 8) 
employs a time-trend model due to the small number of incumbent institutions in the 
market. However, the cost function shift model is used for the productivity study of 
building societies (chapter 10), where a sufficient number of institutions exist. 
'A notable exception was provided by Varian (1985). 
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SECTION TWO 
Chapter 6A general test of competitive conditions in UK building society 
"ýý mortgage market: 1990-95 
6.1 ý Introduction 
In chapter 2, a number of changes to the operating environment of UK depository 
institutions were considered. These changes included the re-regulation of the retail 
banks and, building societies, changes of market structure in both sectors, the 
development of new technology for delivering banking services and the changing 
form of branch networks held by depository institutions. All these factors may have 
had a substantial influence on the level of competition prevalent in UK depository 
institutions. 
1 
Previous regulation limiting the scope of services that depository institutions may 
provide and the degree of price competition that could be undertaken was repealed 
during the 1980s and 1990s. These restrictions may have led depository institutions to 
adopt a number of distinct competitive strategies, including an expansion of their 
branch networks in an attempt to provide customers with an implicit service return 
(see for example the discussion of Kolari and Zardkoohi, 1992 and Zardkoohi and 
Kolari; 1994, in chapter 4). The expansion of branch networks under more restrictive 
regulation is an example of depository institutions following an objective function 
that may conflict with cost minimisation and efficiency maximisation. When these 
regulatory restrictions were repealed, banks and building societies reduced the 
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number of branches. It is commonly thought that that change led to a greater degree 
of price competition in the building society sector. 
The introduction of new technology to deliver banking services also affected the 
competitive strategies of UK depository institutions. ATMs, for example, have greatly 
increased in number and usage, providing both increased service quality and 
convenience for customers. The use of ATMs particularly in the UK has displayed a 
willingness on the part of depository institutions to compete in terms of this new 
technology. Initially, ATMs were established by banks and building societies in 
isolated networks. During the sample period, a number of competitive alliances 
between providers were established (e. g. between a number of building societies in 
the LINK network, or between Natwest and Midland banks), increasing the scale of 
competing ATM networks. Whilst most other European countries initially 
experienced a degree of ATM network competition during the 1980s, most have now 
moved towards a greater degree of co-operation, with France, Belgium, Denmark, 
Norway and Italy having an integrated or nearly integrated network of ATMs. This 
level of co-operation has not occurred in the UK where only limited alliances and bi- 
lateral agreements exist between depository institutions (see Vesala, 1995, for further 
discussion of this issue) 
The new entrants to the mortgage market in the 1980s, particularly the specialised 
mortgage lenders and retail banks, may have contributed to the reduced profitability 
and the large losses that dominated the building society sector in the early 1990s. 
These entrants may be characterised both by their proprietary form and to a lesser 
extent the brevity of their presence in the mortgage market. 
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One important reason for considering the competitive conduct of institutions in a 
thesis primarily concerning efficiency and productivity is that a lack of competitive 
pressure may reduce the pressure on managers to perform optimally. The implications 
of such a `quiet life' have been considered by Berger and Hannan (1998) who suggest 
that " ... there may also be higher cost per unit output in concentrated markets 
because of slack management". (p. 454). Thus `slack' managers may follow private 
objectives or `satisfice' through following alternative objectives to cost minimisation 
and efficiency maximisation, such as fostering greater market power at the expense of 
cost minimisation. Previous analysis of competition in the UK retail bank sector 
suggests that only a limited degree of contestability exists in this market, implying a 
lack of long-run competitive equilibrium (Molyneux et al, 1996). 
In ' this chapter, the competitive conditions in the UK building society mortgage 
market will be assessed. This is important and timely for three reasons. First, a study 
of the competitive conditions in the building society industry is an omission within 
the literature. Secondly, this analysis should provide greater clarity in determining the 
competitive conduct of building societies. Lastly, the study is important in 
accommodating the recommendations made in chapter 4, that both potential sources 
and biases of efficiency be investigated further. It is posited that the competitive 
conditions of depository institution markets may be a primary cause of sub-optimal 
behaviour. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Contestable market theory and monopolistic 
competition are outlined in section 6.2. Section 6.3 provides a review of studies that 
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have previously considered competition in depository institutions and section 6.4 
explains the Rosse-Panzar statistic. The data and variables employed in the study are 
described in section 6.5. The model specification and results are provided in sections 
6.6 and 6.7, respectively. A summary of the chapter is provided and conclusions are 
drawn in section 6.8. 
6.2 " Contestable market theory and monopolistic competition 
Contestability theory (Baumol et al, 1982) can be viewed as a special case of classical 
competitive market theory. The theory was proposed to generalise differences in 
market structure and as a powerful tool for improving the regulation of industry. It is 
suggested that " ... perhaps the most noteworthy 
implication of contestability theory is 
that a wide difference in appearance between a particular market and the form of 
perfect competition need not deprive the invisible hand of its power to protect the 
public interest" (Baumol et al, 1982, p. 447). The influential nature of this theory in 
economics has been described as " ... a `rebellion' which 
does without benefit of the 
conjectural variation, reaction functions, and other paraphernalia of standard 
oligopoly analysis" (Baucool, 1982, p. 1). 
Contestability emphasises the assumption that an `imperfect' industrial structure may 
allow a long-run competitive equilibrium to form. This is hypothesised to occur 
through the potential entry of competing firms to the market during disequilibrium. 
Anticipated competition, both real or imaginary, is viewed to engender competitive 
behaviour among the incumbents in a market. Central aspects of contestability may be 
defined as the static form of the model, hypothesised free entry and exit of institutions 
to the marketplace with no consideration of a possible time lag for retaliation or sunk 
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costs, and the assumption that potential entrants to the market are price takers, freely 
accepting the present incumbents' previous entry prices. Thus " ... the critical feature 
of a contestable market is its vulnerability to hit and run entry" (Martin, 1993, p. 300). 
Applying the theory of contestability to the theory of monopolistic competition, 
developed by Chamberlin (1933), may initially be viewed as contradictory. 
Chamberlin suggested that product differentiation is the distinguishing characteristic 
of this market conduct where differentiation is achieved through such factors as " ... 
quality, design, color, or style", where " ... 
in so far as these and other intangible 
factors vary from seller to seller, the `product' in each case is different" (p. 56). 
Baumol et al (1982) amended for this by suggesting that an " ... entrant can closely or 
exactly duplicate the product design of the firm depicted" (p. 332), or if each variant 
is sold by at least two suppliers, perfect contestability will lead to marginal cost 
pricing. Martin (1993) considers this revision in greater depth. 
Firms operating in a monopolistically competitive market selling differentiated 
products can be viewed to be qualitatively indistinguishable from classical profit 
maximising monopolists at the firm level. To elaborate this point, Chamberlin (1933) 
emphasised that as " .., long as the substitutes are to any degree imperfect, he (the 
firm. ) still has a monopoly of his own product and control over its price within the 
limits imposed upon any monopolist - those of demand" (p. 67). The mortgage 
provider could therefore be assumed to provide a financial service with distinct 
characteristics. The provision of a mortgage with these exact characteristics is 
possible only through the one mortgage provider. Thus at the firm level a 
monopolistically competitive firm and a monopolist are indistinguishable. Following 
Baumol (1982), whilst characteristics may be viewed as distinct on a firm level, at the 
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industry level substitute characteristics, deemed equivalent by the consumer, may be 
incorporated within the service by other incumbent providers. A clear distinction 
between monopolistic competition and profit maximising monopoly may then be 
observed at the group or industry level. Analysis of monopolistic competition can be 
seen, to be concerned with both an individual equilibrium and group equilibrium 
(Panzar and Rosse, 1987). To test for this situation the comparative static approach of 
the Rosse-Panzar statistic is employed. 
6.3. Previous studies 
A number of previous approaches have been used to quantify competition in banking. 
These may be broadly divided into the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) 
paradigm (from Bain, 1951) and New Economic Industrial Organisation (NEIO) 
approaches (see Bresnahan, 1989). 
The SCP paradigm considers how the observable characteristics of a market or 
industry may affect the conduct and performance of participants within the market. 
Development of this approach was partly driven by difficulties experienced in the 
empirical measurement of concepts used by economic theory (such as marginal cost 
and elasticity) and partly by the desire to build a theory of sub-optimal behaviour. 
Previous SCP studies have used a range of proxies to represent market structure and 
market performance. Market structure has been represented by the relationship 
between buyer and seller costs, the degree of product differentiation, the degree of 
concentration within a market place, the degree of market share, and the entry 
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conditions for potential new firms. Profitability, the relation of rates of return to 
assets, the scale of the costs of selling and efficiencies have been used to represent 
market performance. Other factors, including risk, leverage, buyer and seller 
concentration and foreign competition and macro-economic factors, have all been 
considered in various SCP studies. 
Principal findings of SCP studies include the rejection of the concept of long-term 
equilibrium, a link between the performance of the firm and the concentration of the 
market and the connection between performance and the market power of individual 
firms. Problems with the SCP paradigm have been numerous, although the central 
problem of whether high profits indicate good or bad performance has been a serious 
block on further research. 
A number of empirical studies have tested hypotheses relating to the SCP framework 
for depository financial institutions. Lloyd-Williams and Molyneux (1994) considered 
the effect of governmental and regulatory pressures upon banks to merge and the 
consequent effects upon market structure and conduct in a study of Spanish banks. 
Assuming that a higher degree of market concentration will engender collusion 
among firms in the industry, it follows that within an industry of increasing 
concentration Spanish banks may receive substantially larger profits, irrespective of 
other changes within the industry, such as efficiency. This hypothesis was tested 
using a sample of 92 banks for the 3-year period 1986-1988. The results suggested 
that the concentrated market had reduced the cost of collusion and led to higher 
profits for all incumbents. 
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Goldberg and Rai (1996) considered the relationships between market structure and 
performance for a number of European banks between 1988-91. The traditional SCP 
hypothesis and the structure-efficiency hypothesis were tested using a range of 
performance indicators and a translog cost model specification with an intermediation 
approach. Little support was found for either hypothesis. 
Molyneux and Forbes (1995) consider the SCP paradigm for banks in 18 countries. 
The sample taken between 1986-89 includes banks operating in a broad range of 
regulatory environments. The study provides empirical support for the traditional SCP 
paradigm concluding that the degree of concentration has an effect on the level of 
competition within the industry. Other studies have also been conducted by Bourke 
(1989), Berger and Hannan (1989) and Molyneux et al (1996). A review of many of 
the SCP studies (pre-1984 studies, primarily from the US) is provided by Gilbert 
(1984) 
The New Economic Industrial Organisation paradigm (NEIO) (see Bresnahan, 1989) 
considers market power in single markets or industries. Two central ideas dominate 
the NEIO paradigm. First, it is assumed that price-cost margins are not directly 
observable (i. e. marginal cost is not directly observed), but may be inferred from firm 
behaviour. Secondly, the view that individual industries have important idiosyncrasies 
is assumed. This point implies that the institutional features of an industry may 
influence the conduct of individual firms. Firm and industry conduct are viewed as 
unknown and have to be estimated. 
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Previous studies of competition in depository institutions and financial markets, using 
techniques other than the Rosse-Panzar statistic, have been limited. Notable examples 
include Spiller and Favaro (1984), Suominen (1994), and Vesala (1995). Spiller and 
Favaro (1984) considered the form of competition that was present in the Uruguayan 
banking sector. The analysis suggested that banking firms do not have the same 
conjectures, or respond differently to actions of other banking firms within the same 
market. Size was viewed to be a determinant of differing conjectures. Suominen 
(1994) considered a two product test for competition in the Finnish banking industry 
between 1986 and 1990. It was concluded " ... that some monopoly power was 
present in the pricing of banking services during the late 1980s" (p. 107). Vesala 
(1995), in a research monograph, estimated a number of NEIO models, including the 
Rosse-Panzar statistic, also for the Finnish banking industry during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. A broad range of issues were considered, including the nature and level 
of oligopolistic behaviour, the measurement of price competition over time, and an 
analysis of the interdependence between deposit and loans market. 
Studies that apply the Rosse-Panzar statistic in relation to depository institution 
markets include Nathan and Neave (1989), Molyneux et al (1994) and Vesala (1995). 
Nathan and Neave (1989) applied the Rosse-Panzar statistic to a sample of Canadian 
financial institutions. Cross-sectional samples of 14 schedule A and 58 schedule B 
banks and 39 trust companies were considered for 1982 and 1984. Monopolistic 
behaviour was indicated for Canadian financial institutions. Molyneux et al (1994) 
used the Rosse-Panzar statistic to assess competitive conditions in a number of 
European banking markets. This broad ranging study incorporated a number of 
variables to control for risk, cost and size characteristics of the institutions considered. 
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A sample of German, French, Italian, Spanish and UK banks were considered for the 
period 1986-89. The study concluded that monopolistic competition existed in the UK 
banking market (a result of 0.628 was estimated for the Rosse-Panzar statistic). 
Similar results were obtained for the other European markets. Vesala (1995) used a 
similar approach to assess the levels of competition in Finnish banks between 1985 
and 1992. Cross- sections were estimated for every year. A substantial increase in the 
level of competition of Finnish banking was observable over the sample period, with 
the H statistic estimates rising from 0.182 in 1985 to 0.620 in 1992. This increase in 
competition coincided with the substantial re-regulation of the Finnish banking sector 
in 1986. 
6.4 The Rosse-Panzar statistic 
The Rosse-Panzar statistic may be used to test for long-run competitive equilibrium 
(or perfect competition), monopoly (or perfect cartel conditions) and monopolistic 
competition (or long-run Chamberlinian equilibrium). The testing procedure is 
undertaken in two stages. Validity of the overall or competitive equilibrium test 
requires that the sample be in long-run equilibrium. Thus, presence of long-run 
equilibrium has to be tested first. The competitive environment statistic (H), which 
may then be estimated, can be viewed as the sum of firm level elasticities of total 
revenue with respect to input prices. This can be written as: 
H=J: wjaR/awr/R (6.1) 
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where w= input price, R= the revenue function, for i firms. The differing 
interpretations of the H statistic are displayed in Table 6.1. 
How the statistic enables testing for distinct forms of market conduct and behaviour 
may be explained intuitively. The H statistic quantifies the responsiveness of total 
revenue to a proportional increase in all input prices. Cost is assumed to be linearly 
homogeneous in input prices, so that a one per cent increase in input prices will 
inflate costs by one per cent for all output levels. The symmetry assumption is 
imposed a priori and presupposes that the quantity of output produced will not vary 
with differing forms of market conduct. 
Table 6.1 Interpretations of the H statistic 
-Estimated H Industry equilibrium/ competitive equilibrium 
H: 50 Monopoly equilibrium. 
H is a decreasing function of the perceived demand elasticity 
0<H<1 Monopolistic competition (Chamberlinian equilibrium) 
H is an increasing function of the perceived demand elasticity 
H=1 Perfect competition 
Source: adapted from Molyneux et al (1994) and Vesala (1995). 
A profit maximising monopolist will produce where marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue. If factor prices increase, there will be a proportionate rise in marginal cost 
(assuming linear homogeneity). This in turn will lead to a reduction in the quantity of 
i 
output and a rise in price. As the monopolist will only operate on the elastic portion of 
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the demand curve, the elasticity of total revenue with respect to input prices will be 
non-positive (i. e. H SO). 
Under long-run competitive equilibrium (or perfect competition), an increase in factor 
prices will lead to a proportionate rise in average and marginal costs. This will, in the 
short-term, reduce revenues and lead to the exit of incumbents. This exit will increase 
the demand facing the remaining incumbents. Following established theory, in the 
long-run, an unchanged equilibrium level of output is expected. This is due to the 
infinitely elastic demand curve faced by firms in a perfectly competitive market. The 
rise in, costs will equally lead to a proportional increase in total revenue for the 
remaining incumbents so that the elasticity of total revenue with respect to input 
prices will equal unity (i. e. H= 1). 
Under monopolistic competition or large group Chamberlinian equilibrium, the firm 
will produce at a long-run level of output and price that is determined by the tangency 
between average cost and the demand function'. The difference between the average 
cost at which the firm operates and the minimum average cost (where a firm would 
produce in perfect competition) provides an indication of the level of market power 
exercised by the firm. A rise in factor prices will increase average cost, which in turn 
will lead to a fall in both output and revenue. Through imposing the a priori 
assumption that the elasticity of demand of a firm under symmetric monopolistic 
competition will increase with the number of substitutes for a product, the degree of 
`competitiveness' of the market may be quantified. Thus the value of the H statistic 
between zero and unity should indicate the degree of control incumbent firms possess 
over their differentiated product markets and therefore the contestability of the 
market. A lower value of H will indicate a higher level of control over differentiated 
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product markets or a lower level of contestability. Conversely, a higher value for H 
will suggest a lower level of control over differentiated product markets and a higher 
level of contestability. 
A number of potential difficulties with the statistic have been suggested. Shaffer 
(1982) emphasised the importance of considering firms operating in the same market. 
He also stressed that the presence of many small firms may disguise the presence of 
disequilibrium. This would cause the estimate of H to fall and make a negative value 
more likely, regardless of the conduct prevalent within the market. Following 
recommendations made by Shaffer, the stability of market shares over the sample 
period should be examined to test if such bias is occurring. When the market shares 
display stability, a bias by the small firms effect may be rejected. When instability is 
recognised, a small firms effect may be present leading to lower than expected H 
statistic results. Additionally, the limited definition of the production process denoted 
by the truncated functional form, may be viewed as a blunt approximation of the true 
productive technology (Perrakis, 1991). 
6.5 Data 
A balanced data set of 77 building societies between 1990 to 1995 is employed. The 
data, drawn from the Annual Reports and Accounts of the building societies, are 
pooled for two periods of 1990-1992 and 1993-1995 and deflated to 1993 prices by 
the Retail Price Index. An incomplete data set is used (the total number of building 
societies in 1990 was 99) in order to obtain a balanced and contiguous set. 
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The - factor prices used in the empirical model are defined following the 
recommendations provided in chapter 3. The price of labour is defined as the total 
yearly labour costs of a building society divided by the number of full-time equivalent 
employees. The price of capital is defined as the total annual expenditure on capital 
goods and infrastructure in addition to the level of depreciation divided by the level of 
fixed assets held by the building society. Criticisms of this definition and possible 
bias that may consequently occur are discussed in chapter 3. The price of deposits is 
defined as total interest paid divided by the level of deposits held by the individual 
building societies. 
A number of environmental variables are included in the revenue function to control 
for 
, 
firm specific and external factors that may be associated with revenue. By 
controlling for factors that may systematically vary with the dependent variable 
estimation bias may be reduced. Total assets (Ass) are used to control for different 
building society sizes and potential economies of scale. Other control variables 
include the loans to assets ratio (LAR) and the level of provisions for bad and doubtful 
debts (used as a proxy for the level of risky behaviour and the differing levels of asset 
quality). This variable (denoted by PD) is included to control for the potentially 
higher or lower profits that may be associated with risky behaviour. 
Average levels of building society profit are variable over the sample period. An 
average profit of approximately £16m was recorded between 1990 and 1991 across 
the 77 societies. A considerable rise in average profits is recorded for 1994 and 1995, 
when levels of £22m are achieved. Interest payable and receivable, both overall and 
specifically on retail deposits and non-retail deposits have displayed a gradual 
decline. This trend mirrors the underlying interest rate prevailing within the economy 
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as a whole. The differential between interest received and interest payable rises over 
the period from £A6m in 1991 to £64m in 1995 indicating an overall rise of nearly 40 
per cent over the entire period. This change is perhaps an indication of the instability 
of interest rates, a reduction in the level of competition or a move towards greater 
internal reserve generation. 
6.6, ý ti. Model specification 
T5 
To investigate competitive conditions, a revenue function is specified, assuming an 
intermediation model of bank production (see Sealey and Lindley, 1977). Further 
discussion of the intermediation model is contained in chapter 3 and chapter 7. It is 
assumed that mortgage loans are produced using labour, capital and deposits. Total 
revenue from mortgages (TR) is the interest receivable on mortgages. The model form 
employed follows the approach adopted by Molyneux et al (1994). This allows 
comparison of our results with the estimations for the UK retail-banking sector. 
The equilibrium test employed is similar to that used in previous studies (for example 
Molyneux et al, 1994, and Nathan and Neave, 1989). The equilibrium test is based on 
the assumption that in equilibrium, long-run competitive capital markets will equalise 
risk-adjusted rates of return across financial institutions. It would therefore be 
expected that, in equilibrium, the rates of return should not be correlated with input 
prices. This is tested by imposing return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable in 
the regression equation. If a significant value is noted in the sum of parameter 
coefficients for factor prices, a level of correlation or association between the rate of 
return and factor prices is reported. This would be an indication of dis-equilibrium 
conditions. If the sum of parameter coefficients for factor prices is not significantly 
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different from zero, association or correlation between the rate of return and factor 
prices is rejected. This result would suggest that equilibrium conditions are prevalent 
in this market. 
The empirical model may therefore be represented as: 
Competitive environment test 
LnTR =a+ ßLnPL + ZLnPK + bLnPF + cpLnAss + OLnPD + 77LnLAR (6.2) 
Equilibrium test 
LnROA = y+ Kd nPL + ALnPK + /LLnPF + vLnAss +'rLnPD + rLnLAR (6.3) 
Where: 
Ln = Natural logarithm 
TR = Total mortgage interest revenue (i. e. total revenue) 
ROA = Return on assets (the ratio of profits after tax to total assets) 
P,, = Labour expense per full time employee 
PK = Capital expenses per pound of fixed assets 
PF = Ratio of interest payable on retail funds to total retail funds (i. e. the 
unit price of retail funds) 
Ass = Total assets 
LAR = Mortgage to assets ratio 
PD Ratio of provision for bad and doubtful debts to total assets 
and a, A, x, S q', 0,77, y, K, A, p, v, 'rand rare parameters to be estimated. 
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6.7 Results 
Parameter estimates, diagnostic statistics and H statistics are displayed in Table 6.2. 
The majority of t statistics for the competitive environment test are statistically 
significant, suggesting a low level of estimation error. The model fit diagnostic 
statistics (the adj. R2 and F statistics) indicate a high level of model fit for the 1990-92 
period with this statistic. A lower level of model fit (although still statistically 
significant) is recorded for the 1993-95 period. The log likelihood statistic= is 
substantial for both time periods, indicating that a linear form of the equation is 
rejected. The Durbin-Watson statistic is a test for autocorrelation and may be regarded 
as a test of mis-specification in this model. The presence of substantial auto- 
correlation for either time period is rejected. The majority of t statistics for the 
equilibrium test are also statistically significant, suggesting a low level of estimation 
error. The diagnostic statistics for model fit, with the equilibrium test, differ between 
the two time periods. The 1990-92 period exhibits a low, but, statistically significant 
level of model fit, whilst in the 1993-95 period, model fit may be rejected. Linearity 
and substantial autocorrelation are both rejected for the equilibrium statistic. 
The coefficient for the price of labour is positive for both periods yet significant for 
the 1993-1995 period. Estimates of the capital price coefficient are insignificant in 
both equations and both time periods. The deposit price coefficient is significant and 
positive for both periods indicating the relative importance of this input in the revenue 
function. 
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Table 6.2 Parameter estimates, diagnostic statistics and results 
Competitive Environment test 
1990-1992 1993-1995 
a -0.704 (0.681) -1.083 (0.128) * 
ß 0.004 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005) * 
x -0.008 (0.008) 0.002 (0.008) 
8 0.561 (0.022) * 0.494 (0.035) * 
-0.009 (0.002) * 0.010 (0.002) * 
cp 0.505 (0.040) * 0.493 (0.037) * 
11 0.004 (0.001) * 0.016 (0.002) * 
Equilibrium test 
-2.195 (0.484) * -5.720 (0.713) * 
K -0.089 (0.038) * -0.044 (0.029) 
X -0.038 (0.056) -0.023 (0.045) 
µ 0.477 (0.158) * -0.167 (0.019) * 
v -0.077 (0.016)* 0.004 (0.011) 
n. 
a 
1.597 (0.285) * 0.280 (0.204) 
ti -0.008 (0.008) 0.003 (0.009) 
Competitive environment test Equilibrium test 
1990-1992 Adj. R2 = 0.840 Adj. R2 = 0.185 
1993-1995 Adj. R2 = 0.565 Adj. R2 = 0.016 
1990-1992 F statistic = 208.01* F statistic = 9.910* 
1993-1995 F statistic = 52.200* F statistic = 1.640 
1990-1992 Durbin Watson = 1.954 Durbin Watson = 2.121 
1993-1995 Durbin Watson = 2.010 Durbin Watson = 2.192 
1990-1992 Log Likelihood = 311.652 Log Likelihood = -153.150 
1993-1995 Log Likelihood = 330.071 Log Likelihood = -76.824 
Competitive environment test Equilibrium test 
1990-1992 0.557 (0.023)* 0.3505 (0.164)* 
1993-1995 0.504 (0.036)* -0.2338 (0.201) 
Note: standard errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
The control for total asset size (Ass) appears indecisive, shifting sign between the time 
periods for both equations, perhaps suggesting a changing relationship between the 
scale of building societies and the other variables. The PD coefficient is significantly 
positive for both time periods and in both equations. This result indicates that the 
level of provisions for risky loans and revenue and the levels of provisions for risky 
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loans and return on assets may both be positively correlated. The LAR coefficient is 
positive and significant for both periods with the competitive environment test. 
The results from the equilibrium test are mixed. The sum of parameter coefficients for 
factor prices is significantly different to zero in the 1990-92 period indicating that dis- 
equilibrium may be present. The sum of parameter coefficients of factor prices are not 
significantly different from zero in the 1993-1995 period suggesting that equilibrium 
is present in 1993-95 period. The results indicate only weak inference may be drawn 
for the dis-equilibrium period. 
The 'competitive environment H test allows rejection of long-run competitive 
equilibrium or monopoly equilibrium for both time periods. The value of the H 
statistic falls from 0.565 to 0.504 between 1990-92 and 1993-95. This indicates that a 
increasing level of market power is observed over the sample period. To summarise, 
an increasing level of monopolistic competition may be observed for the building 
society sector between 1990 and 1995. 
Following the recommendations made by Shaffer (1982), the presence of market 
stability is also tested. The degree of market stability of incumbents' market share is 
quantified with three methods. First, a sum of absolute changes in market shares for 
the building society mortgage market for the top 5,10 and 15 building societies is 
taken, following the method used by Hardwick (1996). Secondly, the correlation of 
market shares and ranks in the mortgage market in different years is made. Thirdly, a 
test of independence of market shares in the mortgage market between different years 
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is performed using the Wilcoxian-Mann-Whitney testa. Results of the tests are 
presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Tests of market stability 
Sum of absolute changes in market shares 
Top 5 Top 10 Top 15 
1990-1991 -0.171 0.000 0.102 1991-1992 -0136 0.013 0.005 1992-1993 -0.041 0.035 0.014 1993-1994 -0.077 0.013 -0.002 1994-1995 0.323 0.119 0.069 
Correlation of market shares and market share ranks 
Rank 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Market share 
1990 - 0.999 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.994 1991 0.999 - 0.999 0.998 0.997 0.995 1992 0.998 0.999 - 0.999 0.998 0.995 1993 0.998 0.999 0.999 - 0.999 0.997 
1994 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 - 0.997 
1995 0.984 0.978 0.998 0.980 0.984 - 
The Wilcoxian-Mann-Whitney test 
Z 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1990 - -0.042 -0.030 -0.077 -0.103 -0.364 1991 -0.042 - -0.056 -0.042 -0.061 -0.310 1992 -0.030 -0.056. - -0.101 -0.115 -0.387 1993 -0.077 -0.042 -0.101 - -0.028 -0.295 1994 -0.103 -0.061 -0.115 -0.030 - -0.279 1995 -0.364 -0.310 -0.387 -0.295 -0.279 - 
The sum of absolute changes in market shares indicates a low level of absolute 
change in market shares amongst the largest incumbent building societies during the 
sample period. The correlation of ranks and market shares are presented in the middle 
of the table. These statistics indicate high levels of correlation between different years 
in the building society mortgage market and only a slight decline over time. The 
Wilcoxian-Mann-Whitney test is used to test whether the market shares for a specific 
year have been drawn from the same population as another year. The null hypothesis 
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cannot be rejected for any pair of years with 0.01 significance. These results support 
the hypothesis that market shares were stable during the sample period. 
6.8 Conclusions 
This study suggests that monopolistically competitive conduct was present in the UK 
building society mortgage market during the early 1990s. The level of market power 
of incumbent building societies also exhibits a slight rise over the sample period. This 
is reflected in the rising level of interest spread experienced by building societies 
throughout the sample period. Such a result occurs at a time of rising profitability of 
the sector as a whole. 
Bias in the Rosse-Panzar statistic resulting from instability in market share of building 
societies is rejected. The UK building society mortgage market appears to be 
operating under similar competitive conditions to the UK retail bank loan market, as 
reported by Molyneux et al, (1996). A slightly lower level of market power in the 
building societies mortgage market was indicated. It may be concluded that the 
building society mortgage market does not appear to be particularly competitive. The 
estimated values for the H statistic indicate a level of market power approximately 
half-way between monopoly and perfect competition. 
The implications of these findings for the efficiency and productivity of the sector are 
substantial. As building societies operate with a degree of market power and not at 
minimum average cost, opportunities for `slack' management to follow alternative 
objectives to cost minimisation and efficiency maximisation may exist. This would 
result in a reduction in the level of efficiency and productivity below what would 
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otherwise be expected. Possible avenues for future research into the measurement of 
levels of competition between depository institutions will be considered in chapter 11. 
t See Varian, 1984, for further discussion of these specific market forms. Z As the model is estimated with an Ordinary Least Squares estimator, the log-likelihood test only tests 
for log-linearity and not for model fit, as is possible when a Maximum Likelihood estimator is 
employed (see Greene, 1993 and chapter 9 for further discussion). 3 The Wilcoxian-Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric statistic, which is used to test if two groups of 
ordinal or continuous data have been drawn from the same population. The null hypothesis of the test is 
that the two samples have the same distribution. The alternative hypothesis is that one sample (X) is 
stochastically larger than the other sample (Y), i. e. it is a directional hypothesis. The two samples are 
deemed to be part of the same distribution if the `bulk' of the sample X, is similar to the 'bulk' of 
sample Y. The test is conducted by considering the average ranks of the two samples (X or Y). If the 
average ranks are similar then the null hypothesis is not rejected. Conversely, if the average ranks do 
differ the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative would not be rejected. Significance levels are 
determined in relation to Wilcoxian-Mann-Whitney distribution (from tables). See Siegal and Castellan 
(1988) for further discussion of this statistic. 
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Chapter 7 Economies of scale, economies of product mix and cost efficiency in 
the UK retail banking sector 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides estimates of distribution-free cost efficiency, economies of 
scale, economies of scope and cost complementarities in the UK retail banking 
industry. Two distinct approaches to modelling bank production, the production and 
intermediation approaches, are employed. A fixed-effects panel data model with a 
translog specification is used to provide estimates over the sample period 1984-1997. 
To the author's knowledge, this is the first study to estimate the cost characteristics of 
the UK retail-banking sector over time. 
The properties of the production and intermediation models were discussed in chapter 
3. Theoretically, both models appear to represent the activities of financial institutions 
adequately but differences may exist in terms of statistical estimation. Following 
recommendations forwarded in chapter 3, both models are estimated. Differences in 
terms of model fit, approximation error and specification error will be assessed in 
order to suggest which modelling approach is superior in terms of the statistical 
criteria (though it must be emphasised that neither model can be rejected in terms of 
its economic interpretation). 
Many studies in the USA and Europe (but not the UK) have examined the existence 
of economies of scale and scope in banking (see chapter 4). The importance of a cost 
study of UK retail banks lies primarily in the provision of empirical evidence as to 
152 
whether many of the recent changes in British banking have been driven by cost 
factors. The only previous efficiency studies of UK retail banking are Allen and Rai 
(1996), Drake and Howcroft (1994) and Altunbas et al (1995)1. Allen and Rai (1996) 
estimated a global cost function with bank observations from 15 countries, including 
the UK. Drake and Howcroft (1995) used a non-parametric DEA (data envelopment 
analysis) method to calculate the relative efficiency of bank branches for a UK 
clearing bank. Optimal bank branches were found to be those branches which had 
total lending of £3 - 5.25m and an average of nine employees. Altunbas et al (1995) 
estimated inefficiency scores for a pooled sample of banks and building societies in 
1993 (also see Molyneux et al, 1996). An econometric frontier model was employed 
with assumptions of an exponential distribution of inefficiency imposed. The model 
assumed that banks and building societies employed three inputs to produce earning 
assets, the only output included in the model. Overall, very low levels of inefficiency 
were found. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 outlines the model specification, 
while the methods used in the estimation of the cost models are outlined in section 
7.3. The data set is described in section 7.4 and results from the cost models are 
presented in section 7.5. A summary of the chapter and conclusions are provided in 
section 7.6. 
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7.2, : Model specification 
As mentioned in section 7.1 and following the suggestion in chapter 3, both the 
production and intermediation models of depository institution production are 
estimated in this chapter. 
In the intermediation approach to modelling bank production, banks are assumed to 
borrow funds and transform them into loan funds, which form the principal output 
from the productive system. Banks are assumed to use deposits as raw materials or 
intermediate products within the production process. These inputs are transformed 
into the final product, loans and ancillary business (the latter output being outside the 
scope of the principal intermediating process). Total cost consists of operational cost 
(i. e. labour and capital cost) and the interest cost of attracting the borrowed funds that 
are then re-lent. This definition of monetary inputs and outputs ignores the effects of 
differing asset quality and risks associated with lending. 
In the production approach, depository institutions may be viewed as transforming 
two input groups (capital and labour; X1, X2) into three output groups (loans, 
investments and deposits); Y1, Y2, Y3. Cost is defined as operating cost (0C). 
In both models, outputs are quantified by their values at the end of the financial year. 
Y, denotes the aggregate of loans issued by the bank at the end of that year, Y2 
represents the total deposits held by the bank, and Y. denotes investments held by the 
bank. The price of labour (P, ) is proxied by the total annual wage bill divided by the 
number of full-time equivalent employees. The price of capital (P2) is proxied by the 
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aggregation of annual property and equipment rentals and depreciation divided by the 
book value of physical capital, multiplied by 1000, to provide a measure of capital 
cost for every £1000 of physical capital. The price of deposits (P3) is total interest 
payable divided by the book value of deposits, multiplied by 1000, to provide a 
measure of the interest cost of every £1000 of deposits. 2 The level of provisions for 
bad and doubtful loans (PROV) is included as a variable to control for the effects of 
risk and differing levels of asset quality in the model. PROV is measured by the value 
of provisions at the end of the financial year. Previous studies that have included the 
level of provisions for bad and doubtful debts include Berger and Mester (1997) who 
suggest that this variable may act as a control for different asset qualities. Although 
previous work into the effect of provisions of bad and doubtful loans on asset quality 
has generally been inconclusive (see, for example, Berger and DeYoung, 1997), a 
negative partial derivative of log C with respect to log PROV would be expected as a 
higher provision would represent poorer management leading to lower cost 
efficiency. 
7.3 Estimation of the cost models 
The model is estimated using a one-way fixed-effects model and the results are used 
to estimate measures of economies of scale and economies of scope. Panel data 
models attempt to amend for differences in time and firm-specific changes, which are 
not considered in pooled data analysis. 
The basic linear relationship for a panel data model, may be defined as 
155 
Yi = x,, ß+ u; t (7.1) 
where i=1,2,..., n denotes, for example individual firms, and incorporates the cross- 
sectional dimension of the model; t=1,2,..., T denotes time and the time series 
dimension of the model. Y« is the it`h observation of the dependant variable and X;, is 
the it`h observation of the explanatory variables. ýß represents the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables. For a one-way error component model, the error term uit may 
be written: 
uit = fli + vir (Z2) 
where Ali represents the time invariant individual specific effects and vet denotes the 
remaining error. In the fixed-effects model, it is assumed that Ui are constant or fixed 
parameters to be estimated, whilst V are independent and identically distributed 
stochastic terms. These terms may be collected to represent the fixed-effects linear 
relationship as: 
_ ýllý + 
Xj, i + vi, (7.3) it 
This model may be estimated using a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model. 
The procedure for estimation is set out in detail in Greene (1993,1995), Baltagi 
(1995) and Intriligator et al (1996). The fixed-effects model assumes that the period- 
varying effects are constants for each firm. This assumption implies that the sample is 
drawn from a population with finite boundaries. The fixed-effects model thus 
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operates through conditional inference. `Effects' models aggregate both period 
invariant and individual invariant variables with individual time varying variables. 
Due to the limited number of observations in the retail banking data set, a translog 
functional form (rather than a flexible Fourier functional form) is used to represent 
productive technology. Further explanation of this decision is given in chapter 5. A 
non-decreasing relationship between inputs and outputs, concavity of the cost 
function and homogeneity of degree one in input prices is assumed. The expansion of 
the cost functions into Diewert flexible, second-order translog cost models allows the 
potential benefits of multi-product production to be estimated. The relaxation of the 
output homogeneity restrictions allows measurement of economies of scale. The cost 
function model is assumed to be separable by restriction. 
The production and intermediation translog models may be written as follows, where 
for simplicity the i and t subscripts are omitted. 
The production model 
LnOC= EajLnYj+EßrLnp, +2Ey , xjSLnYj 
Ys+2ovrgLnPºLnpq+ 
rjsrq 
II 8j, LnYjLnP, + i7LnPROV+ 
1 %(LnPROV)2+v+v (7.4) 
jr 
forj, s=1,2,3andr, q=1,2. 
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The intermediation model 
LnC= Y 
a; Ln Y; + 
1ßr Pr +2Il zjsLnyj Lnys +2 %ÜryLn Pr 1JZ pq + 
S jrLn yj Ln Pr +i jLnPROV + 
jr2 
(LnPROV ýZ +v+v (7.5) 
andforj, s= 1,2andr, q= 1,2,3. 
Following established cost and production theory, restrictions are imposed to ensure 
symmetry (. ,= Xý and cvrq= (vqr). Linear homogeneity in input prices of degree 
one (where linear homogeneity suggests if all input prices are doubled, then costs are 
exactly doubled) requires: 
ß3r=1 
, 
ZO)rq=O, 2: Sjr=0, (7.6) 
rrj 
In the equations, PROV represents provisions against bad and doubtful debts, OC 
indicates operating cost, C represents total cost, Y represents outputs, P denotes input 
prices and a, ß, S, X, A, rJ and co are parameters to be estimated (the estimates will of 
course different for the two models and will be reported separately). The error term 
represented here as v+v includes both random error and firm specific effects, 
incorporating both the intercept and the error term. 
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7.4 - Measures of cost efficiency and the data 
Distribution-free cost efficiency is a measure of long-run, firm-specific efficiency. 
The specific efficiency of individual retail banks is derived through reference to the 
efficiency of the most cost efficient retail bank within the sample. The advantage of 
this approach is that it removes many of the strong distributional assumptions of 
efficiency imposed in alternative techniques such as econometric frontiers (see Drake 
and Weyman-Jones, 1996, and chapter 5, for further discussion of this issue). 
Efficiency is derived directly from the individual effects produced by the fixed- 
effects model, where the individual effects, v, would include the " ... unobservable 
entrepreneurial or managerial skills of the firm's executives" (Baltagi, 1995, p. 9). The 
approach assumes that efficiency is constant over time and random variation in 
efficiency may be removed through averaging over time. Distribution-free efficiency 
may written: 
Efficiency = exp(min[v]-v) = min[v]/v (7.7) 
for the i retail bank, where min(t) is assumed to be the fixed-effect of most efficient 
bank in the sample. The measure is bounded by [0,1] where 1 represents 100 per cent 
relative cost efficiency. For further discussion of this measure, see DeYoung (1997). 
The sample was constructed with data from the Annual Reports and Accounts of 11 
UK retail banks from 1984 to 1997. All of the 11 banks are recorded, over the period, 
in the Annual Abstract of Banking Statistics, produced by the British Bankers 
Association. The data are deflated using the Retail Price Index to 1985 prices. The 
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banks included in the sample are the Royal Bank of Scotland, TSB, Barclays, 
Clydesdale, the Co-operative Bank, Lloyds, Midland, Natwest, Bank of Scotland, 
Abbey National and Yorkshire. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Year Operating Loans (£m) Deposits Labour Capital Deposit 
Cost (£m) (£m) price (£) price (£) price (f) 
1985-1989 Mean 1403.7 32417.3 36988.0 33451.9 271.9 79.7 
Standard Deviation 1023.7 24036.4 25430.0 50232.1 253.9 13.6 
1990-1993 Mean 1074.0 25976.5 29670.1 30915.5 470.3 85.8 
Standard Deviation 1113.1 24537.3 27567.6 58695.3 507.9 22.0 
1994-1997 Mean 1071.8 30271.6 31971.4 39813.8 499.8 50.3 
Standard Deviation 1077.5 26375.1 27313.5 83362.5 545.5 12.1 
Overall Mean 1145.9 28728.9 31965.0 34381.1 430.0 71.6 
Standard Deviation 1056.8 24535.0 26399.0 64403.4 476.4 28.1 
Over the sample period, many substantial changes occurred in the UK retail-banking 
sector. The levels of operating cost consistently fell. The levels of deposits and loans 
(by value) initially fell from a high in the 1985-89 period to a low point in 1990-93. 
This low period was marked by economic recession and the possible increased 
competition in the retail-banking sector, both between retail banks and new entrants, 
such as the building societies. Recovery from this position is observed in the 1994-97 
period. Input prices also varied substantially over the sample period. The price of 
labour, initially falling in the 1990-93 period, rose to a high in the 1994-97 period. 
The price of capital has risen consistently throughout the sample period, perhaps 
providing an indication of the levels of investment undertaken in this sector. Deposit 
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prices fell throughout the period 1985-97. This decline in deposit price may be 
regarded as a reflection of a long-term decline of interest rates and the consequent 
reduction in interest costs. Further discussion of the performance of the UK retail- 
banking sector is provided in chapter 2 and by Colwell (1991). 
7.5 Results 
The parameter estimates and diagnostic statistics are presented in Table 7.2. Partial 
derivatives of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of input prices and 
output quantities are displayed in Table 7.3. The estimates of economies of scale, 
economies of scope and cost complementarities are shown in Table 7.4, and estimates 
of cost efficiency are presented in Table 7.5. Results for the partial derivatives of the 
logarithms of cost with respect to the logarithm of input prices and output quantities 
and economies of scale and scope are presented for the entire sample period and for 
the periods, 1984-89,1990-93 and 1994-97. Statistics are not considered over 
different asset size groups due to the small sample size. 
The majority of t statistics are statistically significant for the intermediation model. 
The relatively low number of significant t statistics for the production model, 
however, suggests that this model may experience higher levels of approximation 
error than the intermediation model. The diagnostic tests concerned with the degree 
of model fit (the adjusted R2 and F statistic) both indicate high levels of model fit for 
both the intermediation and production models. The F test for the restrictions 
(equation 7.6) is significant with the intermediation model and is not significant with 
the production model. This finding suggests that the data employed may not `fit' the 
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production model and specification error is possible. This finding is important, as the 
assessment of model fit is one of the objectives stated in section 7.1. 
Table 7.2 Parameters of the fixed effects models 
Intermediation Production Intermediation Production 
Coeff. Standard Coeff. Standard Coeff. Standard Coeff. Standard 
Error Error Error Error 
al -5.916 (0.541)* -1.634 (2.191) w33 0.817 (0.076)* - - 
a2 -8.624 (0.832)* -0.250 (0.274) w12 -0.809 (0.070)* -0.073 (0.054) 
a3 - 1.893 (2.060) co13 -0.806 (0.114)* - - 
ß1 -11.334 (0.356)* 0.793 (0.585) (0 23 0.083 
(0.028)* - 
ßz -2.037 (0.345) * 0.207 (0.585) 511 -0.322 (0.066) * -0.283 (0.394) 
ß3 15.540 (1.010)* - 812 0.170 (0.031)* 0.063 (0.112) 
x1l 0.981 (0.013)* 0.968 (0.121)* 513 0.081 (0.036)* 
7-22 0.030 (0.006)* 0.007 (0.007) 821 -0.192 (0.064)* -0.091 (0.050)* 
X33 - -0.074 (0.086) 822 0.073 (0.021) * -0.003 (0.017) 
X12 - 0.955 (0.128) * 823 0.190 (0.027) * - 
X13 -0.011 (0.014) -0.911 (0.047)* 831 - - 0.409 (0.376) 
Y-23 - 0.054 (0.091) 832 - - -0.095 (0.106) 
culý 0.718 (0.086)* 0.082 (0.034)* 11 -0.219 (0.041)* 0.038 (0.041) 
cu22 -0.002 (0.036) -0.010 (0.032) ?. 0.057 (0.009) * -0.002 (0.009) 
Standard errors in brackets *= significant at 10% 
Diagnostic Statistics for the Intermediation model 
F statistic for model = 158.92, prob. = 0.000, adj. R2 = 0.972 
F statistic for the restrictions = 115.79 prob. =0.000, Log Likelihood = 22.147 
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Diagnostic Statistics for the Production model 
F statistic for model = 696.07, prob. = 0.0000, adj. R2 = 0.994 
F statistic for the restrictions = 6.598, prob. = 0.23, Log Likelihood = 120.521 
Table 7.3 Partial derivatives of the logarithms of cost with respect to the logarithms of 
input prices and output quantities 
Intermediation Production Intermediation Intermediation ; Production 
Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. ; Coeff. S. E. 
Partial derivative of the logarithm Partial derivative of the logarithm Partial derivative of the logarithm 
of cost with respect to the of cost with respect to the of cost with respect to the 
logarithm of labour price logarithm of deposit price logarithm of capital price 
Overall 0.376 (0.039)*; 0.706 (0.041)* 3.501 (0.027)* -0.079 (0.214): 0.057 (0.193) 
1984-1989 0.169 (0.053)*; 0.779 (0.034)* 4.254 (0.359)* -0.123 (0.209): 0.094 (0.028)* 
1990-1993 0.246 (0.052)*; 0.695 (0.037)* 3.961 (0.324)* -0.023 (0.217)! 0.123 (0.029)* 
1994-1997 0.704 (0.059)*; 0.647 (0.065)* 2.567 (0.197)* -0.096 (0.197)10.062 (0.194) 
Partial derivative of the logarithm Partial derivative of the logarithm Partial derivative of the logarithm 
of cost with respect to the of cost with respect to the of cost with respect to the 
logarithm of loan quantity logarithm of deposit quantity logarithm of investment quantity 
Overall 0.754 (0-049)*: -0.029 (0.016) * 0.542 (0.130) * 0.022 (0.018) : -0.029 (0.130) 
1984-1989 0.807 (0.059)*; 0.209 (0.134) 0.657 (0.152)* 0.068 (0.029)*; -0.038 (0.028) 
1990-1993 0.676 (0.049)*: -0.115 (0.050) * 0.498 (0.115) * 0.067 (0.019)! -0.0l6 (0.021) 
1994-1997 0.764 (0.047) * : -0.067 (0.115) 0.477 (0.141) * 0.066 (0.015)*: 0.034 (0.016) 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
Significant, positive estimates of the partial elasticities of cost with respect to the 
price of labour and deposits are recorded for all time periods for the intermediation 
model in accordance with established cost and production theory. Negative, but 
statistically insignificant estimates are found for the partial elasticity of cost with 
respect to the price of capital price. Both partial elasticities of cost with respect to 
output quantities are positive in accordance with expectation both overall and for all 
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time periods. For the production model, both partial elasticities with respect to input 
prices are positive in accordance with expectation, overall and across time periods. 
The partial elasticities with respect to output quantity are also significantly positive 
for deposits, as expected, but are significantly negative for loans. The presence of 
negative partial elasticities of cost with respect to input prices or output quantities, is 
important to consider as it provides an indication of specification error. 
Table 7.4 Economies of scale, economies of scope and cost complementarities 
Economies of scale Intermediation Production 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Overall -------------" 0.776-------.. _. . -(0.044)t '-------- 0.384 ..... -- ----ýO. OS4)f............ 
1984-1989 0.935 (0.046) 0.410 (0.056) f 
1990-1993 0.704 (0.044) t 0.369 (0.053) t 
1994-1997 0.700 (0.045) t 0.376 (0.055) t 
Economies of scope Cost complementarities 
Intermediation Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error 
Overall -1.577 (0.151)* -0.007 (0.056) 
1984-1989 -2.412 (0.136)* 
1990-1993 -2.377 (0.139)* 
1994-1997 -2.675 (0.408)* 
------------------------ Production ----------------- Estimate ---------------------- Standard Error --------------- Estimate -------------------------- Standard Error 
Overall 7.923 (26.151) 0.931 (0.050)* 
1984-1989 9.374 (9.458) 
1990-1993 6.324 (10.444) 
1994-1997 31.489 (240.89) 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. t= significantly different from I at 10%. *= significantly different from 0 at 
10%. 
Overall, statistically significant economies of scale are found in both models (see 
Table 7.4). An average value of 0.776 is recorded for the intermediation model and an 
average value of 0.384 is recorded for the production model. The value of economies 
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of scale for the production model is very low, indicating that a 100 per cent rise in 
output would only lead to 38 per cent rise in cost (overall). This finding is considered 
to ; be less plausible than the economies of scale estimate obtained with the 
intermediation model. An increase in the degree of the economies of scale is observed 
over time for both models. For the intermediation model, economies of scale increase 
from 0.935 in the 1984-89 period to 0.700 in the 1994-97 period. Economies of scale 
increase from 0.410 to 0.376, over the same period in the production model. 
Economies of scope estimates are shown for both model forms, overall and over time 
periods, in Table 7.6. The intermediation model with two outputs considers the cost 
advantage of producing loans and investments jointly as opposed to separately. The 
production model with three outputs (loans, investments and deposits) considers the 
cost advantage of producing these outputs jointly as opposed to separately. Cost 
complementarities are also reported for both models. 
For the intermediation model, substantial diseconomies of scope are recorded 
suggesting that there would be a potential cost advantage of producing loans and 
investments separately. The magnitude of these, significant, estimates also increased 
over time from -2.412 in 1984-89 to -2.675 in 1994-1997. An insignificant, albeit 
contradictory estimate of cost complementarity is reported for this model, reducing 
the degree of confidence in this finding. This may represent a degree of specification 
or approximation error within the model form. 
For the production model insignificant economies of scope are reported. Significant 3 
f 
and contradictory estimates of cost complementarity are also reported. 
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In . Table 7.5, firm-specific distribution-free cost efficiency (see equation 7.7) 
estimates are reported for both production and intermediation models of bank 
production. An average efficiency of 81.9 per cent is recorded for the production 
model and an average of 98.8 per cent is provided for the intermediation model. This 
indicates that present levels of output could be provided with 18.1 and 1.2 per cent 
reduction in inputs for the production and intermediation models respectively. A 
Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.82 is found for the two sets of efficiency results, 
indicating a substantial degree of association in terms of efficiency between the two 
model forms. Levels of dispersion in efficiency differ in magnitude between the 
model forms with standard deviations of 9.95 and 0.66 estimated for the production 
and intermediation models respectively. The smaller retail banks appear to be 
relatively more efficient than their larger counterparts. 
Table 7.5 Firm-specific estimates of cost efficiency 
Production Intermediation Production Intermediation 
Barclays 72.478 98.782 Royal Bank of Scotland 79.433 98.185 
Co-operative 93.503 99.464 Yorkshire 90.939 99.769 
Clydesdale 100 100 Bank of Scotland 82.618 98.185 
Lloyds 71.678 98.259 TSB 77.267 98.408 
Midland 74.285 98.259 Abbey National 85.036 98.632 
Natwest 73.434 98.707 All banks 81.879 98.786 
7.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, economies of scale, economies of scope and cost efficiency in the UK 
retail-banking sector are estimated. This analysis differs from previous studies by 
considering the UK retail-banking sector in isolation from other institutions and over 
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time., Two models of bank production are estimated, the production and the 
intermediation models. A panel data fixed-effects model is employed to consider cost 
efficiency over a number of years, removing any potential bias from disequilibrium 
effects that may have influenced estimation made by previous cross-sectional studies. 
A translog specification of productive technology is employed. Cost efficiency is 
estimated using distribution-free methods removing potential bias that may occur 
when assumptions concerning the distribution of efficiency are imposed. 
Overall, significant and substantial economies of scale are observed for UK retail 
banks. A preliminary conclusion that may be suggested is that expansion of retail 
banks, either through internal growth or merger, has some justification in terms of 
cost efficiency. A variety of economies of scope estimates have been made. These 
broadly indicate that diseconomies of scope exist in the joint production of loans and 
investments, as indicated by the intermediation model, although the potential cost 
advantage to be gained from separate production may be trivial. The presence of 
statistically insignificant economies of scope for the production model provides 
limited empirical support for the joint provision of loans, investments and deposits. 
The confidence that may be placed in all the economies of scope estimates is limited 
due to the provision of conflicting cost complementarity estimates. A low level of 
firm-specific cost efficiency dispersion exists indicating that only limited cost 
efficiency improvements may be made within this industry, particularly by the larger 
retail banks. This result is similar to that reported by Altunbas et al (1995)4 despite 
the very different econometric techniques employed, the different model form and the 
use of a panel data sample in this study. 
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It may be stated that the estimation of economies of scale may be affected by the 
model form, the small sample size, the techniques applied and the different definition 
of costs used in the two model forms applied. Such variance in results due to the 
model employed, whilst indicating the fallibility of analysis, enables a broader view 
of the problem to be considered. The use of dissimilar definitions of cost is 
considered to be a primary source of such a difference. The production approach does 
not recognise the cost of borrowed funds, whilst with the intermediation approach the 
interest costs may come to dominate other sources of cost, potentially distorting 
results. The presence of substantially lower economies of scale with the 
intermediation approach indicates that the inclusion of retail and non-retail funds as 
inputs significantly alters the production problem considered. The larger banks may 
gain access to funds at a cost advantage due to their size and are able to substitute 
such funds for labour and capital in the production of loans. Additionally the 
intermediation approach appears to display a lower degree of approximation error 
than the production model. This finding suggests that the production approach whilst 
`fitting' the data does not concur fully to what would be expected. 
In conclusion, the analysis of UK retail banks over the sample period 1984-1997 
indicates a variety of results distinct from the findings made in previous studies of 
this sector. Substantial economies of scale appear to be present in UK retail banks. A 
variety of economies of scope estimates are produced with the two model forms. 
These estimates were mostly inconclusive. A low level of efficiency dispersion is 
observed, with smaller retail banks appearing to experience the highest levels of 
relative cost efficiency. Lastly, it is decided that due to the substantial level of 
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approximation error and possible specification error in the production model, the 
intermediation model will be employed in the remaining studies. 
' As cited in Molyneux et al, (1996). 2 The size of these variables are different to those employed in chapter 6, to reduce the degree of variance 
between factor prices, costs and output variables. Through a reduction in the dispersion of variable sizes, it is 
hoped bias in standard errors and other residuals used in this analysis will be minimised. 
3 Very large standard errors are reported for the production model indicating a high level of approximation error 
and possibly specification error. 4 As cited in Molyneux et al, (1996). 
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Chapter 8 Total factor productivity growth and characteristics of production 
technology in the UK retail banking industry. 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides estimates of total factor productivity growth, technical change 
and the components of technical change in the UK retail banking sector between 
1985-97. A time-trend approach with an intermediation model and a translog 
functional form is used. To the author's knowledge, this is the first study to consider 
technical change and total factor productivity growth for UK retail banks. 
Total factor productivity growth is the improvement in productive technology 
generated from changes in the efficiency of production and the state of technology. In 
chapter 2, it was stated that the UK retail banking industry has been restructured and 
invested substantially in new technology during the last decade. Amongst such 
changes are the rapid advances in the computing and communication technology. 
Innovations in these areas have led to the development of telephone and internet 
banking and an expansion in the use of a range of financial instruments. This 
anecdotal evidence of changes in the technology underlying the service provision of 
retail banks (i. e. technical change) would be expected to have a significant influence 
on the productive technology and in turn the total factor productivity growth of UK 
retail banks. 
Following the recommendations made in chapter 5, econometric cost efficiency 
techniques are employed in this chapter. A time-trend model is estimated in this study 
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due to the relatively small numbers of observations in the UK retail-banking sector. 
The chapter is structured as follows. A brief outline of relevant literature is provided 
in section 8.2. Section 8.3 outlines the model specification employed in the study. 
Data and results are outlined in section 8.4 and a brief summary and conclusions are 
presented in section 8.5. 
8.2 Relevant Literature 
A number of studies have estimated total factor productivity growth and/or technical 
change in banking. Most previous studies have considered US commercial banks, 
although other depository institutions analysed have included Australian building 
societies (Esho and Sharpe, 1995), German co-operative banks (Lang and Welzel, 
1996) and US savings and loan associations (Stiroh, 1997). Most of these studies have 
modelled production either by means of econometric estimation techniques or non- 
parametric methods based on index number approaches. Most of the econometric 
studies have used either a cost or production function to represent productive 
technology, with a time-trend variable included in the model. Implicit within this 
approach is the assumption that productive technology is known. It is assumed that 
variations in the levels of productive technology are captured by the time-trend 
variable and are representative of technical change. 
As mentioned above, previous studies may be broadly delineated into studies that use 
econometric estimation techniques and studies that employ non-parametric index 
number methods. Previous econometric studies in banking and other financial 
services sectors, have fairly consistently found very low levels of positive or negative 
171 
technical change and similarly low positive or negative levels of total factor 
productivity growth. 
Esho and Sharpe (1995) estimated the total factor productivity growth and technical 
change of Australian permanent building societies between 1974 and 1990. A 
consistent decline in total factor productivity (-2 per cent per annum) and technical 
change were reported. Hunter and Timme (1986) reported significant levels of 
positive technical change for 91 large US banks between 1972-82. Particular 
emphasis was placed on the importance of economies of scale in determining the 
levels of technical change. This study has been criticised for using only a single 
output, constructed as the sum of total assets and total deposits. 
Humphrey (1993) estimated the technical change of US commercial banks between 
1977 and 1988, reporting a number of findings. Between 1977-80, positive technical 
change was found in the US commercial banking sector. This positive change was 
reversed as negative technical change was reported for the 1980-82 period. Between 
1983 and 1988 minimal technical change was reported. This study also considered the 
technical change of banks with different asset sizes. Smaller banks, defined as those 
between $200m and $300m in assets, experienced substantial negative technical 
change over the sample period relative to larger banks. 
Stiroh (1997) used two samples of saving and loan associations (S & L's) for the 
sample period, 1990-95 to estimate technical change and other economic 
characteristics. The two samples included a complete set of S& L's (i. e. including 
observations of S& L's which had merged or discontinued operations during the 
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sample period) and a set of the S& L's that operated continually throughout the 
sample period (i. e. excluding S& L's which had merged or discontinued operations 
during the sample period). Stiroh (1997) reported that S& L's that operated 
throughout the sample period (i. e. the S& L's that remained viable and did not merge 
with other institutions) had a higher level of positive technical change than the 
complete set of S& L's. This broadly suggested that a lower level of technical change 
was prevalent in S& L's that had merged or ceased to trade. Overall, low levels of 
positive technical change were reported for the sample period, with the level of 
positive technical change stable across asset sizes and falling over time. Lang and 
Welzel (1996) examined technical change for German co-operative banks between 
1989 and 1992 using a panel data cost function model. Small, yet significant, negative 
technical change was found. 
A number of other studies have measured total factor productivity growth and 
technical change with alternative techniques. Elyasiani and Median (1990) employed 
a DEA non-parametric analysis of large US commercial banks with assets in excess of 
$300m. A significant level of positive technical change was observed in the sample 
period 1980-85 for 191 large commercial banks. Employing a DEA non-parametric 
analysis of productivity growth, technical change and technical efficiency, Wheelock 
and Wilson (1996) found that some US commercial banks experienced both 
technological improvement and productivity gains between 1984 and 1993. In this 
study, relatively smaller banks, with assets less than $300 million, had lower levels of 
technical change. Daniel and Tirtiroglu (1998) quantified total factor productivity 
growth for US commercial banks between 1935 and 1991. They initially calculated 
total factor productivity growth by employing an index number approach, using a 
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non-parametric Tornquist index, and then attempted to determine what components of 
total factor productivity growth may be attributed to trend and cyclical components by 
employing a Kalman filter technique. A declining trend of total factor productivity 
growth was observed over the sample period, averaging 2.27 per cent per annum. 
Bukh et al (1995) assessed total factor productivity growth for a sample of 159 
Norwegian banks between 1980-89, employing non-parametric, Malmquist indices. A 
fall in total factor productivity growth between 1981-83 and a rise in productivity 
growth after 1987 were reported. 
To summarise, fairly mixed results are reported for total factor productivity growth 
and technical change in banks and other depository institutions. These conflicting 
results may have occurred due to the broad range of data samples, the analysis of 
institutions operating under distinct regulatory conditions and the different techniques 
employed. Employing econometric techniques, it could be stated that overall most 
studies have found that low or negative levels of total factor productivity growth and 
technical change have been prevalent, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
This overall decline in productivity and technical change is not isolated to just 
banking. Wolff (1991), for example, recorded a decline in total factor productivity 
growth for the US insurance industry between 1948 and 1986. 
8.3 Model definition 
Following the discussion in chapters 3 and 6, the intermediation model is employed. 
This approach to modelling production in retail banking (see Alhadeff, 1957, Sealey 
and Lindley, 1977 and the discussion in chapter 3) views the production process as a 
E: ý 
174 
transformation of three inputs (e. g. capital, labour and deposits; Xl, X2, X3) into 
outputs (e. g. loans (Yl) and investments (Y2)). Cost is the sum of both interest and 
operational costs. Banks are assumed to minimise costs. A cost function of such a 
correspondence may be presented as: 
C= 9(ß'1, Y2; PI, P2, P3) (8.1) 
Outputs are quantified by their values at the end of the financial year. The price of 
labour (PI) is measured by the total wage bill divided by the number of full-time 
equivalent employees. The price of capital (P2) is proxied by the aggregation of 
property and equipment rentals and depreciation divided by the quantity of physical 
capital, multiplied by 1000, providing a measure of capital cost for every £1000 of 
physical capital. The price of deposits is represented by total interest payable divided 
by the quantity of deposits multiplied by 1000. This measure is used to quantify the 
interest cost of every £1000 of deposits. Following the recommendation made in 
chapter 3, aspects of risk are incorporated in the model. Risk in production is proxied 
by the value of provisions for bad and doubtful loans (denoted PROV) at the end of 
the financial year. For further discussion of this variable specifically, and variable 
definition and model specifications generally, see chapters 3 and 6. 
A non-decreasing relationship between inputs and outputs, concavity of the cost 
function and homogeneity of degree one of input prices are assumed. The expansion 
of the problem into a second-order translog cost model allows measurement of 
potential benefits of multi-product production. A time-trend translog cost function 
(Humphrey, 1993, Baltagi and Griffin, 1988) is used to represent average technical 
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change over the sample period. The level of technical change for a multi-product 
framework may be represented by the partial derivative of the logarithm of total cost 
with respect to time. A production relation could be presented as: 
y=M, K, t), i. e. y(t) = f(L(t), K(t), t), (8.2) 
where L represents labour, K represents capital and t represents time. Time is 
incorporated in a time trend model through the use of a time specific dummy; i. e. t for 
0,1,2, ..., T years. This approach has been developed to incorporate both quadratic 
time terms and to incorporate the relationships between both time and input prices. 
The intermediation time-trend cost model (for simplicity the t subscripts are omitted) 
may be written as: 
LnC = a0 +Yß. Ln y. + I a; Ln pj+ i7t + 112 cp(t)Z + 
i 
112(1 y1Lnyi Lny, )+ 1/2(2: wikLnPjLnPk)+ 
iIjk 
(x; tLnY; )+l (ý; tLnPj+S;; LnytLnpi 
iiLnPROV + 112 ý (LnPROV)2 +E (8.3) 
fori, l=1,2andj, k=1,2,3. 
Following Shephard's Lemmas, cost share equations are obtained and are used to 
form the system to be estimated, where: 
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S= dLnC/9LnPj = a; + w; k LnPk + I% jT + S;; Ln Yr + ej (8.4) k 
Following Greene (1993), the deposit share equation (S3) is dropped from the 
estimation. This step is taken to make the model operational and to " ... solve the 
problem of singularity of the disturbance covariance matrix of the share equations" 
(p. 505). In accordance with established cost and production theory, the following 
restrictions are imposed: 
jai=1,15; 
j=0, 
E'%j, Z O)jk=0, (k=1,2,3) 
iiIi 
(8.5) 
where C represents total costs, Y represents outputs, P represents input prices, t 
represent time, PROV represents provisions for bad and doubtful loans and a, /3, 
S, A,, ic, gyp, i and w are parameters to be estimated. E and e represents the error terms, 
which are assumed to have zero means and constant variances and may vary across 
the three equations. A seeming unrelated regression (SUR) system of three equations 
is used to estimate a restricted time trend cost model. This estimation technique is 
discussed in more detail by Greene (1993,1995). 
Average technical change is viewed as the first derivative of the logarithm of cost 
with respect to time. The average technical change from the translog cost model, may 
be written as: 
'It]+ct+ jK; LnY, + 2 LnP] (8.6) 
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Average technical change can be decomposed into radial (or neutral) technical 
change. Radial change (-[r) +V t]) is equivalent to Hick's neutral technical change 
where the marginal substitution between factors is unchanged. Radial technical 
change quantifies the shifting of the cost function geometrically towards the origin. 
Non-neutral or dis-embodied technical change (-[I:,, 1LnP; J) represents the change 
i 
in the efficiency or quality of the factor inputs in the production process. This would 
represent a shift towards the cost function or homogenisation within the sample. Scale 
augmenting technical change (-[ K; LnY, ] ) quantifies the technical change linked to 
i 
changes in the scale of institutions in the sample. 
An associated measure which may also be derived from a time-trend model is the 
`bias of technical progress' (see Stiroh, 1997). This measure quantifies how technical 
change influences the cost shares of inputs in the production process. The `bias of 
technical progress' may be written as: 
Bias of technical progress = ash/at = a2 LnC/aLn Pj at (8.7) 
Where Sj is the cost share of input j for i=1, ..., 
3. The value of the bias of technical 
progress indicates that as positive technical change occurs more or less of an input 
may be employed in the production process when the value is greater or less than zero 
respectively. 
From the time-trend model, the percentage change in total factor productivity growth 
may be viewed as the negative technical change plus one minus the partial elasticity 
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of cost with respect to outputs multiplied by the change in outputs. This may be 
written as: 
Total Factor Productivity growth = -Technical change + (1- escüte) Y (8.8) 
This measure is an approximation to a total factor productivity index. Economies of 
' scale are estimated using the OES formula (see equation 5.1) following the approach 
outlined in chapter 5 and employed in chapters 7 and 10. 
8.4 Data and Results 
As in chapter 7, the sample was constructed with data from the Annual Reports and 
Accounts of 12 UK retail banks from 1985 to 1995. All of the 12 banks are recorded 
in the Annual Abstract of Banking Statistics produced by the British Bankers 
Association. The data are deflated to 1985 prices using the Retail Price Index. The 
banks included in the sample are the Royal Bank of Scotland, Standard Chartered, 
TSB, Barclays, Clydesdale, the Co-operative, Lloyds, Midland, Natwest, Bank of 
Scotland, Abbey National and Yorkshire banks. A discussion of the descriptive 
statistics is contained in chapter 7. 
Parameter estimates and diagnostic statistics are shown in Table 8.1. Estimates of 
economies of scale and the partial derivatives of the logarithm of cost with respect to 
the logarithm of input prices and output quantities are displayed in Table 8.2. Results 
are presented for total factor productivity growth, technical change and the 
components of technical change in Table 8.3. 
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Table 8.1 Parameter estimates of the time trend model 
Coeff. Standard Error Coeff. Standard Error Coeff. Standard Error 
Constant -3.764 (0.985)* w22 0.049 (0.006)* 823 -0.036 (0.024) 
al -0.176 (0.069)* (033 -0.082 (0.018)* 11 -0.032 (0.063) 
aZ -0.177 (0.035)* w12 -0.005 (0.001)* cp -0.001 (0.002) 
a3 1.001 (0.076)* w13 0.024 (0.005)* x, 0.007 (0.005) 
P, 0.934 (0.217)* w23 -0.016 (0.001)* 1C 2 -0.007 (0.005) 
ßz 0.129 (0.148) 611 0.002 (0.002) X, 0.019 (0.006) * 
711 -0.028 (0.029) 612 0.002 (0.000) * ? -0.001 (0.000) * 
722 -0.026 (0.004)* 513 0.030 (0.024) 1%3 0.009 (0.009) 
72 -0.015 (0.011) 521 0.004 (0.001) * ter -0.023 (0.037) 
wiI 0.031 (0.017)* 822 -0.002 (0.000)* 0.012 (0.009) 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
Diagnostic Statistics 
F statistic for the model = 269.68, prob. = 0.0000, adj. R2 = 0.983, Log-Likelihood = 533.17 
F statistic for the restrictions = 230.35, prob. = 0.0000, Durbin-Watson = 1.973, 
The diagnostic statistics measuring model fit (the adjusted R2 and F statistic) display a 
high level of model fit. A majority of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 
10 per cent level, as indicated by the t statistics. The restrictions placed on the model 
(equation 8.5) are tested using an F statistic and are not rejected. The degree of 
autocorrelation is assessed by the Durbin-Watson statistic. Autocorrelation (used here 
as a test of mis-specification) within the sample data is rejected. The log-likelihood 
statistic allows linearity in the model to be rejected. Positive partial elasticities of cost 
with respect to input prices are recorded in accordance with established cost and 
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production theory. The partial elasticities of cost with respect to loan quantity are 
significant and positive for all time periods in accordance with theory. However, the 
partial elasticities of cost with respect to investment quantity are negative, although 
not significant, for all time periods. 
Table 8.2 Economies of scale and partial derivatives of the logarithm of cost 
with respect to the logarithm of output quantities and input prices 
Ray scale economies (OES) Partial derivative of the Partial derivative of the 
logarithm of cost with respect logarithm of cost with respect 
to the logarithm of loan to the logarithm of investment 
quantity quantity 
Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. 
Overall 0.896 (0.016)t 0.830 (0.076)* -0.116 (0.103) 
1985-1989 0.893 (0.022)t 0.810 (0.088)* -0.097 (0.096) 
1990-1993 0.896 (0.015)t 0.840 (0.072)* -0.121 (0.103) 
. 1994-1997 0.898 (0.016)t 0.840 (0.071)* -0.127 (0.111) 
Partial derivative of the Partial derivative of the Partial derivative of the 
logarithm of cost with respect to logarithm of cost with respect logarithm of cost with respect 
the logarithm of labour price to the logarithm of capital price to the logarithm of deposit 
price 
Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. 
Overall 0.176 (0.021) * 0.058 (0.003) * 0.606 (0.033) * 
1985-1989 0.055 (0.081) 0.052 (0.003) * 0.545 (0.055) * 
1990-1993 0.175 (0.022)* 0.059 (0.003)* 0.599 (0.033)* 
1994-1997 0.174 (0.021)* 0.065 (0.003)* 0.673 (0.057)* 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at iU% significance; 
t. = Significantly different from one at 10% significance. 
Ik 
As shown in Table 8.3, low levels of total factor productivity growth (overall, an 
increase of 0.803 per cent per annum) and only minor shifts in technical change 
(overall -0.002 per cent per annum) are observed. The constituents of technical 
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change indicate a small degree of improvement in the productive capabilities of the 
industry as a whole or radial technical change (overall, 0.037 per cent per annum) and 
a limited decline in the quality or efficiency of factor inputs (-0.016 per cent per 
annum). Scale augmenting technical change, the improvement in technical change 
from economies of scale present in the industry, displays a slight decline overall (- 
0.023 per cent per annum). 
Table 8.3 Total factor productivity and its components 
Radial technical Non neutral Scale Technical Total factor 
change technical change augmenting change productivity 
technical change growth 
Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. 
Overall 0.037 (0.049) -0.016 (0.027) -0.023 (0.038) -0.002 (0.004) 0.803 (0.125)" 
1985-1989 0.034 (0.055) -0.018 (0.028) -0.026 (0.042) -0.010 (0.006) 0.508 (0.099)" 
1990-1993 0.037 (0.048) -0.016 (0.026) -0.024 (0.039) -0.003 (0.005) 0.211 (0.030)' 
1994-1997 0.039 (0.043) -0.014 (0.027) -0.003 (0.003) 0.022 (0.033) 1.547 (0.264)'` 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
Across time, total factor productivity growth increases, rising from 0.508 per cent (per 
¢z. 
annum) in the 1985-89 period to 1.547 per cent (per annum) in the 1994-97 period. 
Total factor productivity growth reached a low point in the 1990-93 period, when 
0.211 per cent per annum growth was reported. The components of total factor 
productivity growth display a range of features over time. Radial technical change 
rises slightly over the sample period from 0.034 per cent per annum in 1985-89 to 
0.039 per cent per annum in 1994-97. Non-neutral technical change is slight and 
negative across all time periods rising from -0.018 per cent per annum between 1985- 
89 to -0.014 per cent per annum in the 1994-97 period. Scale augmenting technical 
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change improves over the sample period, increasing from -0.023 per cent in the 1985- 
89 period to -0.003 per cent in the 1994-97 period. 
Bias in technical progress (estimated using equation 8.7) is only recorded for the 
model overall. A negative estimate is found for the deposit cost shares (-0.072, with a 
standard error of 0.012 *) 2. Positive estimates are found for the capital cost share 
(0.027, with a standard error of 0.006*) and the labour cost shares (0.058, with a 
standard error of 0.017*). The general conclusion that may be drawn from these 
findings is that labour and capital costs would experience a relatively greater share of 
overall costs with continued positive technical change. Conversely, deposit costs 
would both display a relative decline in their share of overall costs with continuing 
positive technical change. This result broadly concurs with what would be expect in 
an environment of rising capital investment in a labour intensive service industry. 
Further explanation of the bias of technical progress measure is presented in chapter 
5. 
The estimates of economies of scale, shown in Table 8.2, are slightly lower than the 
economies of scale estimates reported in chapter 7. This difference in the magnitude 
of economies of scale is attributed to bias resulting from the inclusion of the time- 
trend `dummy' in the model3. All estimates of economies of scale indicate positive 
economies of scale and are significantly different from one (with 10 per cent 
significance). These estimates therefore may be interpreted as an indication of slight 
positive economies of scale. 
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8.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, total factor productivity growth and its components are assessed. An 
econometric time-trend model employing an intermediation specification of 
productive technology with a translog functional form is used. Overall, very low 
levels of total factor productivity growth and technical change are observed. Notably 
the technological potential of the industry appears to be nearly static over this sample 
period. 
Previous evidence from testing the levels of average technical change and 
productivity growth also indicates either static or negative technical change in the 
1980s and 1990s. The presence of very low levels of technical change and total factor 
productivity growth for such a large and prominent commercial sector is of great 
concern. Whenever a substantial quantity of resources is employed in a low 
productivity area, the potential productivity growth of society is adversely affected. 
The reduction of productivity growth throughout society may, in turn, have a broader 
influence on future levels of output, the level of sustainable wage increases and 
inflation. 
Explaining the low levels of technical change and total factor productivity growth in 
banking is therefore of some importance. The results appear to conflict with the 
anecdotal evidence (for example, the high levels of investment in new technology) 
forwarded in chapter 2 and mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. This change, 
therefore, may provide a good starting point for any explanation. All change in a 
184 
company may lead to a degree of disorganisation limiting future productivity 
improvement in the short to medium term. Equally, the introduction of new 
technology requires substantial efforts from both the organisation and employees to 
adapt and learn how to use such technology in an efficient manner. It may be 
hypothesised that we may be observing a short- to medium-term fall in technical 
change and total factor productivity growth as the retail banks undergo substantial 
change. 
In a similar vein, the introduction of new technology and changes in the organisation 
of service delivery may have altered the form of the final service provided and the 
nature of work performed by the employee. If this has occurred, then the explanation 
for low technical change and total factor productivity growth may be mis- 
measurement. The possibility of mis-measurement would in turn suggest that we are 
observing a far broader phenomenon than we initially suggested. These issues will be 
considered in greater depth in chapter 11. 
' For further discussion, see Shephard (1970) 
2* denotes significance at the 10 per cent level. 
3 Esho and Sharpe (1995) report a similar influence in their model, when the inclusion of a time-trend 
'dummy' reduced the level of positive economies of scale. 
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Chapter 9 The cost efficiency of UK building societies 
9.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, firm-specific cost efficiency in the UK building society industry 
between 1990-96 is estimated. It is important to estimate the relative performance of 
building societies because of their importance in the functioning of the UK economy. 
Building societies, in common with most financial firms in the UK, are highly 
regulated. The analysis of the efficiency of production in building societies should 
provide a clearer understanding of the ramifications of this regulation in terms of 
performance, where " ... the motivation 
for such regulation demands an 
understanding of the behaviour of these firms" (Hancock, 1991, p. 2). Empirical 
evidence is also of particular importance when attempting to assess developments, 
such as the continued external growth of building societies through acquisition and 
merger and the future regulation of building societies. 
Following the recommendations made in chapter 5, this chapter differs from previous 
studies of efficiency of UK building societies and extends the literature in three ways. 
First, efficiency is estimated from a data panel, analysing efficiency over time, and so 
differs from previous cross-sectional approaches. Cross-sectional approaches have 
been criticised as reflecting a disequilibrium position through only considering a 
`snapshot' of the industry at a single year. The data panel used in this chapter 
examines the average efficiency over a seven-year period, which should limit the 
degree of bias that may be attributed to disequilibria in the sample period. Secondly, 
the cross-sectional estimation of firm-specific efficiency with techniques such as 
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econometric frontiers which requires the use of probability distributions. The 
assumptions that underpin the use of probability distributions may lead to possible 
estimation bias (see chapter 5 for further discussion). To free firm-specific estimates 
of efficiency from such assumptions, distribution-free measures of cost efficiency are 
used. Lastly, productive technology is represented by a flexible Fourier functional 
form. This functional form should estimate without the specification error that may 
have adversely influenced previous studies, which used, for example, the translog 
functional form. To the author's knowledge this is the first study to consider cost 
efficiency in building societies using a flexible Fourier functional form. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 outlines the model specification used 
in the study. Section 9.3 presents the measure of cost efficiency to be estimated. 
Section 9.4 outlines data used in the study. Section 9.5 discusses the choice of 
functional form and considers the estimates derived from the initial cost model and 
considers potential problems in estimation. Section 9.6 reports the results from the re- 
estimated models. Section 9.7 provides a summary of the chapter and offers some 
concluding remarks. , 
9.2. Model specification employed 
Building societies create services as opposed to recognisable goods. Both physical 
and non-monetary inputs (physical capital and labour) and monetary inputs (funds 
from a number of sources) are employed to produce services. These services consist 
of non-monetary services, such as the manipulation and administration of customers' 
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accounts, and monetary services, such as loans (Hancock, 1985). Following 
recommendations made in chapters 3 and 7, the intermediation model is employed. 
An intermediation model of building society production assumes that building 
societies aim to minimise costs and employ labour, capital and deposits to produce 
advances. The intermediation approach in the dual cost function would be written as: 
C=S(yv Y2, PI, P2, P3) (9.1) 
where outputs are quantified by their values at the end of the financial year; Y, 
represents mortgage loans (Class 1 advances) and loans secured on property (Class 2 
advances) and Y2 denotes advances made without security (Class 3 advances). The 
outputs therefore represent the services that all building societies were allowed to 
provide (Class 1 and Class 2 advances) and services that only some qualifying 
building societies were allowed to provide after the re-regulation (Building Societies 
Act, 1986) of the sector (Class 3 advances). The price of capital, PI, is proxied by the 
aggregation of the annual cost of property and equipment rentals and depreciation 
divided by the book-value of physical capital. The price of deposits, P2, is defined as 
the value of the total interest payable divided by the value of all deposits. The price of 
labour, P3, is proxied by the total wage bill divided by the number of full-time 
equivalent employees. C represents the total cost of production for the building 
society, including all administration expenses, depreciation and interest costs. 
To estimate a total cost function over a data panel, a one component fixed-effects 
model is used. The model is estimated by the two-step least squares dummy variable 
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(LSDV) model. The procedure for estimation is set out in detail in chapter 7, Greene 
(1993,1995) and Baltagi (1995). 
9.3. Long-run distribution free cost efficiency 
Distribution-free cost efficiency is a measure of long-run, firm-specific cost 
efficiency. In all studies that consider firm-specific efficiency the primary technical 
difficulty (and the probable cause of the differing results reported in most studies) is 
that of distinguishing random error from firm-specific inefficiency. Most econometric 
frontier studies have used probability distributions to represent both random error and 
inefficiency. Long-run, distribution-free measures of firm-specific cost efficiency do 
not employ probability distributions to estimate firm specific efficiency, avoiding 
these possible problems. The estimation of distribution-free, firm-specific efficiency 
is based on the " ... 
identifying assumption ... that cost differences owing to 
X- 
efficiency are persistent, while random errors tend to average over time. That is, good 
management maximises long-run profits by keeping costs relatively low over long 
periods of time, although costs may fluctuate from trend because of luck and 
measurement error" (Berger 1993, p. 263). Firm-specific efficiency is derived directly 
from the individual effects produced by the fixed effects model. Distribution-free 
efficiency may written as: 
Efficiency; = exp (min[Lnv]-Lnv) = min[v]/v (9.2) 
for the eh building society, where min[vjis assumed to be the individual effect of the 
most efficient building society in the sample. The measure is bounded by [0,1] where 
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1 represents 100 per cent relative cost efficiency (for further discussion of this 
measure see DeYoung (1997) and chapter 7). 
9.4- Data employed 
The entire sample has been constructed using data from the Annual Reports and 
Accounts for all UK building societies operating between 1990 to 1996. The data are 
deflated using the Retail Price Index for 1990. Overall, outputs, input prices and total 
costs all display high levels of dispersion both between individual building societies 
and over time. This high level of dispersion is clearly seen by contrasting the size of 
the largest and smallest societies in the sample. The smallest building society in the 
sample is the Londonderry Provident with approximately £1 -2 million in total 
assets, whilst the largest society in the sample, is the Halifax with in excess of £50 
billion in total assets. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 for a range of variables both 
over time (between 1990-96) and over the two asset groups. Due to the low number of 
incumbents in each sample (1990 has the largest number of building societies with 99 
incumbents) only two groups are defined to leave a reasonable number of societies in 
individual asset groups and to reduce the problem of bias imposed by individual 
institutions'. Group 1, defined as `small', contains all building societies with less than 
£100m in total assets. Group 2, the `large' asset group, contains all building societies 
with more than £100m in total assets. The two groups contained 38 and 61 building 
societies respectively. The two asset groups are so defined to ascertain if any 
difference, in terms of cost efficiency, exists between building societies that have a 
`qualifying asset holding'2 (societies with greater than £100m in total assets) and 
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those building societies that do not (building societies with less than £100m in total 
assets). Building societies with a `qualifying asset holding' may engage in a range of 
activities sanctioned by the Building Societies Act (1986) including borrowing money 
from the wholesale money markets and the power to hold class 3 assets3. The data set 
is unbalanced, yet contiguous, as some building societies have merged or de- 
mutualised over the sample period. 
Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics: Overall and over asset size. 
Overall ' N=597 Small N=164 Large N=433 
" Mean Std. Deviation Mean "". 
J Std. Deviation Mean "" Std. Deviation- 
Class 1 assets (£m) 1706.54 5251.26 19.01 10.68 2728.16 454.01 
" Class 2 assets (£m) 62.75 156.02 " 1.73 1.38 --------------- 18&87 " 99.28 
Class 3 assets (£m) 61.39 256.14 0.02 0.09 " 98.51 ; 319.39 
Retail deposits (£m) 1625.00 5668.65 23.46 12.77 2593.21" 6236.98 
Non-retail deposits (£m) "441.18 - -------- 1237.76 ------------- 1.13 ----------------- 1.72 --------- ---------------- "708.31 : 1509.56 
Total costs (£m) 177.41 532.11 2.39 1.67 "283.37 652.94 
------ ------ -Labour price (£) " 11264.28 --------------- 2763.91 -- 11284.33.3833.25 11156.55 2081.91 
-Capital price (£) --- ---548.71 ---"439.12 ----------- --- 768.41 679.26 -452.87 ....... 219.76 --- 
------ Deposit price (£) "56.89" " 23.95 58.10 --------- 24.41 - 56.62 "- 23.83 
. The 
level of class 1 assets, including mortgage loans for house purchase, rises 
substantially between asset groups and displays a high level of dispersion in the two 
asset groups. The average level of class 2 assets also varies between the asset groups 
with the large building societies holding the largest average amounts. Only a small 
amount of Class 3 assets, including insurance and estate agency business, is held by 
the `small' building societies. This result is expected, as some of the `small' societies 
have been legally limited in their ability to issue these assets for much of the sample 
period. 
191 
The labour price varies only slightly across asset groups with the lowest labour price 
recorded for the `large' group of building societies (£11,156). The level of capital 
price appears to decline as the size of building society increases and the deposit price 
remains stable. 
Table 9.2 Descriptive statistics: Overall and over time. 
........................... 
-------------------------- Class 1 assets (£m) 
Class 2 assets (£m) 
Class 3 assets (£m) 
Retail deposits (£m) 
Non-retail deposits (£m) 
Total costs (£m) 
----- ------------------------- Labour price (£) 
- ----------------- apital price (£) 
-- ----------- eposit price (£) 
Class 1 assets (£m) 
- -Class-2 assets (£m) 
Class 3 assets (£m) - 
Retail Deposits (£m) - 
Non-retail deposits (£m) 
-- Total costs (£m) 
-Labour price (£) - 
-Capital price (£) 
Deposit price (£j- 
1990 N=99 1991 ! N=92 1992 ! N=87 1993 ! N=83 
Mean Std. -- -Mean --; -- Std. Mean-I... §td. Mean; ---Std. 
Deviation Deviation Deviation i Deviation 
1357.55 4241.51 1549.22 4596.32 1694.23 4902.60 1829.31 5175.89 
48 24 135.83 57 58 24 135 01 12671 54 65 08 151 10 . , . , . . . . 
25.07 ýrý 110.41 ýý3. -ý''ý120.11 ý- 38.89 I. 137.76 
-2Ö9 
48.82 -'- IS9.60 
1313.09 4131.94 1476.79 4477.34 1600.11 4723.64 1714.99 4890.87 




218.97 686.17 214.58 i 628.19 196.48 551.67 158.05 435.32 
10845.2 2370.93 10358.04 2531.59 10870.1 2649.55 11426.08i 2777.16 
649.91 ! 53729 625.33 649.69 528.84 378.41 490.67 264.51 
---------- ----------- -------- ------- -------- ---------- .. ------- --". ------ 
j 
; " 95.89 ! 7.36 79.15 ! 6.19 ; 61.54 ! 4.36 42.44 ! 4.88 
-- --! - ---------- 1994 ! N= 81 1995 - -- N=79 1996 ! ......... N76ý-ý ---- 
_... _.. _L... _. _..... -_. _. _-_. _. _J_ ... __............... L__. _. -. -. -. -. L. --_. 
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
Deviation Deviation Deviation 
16 ~ 5395 99 ~ 1838 54 1923 6280 21 ' 1863 48 ~6384 79~- - . . . . . . 
_- __------------ 4 --- 68 26 10 81 60 71 ---------- 
i- - 1 80 34 178 -- . 
i... _. _ 16" 206 
. . . . . . 
i 67.61 i 209.16 i 100.33 
1792.80 i 5019.18 i 1777.46 
535.20 i 1407.08 i 499.37 
11646.05: 2801.02 ; 11849.34 
490.054 ! 290.55 1 510.13 
36.73 2.318 36.98 
6142.74 i 1803.64 -" 6278.74 
1496.54 ! 526.54 ! 1543.87 
- 469.90 136.59 ! 428.68 
--------- - 12166.97! " 2946.41 
- - - - -- - -- -- ------ 353.79 ------- -- - - 512.87 -- -- 388.05 
9 '. "31.58 ' - 2.49- 
Some of the variables employed in the model also vary substantially over the seven 
years of the sample period. Class 1, class 2 and class 3 assets have all risen 
substantially over the sample period. The average level of total cost has consistently 
declined over the sample period falling from £219m in 1990 to £137m in 1996. The 
average prices of labour and capital have changed little over the sample period, 
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slightly increasing and decreasing, respectively. However, the average deposit price 
varies greatly over the sample period, mirroring the average level of interest paid, 
which in turn is strongly associated with the prevailing interest rate. 
9.5 The choice of functional form and the cost efficiency model 
In previous studies of the UK building society sector, the translog functional form has 
been mainly used. This Diewert flexible functional form provides a cost function that 
could accommodate a second-order differential approximation to an arbitrary, twice 
continuously differentiable cost function. Such a cost function will satisfy the linear 
homogeneity in input prices property at any point only in certain parameters or an 
`admissible domain' (Diewert, 1971). This representation of productive technology 
may therefore only be quantified or estimated consistently within a certain range of 
observations or `specified domain', leaving the possibility of specification error in 
estimation. 
To amend for this possible difficulty, the flexible Fourier functional form (see 
Gallant, 1981,1984) is employed. The relatively large data set employed in this study 
(overall 597 observations) makes the use of this function possible. The flexible 
Fourier functional form is a second-order polynomial in the explanatory variables 
together with a combination of sine and cosine functions in the explanatory variables. 
This form is Sobelev flexible (see Gallant, 1981) and therefore can estimate 
elasticities consistently and has negative prediction bias, thus removing the potential 
for specification bias in the representation of productive technology, The flexible 
Fourier form includes the translog form nested inside it and should provide a similar 
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interpretation of productive technology to the translog functional from, whilst 
reducing the potential for specification error. 
Symmetry is imposed on the translog portion of the model. The trigonometric vectors 
within the model are chosen a priori, following the approach adopted by Mitchell and 
Onvural (1996). The vectors include single output prices Cos(Zj) and Sin(Zj) and 
single input prices Cos(l, ) and Sin(lr). Pairs of outputs [Cos(Zj + ZS), Sin(Zj + Z5), 
Cos(Zj - ZS), Sin(Zj - Zs), j es], and input prices [Cos(lr + lq), Sin(lr + lq), Cos(l, - lq), 
Sin(lr - l9), rJ, are also employed. 
Linear homogeneity, the assumption that an increase in all input prices leads to a 
similar increase in costs, has been imposed on the flexible Fourier forms in a number 
of ways in earlier studies. Berger and DeYoung (1997), for example, imposed 
standard homogeneity restrictions on the translog portion of the functional form. 
Developing this approach, Mitchell and Onvural (1996) imposed both standard 
homogeneity restrictions on the translog portion of the functional form and restricted 
the sum of the coefficients of all price variables in the trigonometric terms to zero. 
Berger and Mester (1997), however, suggest that the normalisation of all input prices, 
including the trigonometric terms, by one of the input prices, is " ... the only way to 
impose homogeneity on Fourier-flexible specification, since unlike the translog terms, 
the Fourier terms are not multiplicative" (p. 918). The approach adopted by Berger 
and Mester (1997) is employed. The price of labour, P3, is used to normalise other 
input price terms. Monotonicity and quasi-concavity in input prices are not imposed 
due to the semi non-parametric technique underlying the flexible Fourier functional 
form. 
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The flexible Fourier functional form may be written as follows, where for simplicity 
the i and t subscripts are omitted: 
Ln(C/(P3TA)) _ aJLn(YJ/TA)+Y, /3rLn(PrhP3) + 
r 
1 Il xisLn(YIITA)Ln(Y, ITA) [v. qLn(PrI P3) 
(Pq'P3)+ 
-.? i 12 ºv 
j: Bj, Ln(Yj/TA)Ln(p, /p3) +2 oj(CosZj+SinZj)+ j7, (Cosl, +Sinl, ) + 
Jrjr 
t1 ý, ca [Cos(Z; +Z3)+Sin(Zj+Zs)]+E 3[Cos(Z; -Z3) +Sin(Z; -Z3)] + 3 is ýs 








for j, s=1,2 and r, q=1,2,3, where a, A x, co, S (p, X, tu, 9, yand yi are 
coefficients to be estimated. v+v denotes non-random disturbance of the individual 
building societies and random error respectively. It is assumed that random error is 
independent of non-random error. Values used in the construction of the 
trigonometric terms are contained in Table 9.3 
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Table 9.3 Scale Factors and Scaled Variables for the Flexible Fourier 
Functional Form 
Prmin = sample minimum for the r' input price 
Pr" = sample maximum for the r1 input price 
ymin 
= sample minimum for the jth output quantity 
ymax = sample maximum for thejth output quantity 
Wpr = 0.00001- Lnprmin Wyi = 0.00001- Lnyjmin 
M= Lnprlna + Wpr A =61M 
p =6/([LnyjmaX + Wyj] * ý) Input price l= 2[Lnpr + Wpr] 
Output quantity Z= , u[Lny "+ Wy j] 
Overall 
Wp, M1 n 2.2609 Wy, Min 0.6801 X 1.3476 
:- Wp2Min 3.6893 Wy2Min 7.4642 Ui 0.5106 
U2 0.3290 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Z, 0.000 5.8643 L, 0.000 5.9999 
Z2 0.000 5.0554 L2 0.000 5.8166 
Large 
Wp, Min 2.2609 Wy, M'1 1.0520 1.3919 
Wp2Min 0.6801 Wy2Min 7.4642 U1 0.5093 
U2 0.3229 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Z, 0.000 5.8166 L, 0.000 5.9999 
Z2 0.000 5.0554 L2 0.000 5.8166 
Small 
Wp, Min 2.0288 WyiMin 0.6702 1.2307 
Wp2M1 n 3.6151 Wy2M1 n 4.6315 U, 1.2257 
U2 0.9639 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Z, 0.000 5.8105 L, 0.000 4.2484 
Zz 0.000 4.9702 L2 0.000 4.4473 
As shown in section 9.4, the sample used in this study is characterised by substantial 
variation. This substantial difference in the scale of institution could lead to inefficient 
estimates. The spread of costs and output quantities across the sample may produce 
estimates where random errors are widely dispersed in terms of their variance (i. e. 
larger societies would be expected to display higher variance in random errors than 
smaller societies). To amend for this possible heteroscadasticity, all costs and output 
quantities are normalised by total assets as outlined in equation (9.3). This 
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amendment produces variables, which should not vary substantially in magnitude. 
Berger and Mester (1997) suggested that this " ... is particularly important because 
inefficiency terms ... are derived from the composite residuals, which might make the 
variance of the efficiencies dependent on bank size in the absence of normalization" 
(p. 918). 
9.6 " Preliminary results 
The cost model was estimated first using all observations. Parameter estimates from 
this model are displayed in Table 9.4. A high proportion of the estimates in the 
estimated cost model were statistically significant for this model and the diagnostic 
statistics indicate an acceptable level of model fit (an adjusted R2 value of 0.999 was 
recorded). Partial elasticities of cost with respect to input prices and output quantities 
were found to be positive in accordance with established cost and production theory. 
ÄI likelihood ratio test is used to testa if the flexible Fourier functional form provides a 
better `fit' for the data than the nested translog functional form. The test statistic may 
be written as: 
LR = likelihood ratio test = -2(LTL - 
LFF) (9.5) 
Where LFF and LTL are the maximised values of the log-likelihood functions of the 
flexible Fourier and translog models. Following Hardwick (1990) the likelihood ratio 
test is a x2 statistic " ... with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameter 
restrictions imposed" (p. 455). The likelihood ratio test was significant with 10 
197 
degrees of freedom suggesting that the flexible Fourier model provides a better `fit' 
for the data than the translog models. 
Table 9.4 The efficiency model: parameter estimates, partial derivatives and 
diagnostic statistics 
Variable Coeff. S. E. Variable Coeff. S. E. Variable Coeff. S. E. 
ßi -0.2111 (0.0216) * 022 -0.0540 (0.0254) * (P12 -0.0304 (0.0148) * 
P2 0.0131 (0.0652) 012 -0.2432 (0.0210)* C312 -0.1103 (0.0491)* 
pal 0.4855 (0.0678)* 511 -0.0265 (0.0065)* Yl -0.0225 (0.0128)* 
a2 0.0308 (0.0479) 812 0.0280 (0.0055)* 'r2 -0.0981 (0.0193)* 
Xii 0.0522 (0.0119)* $21 -0.0078 (0.0049) 712 0.0129 (0.0095) 
X22 0.0150 (0.0068)* 522 0.0150 (0.0073)* w12 -0.0570 (0.0086)* 
X12 0.0018 (0.0094) (Pi -0.2652 (0.0354)* 1(121 -0.0518 (0.0080)* 
(Oil -0.0328 (0.0057)* (P2 -0.0559 (0.0270)* (P122 -0.0011 (0.0072) 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of capital price 0.3261 (0.0622) * 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of deposit price 0.0291 (0.1448) 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of class 1 and 2 asset quantity 0.8300 (0.0740) * 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of class 3 asset quantity 0.1656 (0.0307) * 
Model size Observations = 597 Parameters = 123 Deg. Fr. = 474 
Model Fit R-squared = 0.9998 Adjusted R-square d=0.9998 
Log-likelihood LFF = 1133.3154 LTA = 877.1932 LM = 512.2444* 
F test values are not reported as they were too large to be estimated by the software employed (Limdep7) 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
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Table 9.5 Distribution free cost efficiency estimates from the cost model: 
Society Efficiency Society Efficiency Society 





60.972 Nottingham 59.606 
Bath Investments 66.281 
-"-------- - - - ---------- - -- -- --- - 
Haywards Heath 72.085 
--- ---- -- ------------------- - -- -- - -- 
Nottingham Imperial 61.270 
--- -- - ---- --------------------- r w - - - ----- 88 ow Bedford Cr 
_-.. - 
n 360 . ---------------------------- 
638 England 58 
-- "-. 
H e a rt Of 
-_-. _------------------ 
891 79 . Penrith ___ ----------------------- ------ Beverley 82 . 622 Hendon 53 . 810 Portman 
82.571 
---"-- -------------------------------------6- Bexhill 92.74 
---------------------------- - --------- 
'H- ---------------------------- -- -- inckley & Rugby 62.924 
--------------------------------------- 
---------------------- Portsmouth 67.349 
----------"---.,. ------------ - - Birmingham Midshires 68.881 Holmesdale 65.866 Principality 57.954 
Bradford &- Bingl ey 67.939 Permanent79.794 Ilkeston 67.643 Progressive 
_ Bristol & West 62.402 --------------- Ipswich 75.646 -------------------------- ---_--_--- Saffron Walden '69.646 
Herts & Essex 
Britannia 69.960 ___ Kent Reliance 56.378 Scarborough 59.714 
-- ------- - ----------------------------------- --- Buckinghamshire 82.390 ------------------------------"------- 60.371 Lambeth -------- -------- ---- Scottish 63.500 
Cambridge 57.050 _ 63.546 Lancastrian ý- - Shepshed 




87.132 _-----_--_--_--_ Leamington Spa__.. 
_____.. _. _ 
55.935 Skipton 
___. __..... ___. __ 
74.872 
----- Chelsea 74.072 Leeds 62.909 Southdown 66.734 
---------------"-------"--.. - ----------------------------------------- Cheltenham & Gloucester 69.738 -------------------------------- ------- ck 65.053 Leeds & Holbe Si -- St Pancras 68.827 
Chesham 67.712 _ Leek United -. - 74.135 Stafford Railway 
--_.. -_61.442 --- ------- _______________________ --------- --------- Cheshire 72.323 --__-"---__-_-- -- ---- ---- -------- Loughborough 63.592 -------- Staffordshire 70.072 
Cheshunt 66.448 
---------------------- 
Londonderry Provident 100 
... ----------------------------- - 
Standard 70.883 
------------------........ -------- ---"------------- Chorley And District 74.449 ----- -- 66.768 Manchester Stroud and Swindon 100.000 
__________ City & Metropolitan 63.165 ------------------------ Mansfield 60.344 Surrey 
__________________ 
60.316 
Clay Cross 76.215 
-- ---------------- 
Market Harborough 64.307 
. --- - ---------------- 
Swansea 53.526 





Melton Mowbray___--___----- 53.094 
------- - .. _. __ 
Tipton & Coseley 
... 
67.852 
-- -"-.... ---... _ - -------- Darlington 59.204 --- -- -- Mercantile 62.108 Town & Country 71.247 
...... Derbyshire 63.439 
-------------- 
Mid-Sussex 56.621 TYnemouth 
. _--------"-_- 
68.274 
------ ----- -------------------- Dudley 62.909 
------------------ 
---------------------------------70--- Monmouthshire . 959 Universal 
69.079 
-------------------------- --- -------------------- Dunfermline------------------ 64.861 ----------------------------------- Mornington 
_--_-.. 
69.334 ------ Vernon 
_. _ ...... .. 
62.255 
-- Earl Shilton 70.806 
- "- - -- - 
National & Provincial 71.576 West Bromwich 57.286 
---.....,. -- --- - -- -- g - - ---- ----------------"------- 100 - y Ecolog -N---ati----onal -- Counties -----------.. -- 63. ----105- . 
--- West---C- umbria -- 67 . 006 
Furness 57.713 
"--------- 
Nationwide Anglia 96.838 Woolwich 58.913 
--------------------- -- --------------------------- Gainsborough 84.858 
-------- -------------------- 
--------------------------------------- Newbury 59.378 
- -----------------"------- -- 
------------ Yorkshire 64.480 
----- -------------------------- ------------- Greenwich 61.802 ----- .9 Newcastle 6016 Average - 
6.7.518 
--- - Halifax 
_. "-_"-. -"__.. _____. __ 
78.650 --------------- 
----------- --- ---- 
-- --- ---------- --- ---- North of England 
-------------65.166 ---------------- --- 
Stdev 
--_. -_-_. _-. _--_-. _ 
9.287 ------ 
- Ham shire 52.355 Northern Rock 67.452 Min 52.355 
The distribution-free firm-specific cost efficiency estimates are reported in Table 9.5. 
Both the Londonderry Provident and the Ecology building societies are treated as 
extreme outliers. The estimates indicate an average level of cost efficiency for UK 
building societies between 1990-1996 was of 67.5 per cent. The magnitude of 
efficiency dispersion is also considerable with a standard deviation of 9 per cent and a 
minimum efficiency of 52 per cent. These results appear to be skewed with the some 
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of the smallest building societies operating with higher levels of efficiency than larger 
building societies. On average the `large' building societies have an average 
efficiency of 66.765 per cent whilst the `small' societies have an average efficiency of 
70.746 per cent. Small societies, however, have a greater dispersion of efficiency with 
a standard deviation of 12.588 per cent, a value larger than the standard deviation of 
`large' building societies (9.312 per cent). 
It is possible that the differential treatment in terms of regulation and legislation of 
. 
`large' and `small' building societies may have resulted in some societies operating 
with a distinct productive technology. This difference may have resulted in an 
exaggeration of the `relative' efficiency of building societies leading to an under- 
estimate of efficiency. To amend for this possibility, the cost model is re-estimated 
separately for the `large' and `small' societies. 
9.7 The re-estimated efficiency models 
The cost function (equation 9.3) is re-estimated first using a smaller sample of 61 
`large' building societies with more than £l00m in total assets, and secondly using the 
sample of 38 `small' building societies with less than £100m in total assets. As 
before, the data sets are deflated by the Retail Price Index to 1990 prices and are 
contiguous and unbalanced. The amended scale factors and scaled variables for the 
flexible Fourier functional form model are displayed in Table 9.3. The parameter 
estimates and diagnostic statistics for the re-estimated `large' building society cost 
model are shown in Table 9.6. The parameter estimates and diagnostic statistics for 
the re-estimated `small' building society cost model are shown in Table 9.7. The re- 
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estimated distribution-free cost efficiency estimates for `large' building societies are 
reported in the Table 9.8, whilst the re-estimated distribution-free cost efficiency 
estimates for `small' building societies are reported in the Table 9.9. 
Table 9.6 The efficiency model: parameter estimates, partial derivatives and 
diagnostic statistics: Large building societies 
Variable Coeff. S. E. Variable Coeff. S. E. Variable Coeff. S. E. 
ß1 -0.1728 (0.0391)* 022 -0.0948 (0.0399)* (P12 -0.0170 (0.0130) 
P2 -0.3435 (0.1323)* 012 -0.3372 (0.0384)* G5 12 -0.0427 (0.0770) 
p(1 0.2928 (0.1210)* 811 -0.0021 (0.0140) 71 0.0007 (0.0163) 
a2 0.0686 (0.0667) $12 0.0207 (0.0059)* 'r2 -0.0933 (0.0274)* 
Xil 0.1044 (0.0276)* 821 0.0080 (0.0053) ßr12 0.0145 (0.0111) 
X22 0.0183 (0.0085)* 822 -0.0049 (0.0106) W12 -0.0392 (0.0102)* 
X12 -0.0142 (0.0155) (P1 -0.3450 (0.0507) * K121 -0.0257 (0.0080) * 
w11 -0.0103 (0.0157) T2 0.0262 (0.0344) (Q122 -0.0028 (0.0067) 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of capital price 0.6841 (0.1520) 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of deposit price 0.4893 (0.2727)* 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of class I and 2 asset quantity 1.3013 (0.1581) * 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of class 3 asset quantity 0.0239 (0.0152) 
Model size Observations = 433 Parameters = 94 Deg. Fr. = 339 
Model Fit R-squared = 0.9998 Adjusted R-squared = 0.9998 
Log-likelihood LFF = 917.1894 Lam, = 786.6675 LM = 261.0438* 
F test values are not reported as they were too large to be estimated by the software employed (Limdep7) 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
Relative to the overall model, a lower proportion of the parameters in the estimated 
cost model (50 per cent) were statistically significant for the `large' model, as would 
be expected with fewer observations. However, the diagnostic statistics indicate an 
acceptable level of model fit (an adjusted R2 value of 0.999 was recorded) and partial 
elasticities of cost with respect to input prices and output quantities were found to be 
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positive in accordance with established cost and production theory. A significant 
likelihood ratio test was recorded indicating that the flexible Fourier functional form 
provides a better `fit' for the data than the nested translog functional form. 
Table 9.7 The efficiency model: parameter estimates, partial derivatives and 
diagnostic statistics: Small building societies 
Variable Coeff. S. E. Variable Coeff. S. E. Variable Coeff. S. E. 
ßl 0.0358 (0.0603) 2 0.0342 (0.0562) (P12 -0.0786 (0.0864) 
02 2.1329 (0.7963)* (012 0.4730 (0.2602)* 012 0.0365 (0.0896) 
al 0.1541 (0.4279) 8t 1 -0.0021 (0.0308) 71 0.0382 
(0.0438) 
Ott 2.0066 (0.5924)* 812 -0.0089 (0.0180) 72 0.1510 (0.1355) 
x1i0.1615 (0.1533) 821 -0.0205 (0.0430) Y12 -0.0199 (0.0251) 
X22 0.4839 (0.1396)* 822 0.5627 (0.1725)* V12 -0.0054 (0.0224) 
X12 -0.0412 (0.1402) (P1 -0.1571 (0.1080) K121 -0.0191 (0.0179) 
(Ot1 -0.0391 (0.0191)* (P2 0.5371 (0.1486)* 7122 0.0352 (0.0437) 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of capital price -1.1059 (0.6166)* 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of deposit price 1.3385 (0.6531)* 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of class 1 and 2 asset quantity 0.9286 (0.5764) 
Partial derivative of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of class 3 asset quantity 2.0066 (0.6831)* 
Model size Observations = 164 Parameters = 54 Deg. Fr. = 110 
Model Fit R-squared = 0.9978 Adjusted R-squared = 0.9968 
Log-likelihood LFF = 331.3232 L, = 314.0146 LM = 34.6172* 
Model test F= 946.29 Prob. Value = 0.0000 
(vote: atanaara errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
A low proportion of the parameters in the estimated cost model were statistically 
significant for the `small' model. The diagnostic statistics indicate an acceptable level 
of model fit (an adjusted R2 value of 0.998 and a statistically significant F test were 
recorded). Whilst most partial elasticities of cost with respect to input prices and 
output quantities were found to be positive in accordance with established cost and 
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production theory, the partial elasticity of cost with respect to the price of capital was 
significant and negative. This may be an indication of approximation error associated 
with the relatively small sample used. A significant likelihood ratio test was recorded 
indicating that the flexible Fourier functional form provides a better `fit' for the data 
than the nested translog functional form. 
The average level of efficiency is somewhat higher when only `large' building 
societies are considered relative to the overall sample. An average cost efficiency of 
; 76.8 per cent is recorded, indicating that on average `large' building societies could 
, operate with 
23 per cent fewer costs. The lowest efficiency estimate recorded was 65 
, per cent, whilst the standard deviation of efficiency is 5.8 per cent. This shift in the 
magnitude of efficiency is assumed to be a product of considering a more 
homogenous sample6. 
The average level of efficiency for building societies with less than £100m in total 
assets is far greater than the average efficiency of larger building societies. An 
average cost efficiency of 91.7 per cent is recorded, with the lowest efficiency 
estimate of 82.7 per cent. The standard deviation of efficiency is lower than that 
recorded for the large and overall groups (5.8 per cent). The higher levels of 
efficiency recorded by smaller societies may have resulted from a number of causes. 
The sample is smaller which may have led to greater approximation error. 
Additionally, the smaller sample may have provided a more homogenous sample 
reducing the relative dispersion of efficiency. Equally, the smaller societies, which 
have operated under a different regulatory environment, are more efficient than larger 
societies which have become more diversified in their operations7. 
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Table 9.8 Distribution free cost efficiency estimates from the re-estimated cost 
model: Large building societies 
Society Efficiency Society Efficiency Society Efficiency 
---------------------------- Alliance & Leicester ----------- 75.196 ---------------------------- Ipswich ----------- 69.823 ---------------------- Nottingham ----------- 74.711 
----------------------------- Barnsley ---------- 73.690 ------------------------- Kent Reliance ---------- 72.670 --------------------- Portman --------" 74.288 
------------------------------ Birmingham Midshires ----------- 79.959 ---------------------------- Lambeth ----------- 75.081 ------------------------ Portsmouth ----------- 69.076 
---------------"----- & Bingley - 
. 00 
----------------------- -- -: i 
Bristol & West 1.379 
----------- 
72.805 Progressive 82.161 
Britannia 79.060 86.039 Saffron Walden 73.129 
_ ___ _ - 
Herts & Essex 
__ -------- Cambridge - __ 69.003 __ ______ Leeds Permenant _ 75.891- ___ _ Scarborough "- 75.470 
Chelsea --- 83.698 Leek United 76.023 Scottish .............. 
elthm & Gloucester 78.949 Loughborough 81.431 Skipton 78.823 
Chesham 17 Manchester 72.191 Southdown 79.636 
Cheshire - 83.894 Mansfield ------------------ 7 a: ý" Staffordshire - -..... 82.161- 
------------------------------ Cheshunt ----------- 77.231 --------------------------- Market Harborough 
- 
----------- 78.634 ------------------.... Stroud and Swindon ........... 71.587 
--------M"-- tr---------------- City & etropolitan 80.008 ---------------- ----- Marsden 
- 
----------- 66.152 ---------------------- Teachers --------- 79.491 
Coventry -------------------- 81.549 Melton Mowbray 75.542 Tipton&Coseley 86.152 
Cumberland ----------------- 71.289-- Mercantile - 'T- 




nfe Durmline 77504 vini ------- h 78.011 
Furness 6937 00.000 ý" 74.910 
Greenwich ..................... ............ 75.397 ........................... Nationwide Anglia -- .......... 71.405 - ..................... Yorkshire- 81.263 
Halifax--------------------- 92.333-- - Newbury ----------------- 74.400 " ---------- ----...... - ----------- 
--------------- Hanley Economic 73.718 Newcastle - 78.011 Average .... " 76.763 
Haywards Heath -- "- ........... 73.265 ............................. North of Englan 79.79-' Standard n 5f&" 5.804 - 
Heart Of England - 65.037 NRock - 
. 
79.204 Minimum-- - -- uiii---- 
- 




Table 9.9 Distribution free cost efficiency estimates from the re-estimated cost 
model: Small building societies 
Society Efficiency Society Efficiency Society Efficiency 
------------"----------------- Bath Investments --- -- 89.792 --------------.............. Gainsborough .... -------- 94.298 ----------- _... ------- St Pancras ----....... 84.357 
Bedford Cro -w-n --------------- 
---"-- ---------------- 
94 . 226 
--m_`ps -----------"------- Hamps hire ----- 82--. ---726- 'Stafford -- Ra -" il "-- way------ ---- 91.3-----35-- 
verley Be ------- 
------ 
---- 93---. --165-- ----- e ---nden-------------------- Harp ---- 91---. --268-- -------------- Standard ---- 92.4 96.4 74 
---------------------- 
----------- 
95.069 Hendon 9--1.023 Surre 84.568 
------------------- Buckinghamshire ---- 90.845 --------------------------- Holmesdale --_ -- 90.316 --------------------- Swansea .... ------ 93.141 
Catholic 93375 Ilkeston Permanent 94346 - Tynemouth 90031 
Ch orley And District 91067 Londonderry Provident 100000 West Cum bria 91000 
Cly Cs 
- 
--- 437 - dsx 91.65 
- 
Dudley _ 87925 NottinghamImperial __ 92770 Average 91666 
Earl Steilton - Penrith _91.179 d eon 3.635 
Ecology 95.680 Shepshed - 92.654 Minimum 82.726 
9.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the cost efficiency of UK building societies between 1990 and 1996 
was investigated. This analysis differs from previous studies in three central respects. 
Firstly, the model is estimated using a panel of building society observations over a 
seven-year period, reducing the possibility of reporting on what may be a time of 
distinct operating conditions. Secondly, distribution-free cost efficiency is estimated. 
This measure provides an indication of average relative efficiency, without the 
imposition of distributional assumptions employed in previous studies. Thirdly, a 
flexible Fourier functional form is employed to represent productive technology. This 
relatively under-used functional form, whilst inclined to provide higher levels of 
approximation error, is statistically superior in reducing the levels of specification 
error than other functional forms used in the literature. 
Both differences and similarities are identified with previous studies that have 
considered efficiency in UK building societies. The efficiency estimates made in this 
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chapter differ from the econometric estimates produced by Drake and Weyman-Jones 
(1996) in that a substantial dispersion of efficiency appears to exist in the UK 
building society sector. The dispersion of efficiency reported in this study appears to 
support many of the conclusions made by the non-parametric DEA studies. For 
example, Piesse and Townsend (1995) found that substantial efficiency dispersion, 
which may be systematically related to scale factors, existed in the building society 
sector. 
To conclude, differential levels of cost efficiency are observed for the UK building 
society sector between 1990 and 1996. Building societies of different sizes appear to 
experience distinct levels of efficiency. This finding is particularly important in policy 
terms due to the differential treatment of building societies of different sizes in terms 
of the activities the societies may undertake. An average cost efficiency of 76.8 per 
cent was estimated for the building societies deemed to be `qualifying asset holding' 
societies under the 1986 Building Societies Act. This qualification allowed a far 
greater degree of diversification in terms of form of operations undertaken and the 
services offered by these societies. The `small' group of societies, which were not 
`qualifying asset holding' societies and were denied many of these opportunities for 
diversification, have a greater average efficiency of 91 per cent. This finding is of 
significance in policy terms, as it seems that the on-going processes of re-regulation 
and diversification appear to have adversely affected the cost efficiency of this sector. 
Equally, it may be stated that despite previous empirical evidence (see chapter 4) that 
large depository institutions are generally more efficient than small depository 
institutions, this does not appear to be the case for UK building societies. The 
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different opportunities available to large and small societies could be an explanation 
of such a result. 
The estimation of a broader range of economic characteristics and tests of economies 
of scope for the joint production of class 1 and 2 with class 3 assets, sanctioned by the 
Building Societies Act (1986), are considered in more detail in chapter 10. 
t.. 
This problem prevented the use of individual asset groups for the retail bank data set and is discussed 
in chapter 7. 
2 Section 118 Building Societies Act (1986) --n" (1) This section has effect for determining for the 
purposes of this Act whether, in any financial year, a building society has a "qualifying asset holding". 
(2) A building society has a qualifying asset holding in any financial year, if, and only if, the aggregate 
value of its total commercial assets, as shown in its annual accounts for the previous year, is not less 
than £100 million or such other amount as may be substituted for it under subsection (3) below. " 
3 Class 3 assets include money lent to individuals, with or without security, whether or not at interest 
and whether or not they are members of the society. Advances fully secured on land do not constitute 
class 3 loans except under certain circumstances (Building Societies Act (1986) 16- (1-2). ). 
4 This test is devised for use with maximum likelihood estimators. It is used here to provide a broad 
guide as to whether the flexible Fourier functional form provides a better 'fit' for the data than the 
translog functional form (see Greene, 1993 p. 380). 
3 10 degrees of freedom are assumed for the LM test resulting in a critical value of 15.9871. 
6 Consideration of possible heteroscedasticity in the sample is made in chapter 10. 
Further investigation of the existence of differing productive technologies is suggested. A possible 
approach for considering distinct productive technologies was presented by Beard et al, (1991). In this 
study, a finite mixture analysis was used to test for the existence of multiple technologies in a sample 
of US S&L's. The presence of multiple technologies was not rejected. 
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Chapter 10 Economies of scope, economies of scale, technical change and total 
factor productivity growth in UK building societies 
10.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a number of cost characteristics of the UK building society sector are 
calculated from cost functions which are estimated for every year of the sample 
period, 1990-96. The cost characteristics considered include economies of scope, 
economies of scale, cost complementarities, technical change and total factor 
productivity growth. In chapter 2, it was suggested that the UK building society sector 
had undergone substantial re-structuring and change during the 1980s and early 
1990s. A study of total factor productivity growth and technical change, in association 
with other cost characteristics, should help to establish the effects of these changes in 
terms of the cost structure of the industry. To the author's knowledge, this is the first 
study to consider total factor productivity growth and technical change in the UK 
building society sector. 
Productivity measures are used to quantify the change over time in the `efficiency' of 
production. An analysis of this kind may allow a greater understanding of the 
implications of the regulatory, organisational and market-related changes in terms of 
technical change and total factor productivity growth. Measures of total factor 
productivity growth incorporate aspects of technical change, scale efficiency, 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. A broader discussion of productivity 
was presented in chapter 5. A review of studies considering the productivity and 
technical change of depository institutions is contained in chapters 5 and 8. 
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 10.2 outlines the model specification 
used in this chapter and section 10.3 considers the methods of measuring total factor 
productivity growth and technical change. Section 10.4 reports the results of the 
study. A summary of the study and conclusions are presented in section 10.5. 
10.2 Model specification 
Following the recommendations made in chapters 3 and 7, an intermediation model of 
depository institution production is employed. As in chapter 9, building societies are 
assumed to produce outputs in the form of class 1 and class 2 assets (Y, ) and class 3 
assets (Y2) using labour (XI), capital (X2) and deposits (X3). The cost (C) of production 
is therefore an amalgam of operational and interest cost. A cost function may be 
represented as: 
C= 8(Yi, Y2, Pi, P29 P3) (10.1) 
Output quantities are measured by their values at the year-end. Input quantities are 
denoted by the total full-time equivalent staff numbers, tangible fixed assets and the 
value of both retail and non-retail deposits at the year end. As in chapter 9, the price 
of labour is proxied by staff costs divided by the number of full time equivalent staff 
(pl). The price of capital (P2) is defined as the sum of property and equipment rental 
costs and depreciation costs, divided by the level of total fixed assets, multiplied by 
1000, to provide a measure of capital cost for every £1000 of physical capital. The 
209 
price of deposits (P3) is obtained by dividing the value of total interest paid by the 
value of total deposits, multiplied by 1000, to provide a measure of the interest cost of 
every. £1000 of deposits. Further discussion of the variable definitions and model 
specifications employed in this chapter can be found in chapters 3 and 5. 
10.3 Approaches to measuring productivity and characteristics of productive 
technology 
Total factor productivity growth and technical change are quantified using a cost 
function shift technique from Humphrey (1993). The cost function shift approach 
examines the change in average costs for each of the sample years. A translog 
specification is employed to represent productive technology. The translog functional 
form is employed due to the relatively small samples that are available on a yearly 
basis (the largest sample from a single year is 99 observations in 1990; see chapters 5 
and 9 for further discussion of this issue). 
The translog cost function model may be written as: 
LnC=a0+ 
_, ajLtzyj+Iß, 




1: y1rLnyfLnPr +E (10.2) 2"9Jr 
forj, s= 1,2andr, q= 1,2,3. 
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Following the approach used in chapter 8, cost shares are derived from Shephard's 
Lemma and the deposit share equation (S3) is dropped to make the model operational. 
The cost share equations may be written as: 
Sr=DLnTC/ab2Pr ßr+I.:, w, giPq+., yj, yj+e 
q i 
(10.3) 
Following established cost and production theory, the following restrictions are 
imposed: 
I ßr=1, YCVrq=°º 
rrj 
(10.4) 
Estimation of total factor productivity may be derived from estimates of technical 
change and scale elasticity. Following Humphrey, (1993) technical change may be 
written as: 
Tech =- (ACr+1 - AC1)/AC1 (10.5) 
Where Tech represents technical change, ACS represents average costs in period t and 
AC, +, represents average costs in time period t+1. Average costs are (fitted) total costs 
divided by the value of total assets of the building societies. For each year, the 
211 
logarithm of total costs are `predicted' by multiplying the parameter estimates by the 
relevant building society input price and output values. 
Total factor productivity growth may be viewed as a measure of the change in cost 
efficiency over time. Following Baltagi and Griffin (1988), total factor productivity 
growth may be written as: 
TFP = -Tech + (1- . 6scajY 
where TFP = change in Total Factor Productivity Growth 
Tech = Technical change 
ýSýalý = Economies of scale (OES) 
and y= change in output (10.6) 
Average change in output, Y is calculated as the percentage change in the average 
level of output. The change in output is recorded for all outputs (including Class 1,2, 
and 3 assets) and for all years and assets groups. 
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Overall, ray economies of scale (OES) are estimated for all years and asset groups. 
Ray economies of scale, which are cost savings resulting from proportional increases 
in the quantities of all outputs produced, are used to represent scale economies. Thus, 
for a building society producing j outputs, we can write : 
OES = (J Ln CID zn y, 
) (10.7) 
forj=1,2. 
According to this radial measure, there are overall economies of scale (and therefore 
decreasing ray average costs) if OES < 1, and overall diseconomies if scale 
(increasing ray average costs) if OES >1 and constant ray average costs if OES = 1. 
Economies of scope and cost complementarities are also assessed for individual years. 
Economies of scope used in this study may be defined as cost savings achievable 
from the joint production of two or more goods or services within a single enterprise, 
compared with their separate production by specialised firms. As in chapter 7, for a 
firm producing two outputs, Y, and Y2, the magnitude of scope economies (ESC) may 
be measured by: 
ESC = [C (Y,, 0) +C (0, Y2) -C (V1. Y2)I /C (V1. Y2) (10.8) 
ESC measures the relative increase in cost that would result from a separation of the 
firm into two specialist firms. There are economies of scope if ESC >0 and 
diseconomies of scope if ESC < 0. As previously mentioned, an alternative way of 
213 
investigating the existence of local economies of scope, used in this study, is to test 
for cost complementarities by checking whether the second derivative of cost with 
respect to output (oC/UY1 öY2) is significantly less than zero. If the value is less than 
zero, then the marginal cost of one good would decreases as the level of output of the 
other good increases. When this is the case, cost complementarities and therefore 
(local) economies of scope are deemed to exist. Further discussion of economies of 
scope and cost complementarities can be found in chapter 5. 
10.4 Data and results 
A sample of UK building societies for the period 1990-96 was used. As in chapter 9, 
data on costs, prices and quantities were taken from the Annual Reports and 
Accounts. Positive levels of prices and quantities were recorded for all societies in all 
years. The data set is contiguous and unbalanced and the data are deflated by the 
Retail Price Index for 1990, where appropriate. Summary statistics for this data set are 
outlined and discussed in chapter 9. A generalised least squares (GLS), iterative, 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimator is used for all estimations, following 
a procedure elaborated in Greene (1993). The parameter estimates are displayed in 
Tables 10.1 and 10.2 with diagnostic statistics shown in Table 10.3. 
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Table 10.1 Parameter estimates: 1990-93 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
0.101 (0.003)* 0.104 (0.003)* 0.127 (0.004)* 0.147 (0.005)* 
CCO 
ß -1.037 (0.038) * -1.104 (0.038) * -0.930 (0.051) * -0.405 (0.056) 
0.102 (0.006) * 0.082 (0.006) * 0.060 (0.007) * 0.067 (0.008) * 
1.934 (0.041)* 2.022 (0.040)* 1.871 (0.054)* 1.338 (0.060)* 
2.850 (0.068) * 3.194 (0.085) * 3.617 (0.107) * 3.570 (0.071) * 
a, 
-1.769 (0.069)* -2.106 (0.088)* -2.538 (0.110)* -2.573 (0.073)* aZ 
-0.001 (0.004) -0.022 (0.004)* -0.019 (0.005)* -0.014 (0.004)* Xu 
0.008 (0.006) 0.008 (0.007) 0.003 (0.006) 0.001 (0.005) 
Xzz 
-0.005 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004) X21 
-0.342 (0.010) * -0.370 (0.010) * -0.310 (0.015) * -0.131 (0.018) * 
-0.057 (0.003) * -0.037 (0.003) * -0.058 (0.005) * -0.128 (0.007) * Yu 
0.341 (0.007) * 0.341 (0.006) * 0.310 (0.009) * 0.214 (0.009) * 
113 
-0.005 (0.000) * -0.003 (0.000) * 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) l(22 
0.068 (0.002) * 0.072 (0.002) * 0.058 (0.003) * 0.023 (0.003) * 
Y2 3 
-0.004 (0.001)* -0.002 (0.001)* 0.001 (0.001) 0.022 (0.002)* 133 
col, -0.001 (0.000) * -0.001 (0.000) * 0.001 (0.000) * 0.001 (0.000) * 
Wie -0.015 (0.001)* -0.009 (0.001)* -0.005 (0.002)* 0.007 (0.003)* 
c013 0.266 (0.010)* 0.293 (0.013)* 0.342 (0.015)* 0.324 (0.010)* 
an, 0.001 (0.000) * 0.001 (0.000) * 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
c)m 0.009 (0.001)* 0.007 (0.002)* 0.006 (0.002)* -0.002 (0.003) 
ah3 -0.260 (0.010)* -0.292 (0.013)* -0.343 (0.015)* -0.331 (0.010)* 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
In all years, the majority of parameter estimates are significant at the 10 per cent 
level. The adjusted R2 and F statistics both provide a measure of model fit with all 
years experiencing high and statistically significant levels of model fit. The F test for 
restrictions provides a test of the restrictions imposed on the translog model. In all 
cases, the restrictions cannot be rejected. The Breusch-Pagan test is used to test for 
conditions of homoscedasticity in the sample; the presence of homoscedasticity is 
rejected for 1990 and 1991 indicating that heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected for 
these years. This finding means that the estimates may be inefficient in these years. 
The log likelihood statistic is significant for all time periods, indicating that a linear 
form of the cost models is rejected. 
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Table 10.2 Parameter estimates: 1994-1996 
1994 1995 1996 
cto 
0.152 (0.006)* 0.152 (0.004)* 0.163 (0.007)* 
-0.863 (0.070)* -1.080 (0.067)* -0.934 (0.060)* al 
a2 
0.043 (0.007)* 0.020 (0.008)* 0.041 (0.010)* 
a3 
1.820 (0.074)* 2.061 (0.071)* 1.893 (0.064)* 
ßl 3.669 (0.118) * 3.726 (0.153) * 3.936 (0.125) * 
ßz -2.701 (0.120)* -2.776 (0.155)* -2.911 (0.127)* 
0.001 (0.004) 0.008 (0.004)* 0.002 (0.005) Zit 
0.012 (0.004)* 0.018 (0.003)* 0.034 (0.004)* 
-0.007 (0.003)* -0.013 (0.003)* -0.022 (0.003)* xi1 
-0.279 (0.023)* -0.351 (0.021)* -0.310 (0.018)* Yll 
-0.072 (0.009) * -0.054 (0.008) * -0.047 (0.007) 
0.289 (0.011)* 0.333 (0.011)* 0.297 (0.010)* 713 
0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 722 
0.049 (0.004) * 0.062 (0.004) * 0.054 (0.003) 
0.012 (0.002)* 0.009 (0.002)* 0.007 (0.002) 133 
W, l 0.001 (0.000)* 0.001 (0.000)* 0.001 (0.000)* 
0012 0.007 (0.003) * 0.008 (0.003) * 0.006 (0.003) * 
0), 3 0.340 (0.015)* 0.354 (0.020)* 0.368 (0.016)* 
Ohl 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
cum -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 
co -0.347 (0.015)* -0.361 (0.020)* -0.375 (0.016)* 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
partial derivatives of the logarithm of cost with respect to the logarithm of input 
prices are displayed in Table 10.4. Positive partial elasticities of cost with respect to 
input prices are found, in accordance with expectation. Estimates of the cost 
characteristics are reported for both individual years and asset groups. Following the 
approach adopted in chapter 9, two asset groups are defined, including `small' 
Societies with less than £100m in total assets and `large' societies, which have in 
excess of a £100m in total assets. 
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Table 10.3 Diagnostic statistics 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
.............................. ........ ----------- 99 -- --------- 92 -- ----------- 87 - ---....... 83 .. --........ 81 . ---........ 79 . . --........ 76 
Observations 
------------------------------ ------------------- 
4 ------ 4 5 5 6 6 6 Iterations 
----------------------------- ------- 78 ------ - Yi-------- --66-------- -62 ------ -60 ---- - Sg-------- -SS ...... 
Degrees of freedom 
" .......................... 2 ....... ..... 0.998 . ..... 0.998 .. 0.999 ..... . 0.999 . 0.999 - -.. - 0.999 ... -- . 0.999 . - 
R 
-......... ---------------- ------- 0...... 997..... . 997- 
. -. .. - 0.998-.. _. .. 0.999 ~ 0.999 ..... .. 0...... 999..... .. 0.999..... . 0.998 . - 
"" - 1644.79* 2463.45* 3253.66* 4326.45* 5435.61* 3210.60* 2062.57+ 
F test 
1422.68* 815.379* 313.231+ 183.485* 98.547+ 147.917+ 123.917+ 
F test for restrictions 
33.2379+ 90.9551+ 25.9807 20.1799 11.4237 16.8033 22.1879 
Breusch-Pagan test 
554.609 543.142 549.529 529.668 536.345 502.442 468.619 
fig-Likelihood Test 
Note: *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
Table 10.4 Partial derivatives of the logarithm of cost with respect to the 
logarithm of input prices 
Partial derivative of the logarithm Partial derivative of the Partial derivative of the 
of cost with respect to the logarithm of cost with respect logarithm of cost with respect to 
f labour rice 1o p__ 
Orall Coeff S. E Coeff S. E Coeff S. E. 
1990 2.011 (0.057)* 0.128 (0.008) 1.187 (0.044) 
1991 2.159 (0.056)* 0.117 (0.008) 1.209 (0.051) 
1992 1.735 (0.081)* 0.128 (0.011)* 1.342 (0.062) 
1993 0.709 (0.095)* 0.455 (0.025)* 1.216 (0.035) 
1994 1.481 (0.121)* 0.159 (0.017)* 1.069 (0.057) 




____ ___ _____ 
0.55 (0.059 ! 
ge' 
1990 1.895 (0.054)* 0.266 (0.017)* 1.336 (0.049) 
1991 2.117 (0.055) 0.122 (0.008)* 1.346 (0.057)* 
1992 1.734 (0.081)* 0.139 (0.012)* 1.493 (0.068) 
1993 0.709 (0.095)* 0.257 (0.017)* 1.331 (0.038) 
1994 1.473 (0.120)* 0.169 (0.018) 1.173 (0.062)* 









ý0: ? ii--- 
--'-Small' 
1990 1.972 (0.056)* 0.117 (0.007)* 0.824 (0.037)* 
1991 2.123 (0.055)* 0.100 (0.007)* 0.875 (0.037)* 
1992 1.740 (0.082)* 0.105 (0.009)* 0.167 (0.046)* 
1993 0.708 (0.096) * 0.208 (0.013) * 0.899 (0.081) 
1994 1.503 (0.123)* 0.133 (0.015)* 0.773 (0.044)* 
1995 1.871 (0.111)* 0.089 (0.014)* 0.723 (0.063)* 
1996 1.603 (0.092)* 0.096 (0.014)* 0.809 (0.051)* 
N te: Standard errors are in brackets. Significantly dij}erent from zero at 10% significance. 
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Economies of scope and cost complementarities are reported in Table 10.5. 
Economies of scale are reported in Table 10.6. Technical change and total factor 
productivity growth are reported in Table 10.7. 
Estimates for economies of scope are greater than zero and statistically significant for 
all years in the overall and the large asset classes. This indicates the presence of 
` economies of scope for the joint production of class 1 and class 2 assets with class 3 
-assets within large building societies. Diseconomies of scope are recorded for most 
years for small societies suggesting economies of joint production are not present in 
building societies with less than £100m in total assets. The estimates of cost 
complementarities are mixed and contradictory for most years. The cost 
complementary estimates therefore reduce the level of confidence that may be placed 
in the economies of scope estimates. 
Table 10.5 Economies of scope and cost complementarities 
Overall 
Economies of scope Cost complementarities 
Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. 
1990 1.280 (0.075)* 1990 0.0137 (0.0046)* 
1991 2.127 (0.157)* 1991 -0.0090 (0.0051) 
1992 2.922 (0.243)* 1992 -0.0133 (0.0054)* 
1993 3.901 (0.231)* 1993 -0.0093 (0.0048)* 
1994 5.297 (0.526)* 1994 0.0050 (0.0040) 
1995 7.287 (0.981)* 1995 0.0127 (0.0040)* 
1996 10.177 (1.169)* 1996 0.0140 (0.0400) 
`Large `Small' 
Economies of Scope Economies of Scope 
1990 2.610 (0.187)* 1990 -0.235 (0.046)* 
1991 4.662 (0.441)* 1991 -0.332 (0.012)* 
1992 7.272 (0.806)* 1992 -0.390 (0.013)* 
1993 9.229 (0.763)* 1993 -0.384 (0.009)* 
1994 13.559 (1.782)* 1994 -0.418 (0.014)* 
1995 21.613 (3.949)* 1995 0.081 (0.037)* 
1996 32.360 (5.079)* 1996 -0.454 (0.014)+ 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. *= Significantly different from zero at 10% significance. 
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Table 10.6 Economies of scale (OES) 
Overall 



















































Note: Standard errors are in brackets. t= Significantly different from one at 10% significance. 
p mixture of economies of scale results are recorded. Overall, economies of scale are 
reported for the period 1991-93, with constant returns to scale reported in all other 
years. Economies of scale are recorded for the small asset group in the 1993-96 
period. Constant returns to scale are found for large societies for the period 1994- 
1996. 
Table 10.7 Total factor productivity growth, output growth and technical change 
(percentage change) 
'Overall Change in Technical Total factor Change Technical Total factor Change in Technical Total factor 
output change productivity in change productivity output change productivity 
growth output growth growth 
Overall 'Large' 'Small' 
1990-91 6.02 0.0461 0.5891 6.52 -0.0476 0.807425 4.71 -0.1095 0.1492 
1991-92 5.26 -0.0976 0.5090 5.06 -0.0791 0.653342 5.78 -0.1258 0.1502 
1992-93 4.65 -0.1493 0.5257 4.45 -0.1523 0.587489 5.21 -0.1700 0.3283 
1993-94 3.30 -0.0706 0.1089 3.47 -0.0680 0.102931 2.83 -0.0849 0.1187 
1994-95 3.24 -0.0954 -0.0195 4.14 -0.0889 -0.09119 0.76 -0.1038 0.0281 
1995-96 6.22 -0.0900 -0.0747 6.82 -0.0810 -0.17803 4.55 -0.1156 0.1227 
- " Average ---------- 4.78 
----------- 
-0.0761 
------------ 0.2731 -------- 5.08 ---------- 0.0862 ------------- 0.3137 ------- 3.97 ----------- 0.1182 ----------- 0.1-495 
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Technical change only exists only at low levels over the sample period. The rate of 
technical change varies only slightly falling slightly between 1990-91 (0.046 per cent) 
and 1995-96 (-0.09 per cent). Similarly low rates of technical change are observed in 
both asset groups during the sample period. 
The percentage change in the output of the building society sector is seen to fall from 
a initial high level of 6.02 per cent growth in the 1990-91 period to a low of 3.3 per 
cent in the 1993-94 period. A recovery in the rates of output growth is seen in the 
second half of the sample period as output growth rises to 6.22 per cent in the 1995- 
96 period. The rate of output growth is also seen to differ between asset groups. 
'Large' building societies experience a far greater growth in outputs throughout the 
sample period with an average growth of 5.08 per cent (overall an average rate of 
output growth of 4.78 per cent was observed). The growth in outputs of the `small' 
building societies is lower with an average growth of 3.97 per cent. The percentage 
change in output of the UK building society sector is displayed in Figure 10.1. 
Figure 10.1 Change in output in the UK building society sector: 1990-96 
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The rate of total factor productivity growth is low in all years. After an initial rise in 
1990-96 
total factor productivity growth in 1990-93 period (average 0.541 per cent) a slight 
decrease in the level of total factor productivity growth is observed in the rest of the 
sample period (overall total factor productivity growth of 0.273 per cent is recorded). 
`Large' building societies experience a slightly higher rate of total factor productivity 
growth over the sample period of 0.31 per cent on average ('small' building societies 
have an average total factor productivity growth of 0.15 per cent). Total factor 
productivity growth is displayed in Figure 10.2 








1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 
  overall   large Q small 
r 
1995-96 
1 0.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, economies of scope, economies of scale, technical change and total 
factor productivity growth have been estimated for the UK building society sector 
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between 1990 and 1996. Cost functions are estimated for every year and the estimated 
co-efficients are initially used to provide estimates of average costs, economies of 
scale, economies of scope and cost complementarities. The level of technical change 
and total factor productivity growth are then estimated, using these estimates and the 
average level of change in the rate of output, following a cost function shift approach. 
Estimates are made for all years and for two asset groups. 
A slight change in the level of economies of scale is observed over the sample period. 
The 'estimates of economies of scope indicate substantial economies of the joint 
production of class 1 and class 2 assets with the production of class 3 assets for large 
societies. This finding indicates that the re-regulation of the building society sector, 
which allowed the joint provision of these new services, is justified in terms of cost 
efficiency. Additionally, this result indicates the diversification for the larger societies 
may have reduced the risk of individual contracts and for the institution as a whole. 
This may, in turn, have allowed the cheaper provision of loans and a reduction in 
resources dedicated to monitoring individual contracts. 
overall, low rates of technical change and total factor productivity growth appear to 
exist in this sector. This indicates that our results from chapter 8, where UK retail 
banks were also found to experience low rates of technical change and total factor 
productivity growth, were not isolated. 
In chapter 8, a number of possible causes of the low rates of technical change and 
total factor productivity growth were introduced. The possible causes included the 
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possibility of mis-measurement of productivity and technical change and the level of 
dis-organisation and difficulties experienced in adapting to new technologies. As the 
building society sector, in common with the banking sector, has also experienced a 
decade of substantial investment in new technologies, it is proposed that the causes of 
the similar low level of technical change and total factor productivity growth may 
have resulted from similar sources. 
Differences between the two sectors do exist and may provide an appropriate starting 
point for further consideration. The building society sector contains a far greater 
number of incumbents than the retail-banking sector. This larger sample allows the 
consideration of the differential performance of building societies of different asset 
sizes. It was reported that the rate of technical change and total factor productivity 
growth varied between building societies of different asset sizes. This suggests that 
building societies of different asset sizes may have adopted qualitatively different 
productive technologies and working practices. The existence of different rates of 
technical change and total factor productivity growth for building societies of 
different asset sizes may also indicate that differential rates of diffusion of new 
innovations and inventions is occurring. The implications of these preliminary 
findings will be discussed in more depth in chapter 11. 
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Chapter 11 Conclusions 
11.1 - 
Introduction 
The conclusions attempt to clarify and assess the results of the thesis. First, a broad 
outline of the thesis content is provided. Then the findings from the empirical studies are 
considered in more detail and are subdivided into an assessment of the estimates of 
economies of scale, economies of scope, cost complementarities, efficiency, technical 
change - and total 
factor productivity growth. Overall conclusions are suggested and 
combined with suggestions for further research. 
11,2 The thesis outline 
In the chapters comprising Section One, a number of recommendations are forwarded. 
Chapter 2 outlines the predominant changes in the conduct and structure of the industry. 
These are categorised as the re-organisation of market structure, the growth of new 
products, 
the development of technology in service provision, the transformation of 
labour markets, the macro-economic environment and the alteration of the regulatory and 
supervisory 
framework. Chapter 3 considers the model specifications and variable 
definitions that have been employed in previous studies of depository institutions. Both 
the production and 
intermediation models are outlined and assessed. No substantial 
theoretical 
flaws are observed in either model form. It is therefore suggested that in one 
empirical chapter 
both these models should be employed. From this study (chapter 7), 
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recommendations on the performance of the models in terms of estimation error and 
plausibility of the estimates are used to determine which model form should be employed 
in subsequent chapters. Additionally, a number of variable definitions are considered 
with recommendations made as to which should be used in the empirical chapters. 
Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive international review of depository institution studies 
of productive characteristics and efficiency. This chapter indicates that the differing 
methods and approaches employed in previous studies, such as the efficiency concept, 
estimation technique, model definition and functional form influence the estimation of 
cost and production characteristics. Chapter 5 considers the definition and estimation of 
efficiency and productivity. Here it is suggested that an econometric, cost efficiency 
panel data approach, employing either a translog or flexible Fourier functional form, 
should be used in the empirical studies of efficiency in chapters 7 and 9. 
Recommendations are also made as to what measures of efficiency, total factor 
productivity growth and technical change should be quantified in the empirical chapters. 
Section Two comprises the empirical chapters in which cost and production 
characteristics of the UK building society and retail banking sectors are estimated. These 
chapters draw heavily on Section One for their principal methods and assumptions. 
Chapter 6 suggests that monopolistically competitive conduct was present in the UK 
building society mortgage market during the 1990s. Both conditions of monopoly and 
perfect competition are rejected. These findings are similar to those estimated for the UK 
retail bank loan market by Molyneux et al, (1994). The level of market contestability 
225 
appears to increase marginally over the sample period. Disequilibrium conditions are 
reported for the 1990-92 period and stability of market shares cannot be rejected for any 
year. 
Chapter 7 provides estimates of economies of scale, economies of scope and distribution- 
free cost efficiency of the UK retail-banking sector between 1984 and 1995. The translog 
functional form is employed to estimate two distinct models of bank production: the 
intermediation and production models. A high level of cost efficiency dispersion and very 
large economies of scale are found in the production model, while a relatively low level 
of efficiency dispersion and a moderate degree of economies of scale are reported with 
the intermediation model. Diseconomies of scope are reported for the joint production of 
loans and investments, and loans, deposits and investments. The intermediation model 
form is shown to have lower approximation and specification error than the production 
model. Based on the limited criteria of the plausibility of results and the level of 
estimation error, the intermediation model is recommended for use in the subsequent 
empirical studies. 
Chapter 8 quantifies the rates of total factor productivity growth and technical change in 
the UK retail-banking sector during the sample period 1984-1995. A translog time-trend 
model is employed with an intermediation model of bank production. Low levels of 
technical change and total factor productivity growth are observed for the sector overall. 
The bias of technical change indicates that deposit inputs would be increasingly 
substituted for capital and labour inputs as technical change continued. 
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Chapter 9 considers cost efficiency in the UK building society industry between 1990 and 
1996. A flexible Fourier functional form with an intermediation model is employed as the 
representation of productive technology. A fixed effects panel data model is used for the 
estimation of economies of scale, economies of scope and distribution-free cost 
efficiency. Overall, low levels of efficiency are observed. Higher levels of efficiency and 
lower levels of efficiency dispersion were recorded when the model was re-estimated 
separately using data for societies greater or smaller than £l00m in total assets. The 
smaller building societies proved to have substantially higher levels of efficiency. From 
this analysis, it is suggested that; (a), smaller building societies may have a productive 
technology which is distinct from all other building societies; and (b), the Building 
Societies Act (1986) which sanctioned the greater diversification of larger building 
societies (those societies with excess of £100m in total assets) may have had a negative 
influence on the cost efficiency of these societies. 
Chapter 10 employs a cost function shift approach to estimate the levels of economies of 
scale, economies of scope, cost complementarities, technical change and total factor 
productivity growth in the UK building society sector between 1990 and 1996. A translog 
functional form and an intermediation specification of bank production are employed. 
Negative rates of technical change and low rates of total factor productivity growth are 
reported. It is also observed that building societies of different sizes have distinct 
experiences of total factor productivity growth over the sample period. Economies of 
scope are reported for the joint production of class 1 and class 2 assets with class 3 assets 
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for `large' societies and diseconomies of scope are reported for `small' societies. Mixed 
and contradictory cost complementarity estimates are also recorded reducing the level of 
confidence placed in the economies of scope estimates. Constant returns to scale and 
slight economies of scale are reported for all asset classes. 
11.3 Economies of scale and product-mix 
In chapter 7, the UK retail banks are seen to have experienced positive economies of 
scale. The empirical study considering economies of scale in the UK building society 
sector (chapter 10) indicates that constant returns to scale and slight positive economies 
of scale are present for building societies at different times during the sample period. 
Positive economies of scale imply that a larger scale of operation may provide a lower 
average cost. It could therefore be stated that larger-scale production in a market with 
positive economies of scale would be in the public interest. Such a position would in turn 
support the continuing trend towards mergers of banks and building societies. In practice, 
such an outcome of public benefit may not be automatic as banks or building societies 
may not operate at minimum average costs (as reported in chapter 6). This problem is 
compounded by the `local' form of scale economies, i. e. the scale economies estimated in 
the empirical chapters only measure the effect of a marginal change in the level of output 
and do not consider the `global' form of scale efficiency (where changes in scale 
efficiency are based on the movement of output that would lead to minimum average 
costs). This approach therefore assumes that in the level of cost inefficiency is minimal 
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and does not differ substantially between depository institutions. A study considering the 
sources of economies of scale and the measurement of a `global' measure of scale 
efficiency would be an appropriate direction for future research. 
The economies of scope results for the retail-banking and building society sectors differ 
in terms of the products considered. Diseconomies of scope for the retail-banking sector 
are recorded for both the joint production of all loans, aggregate investments and total 
deposits with the production model and for the joint production of investments and loans 
with the intermediation model. However, cost complementarity estimates reported for 
both these cases are not supportive, reducing the level of confidence in the plausibility of 
the estimates. 
Economies of scope, of producing both class 1 and class 2 assets with class 3 assets, are 
reported for the `large' building societies and diseconomies of scope are recorded for 
`small' building societies in chapter 10. The main policy implication of this result is that 
the legislation enabling building societies to diversify into a broader range of activities 
appears to be justified in terms of cost efficiency. The results recorded for retail banks 
and building societies provide support for the provision of building society class 1 and 
class 2 assets separately from class 3 assets for the smallest building societies, the joint 
provision of class 1 and 2 assets with class 3 assets for `large' building societies, and the 
separate provision of retail bank loans, deposits and investments. 
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11.4 A descriptive analysis of efficiency 
It is important to assess the efficiency of depository institutions for a number of reasons. 
The level of efficiency of a depository institution provides an indication of its relative 
`success' in production terms both at the level of the individual depository institution and 
at the level of the industry as a whole. This `success' deserves attention as institutions in 
competitive markets will be better able to maintain and develop their businesses when 
they operate efficiently. In addition, the efficient depository institution will be able to 
avoid the high costs of failure for itself, the industry and the broader economy. 
In chapter 7, firm-specific distribution-free cost efficiency estimates are made for both 
production and intermediation specifications of UK retail banks. A correlation coefficient 
of 0.815 is calculated for the two sets of efficiency results, indicating a high degree of 
association between the two model forms. The dispersion of cost efficiency, however, 
differs substantially between the two model specifications. 
In chapter 9, the distribution-free cost efficiency estimates indicate that only a moderate 
degree of cost efficiency is prevalent in the building society sector. The distribution-free 
cost efficiency estimates suggest that the average level of cost efficiency for large UK 
building societies between 1990 and 1996 was 77 per cent and the average level of 
efficiency for small societies was 91 per cent. 
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The causes of the differing efficiency results may be attributed to a wide range of 
sources. These include (a) the use of differing estimation methods and models, (b) the 
growth of the depository institutions over the sample period, (c) a distinct productive 
technology employed by small depository institutions and (d) the prevailing level of 
competition within depository institution core markets. 
a) The use of different estimation methods and models 
In chapter 7, two distinct although theoretically sound models of bank production were 
estimated. The results from these models, whilst associated, differ greatly in terms of 
magnitude, suggesting that the model form is influential in the determination of economic 
characteristics. Equally, the estimates of economies of scale in the retail-banking sector 
differ between chapter 8, where a time trend model is used and chapter 7, where a fixed 
effects panel data model is estimated. The differences between these two studies, 
including the inclusion of a time-trend dummy and different estimation techniques, led to 
similar estimates, which differed in terms of magnitude. Thus, both model form and the 
estimation technique may have an influence on at least the magnitude of efficiency 
estimates. 
b) The growth of depository institutions over the sample period 
The growth of depository institutions may result in control and allocation difficulties. The 
larger the institution, the broader and less transparent are the links between the 
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employees, the management and the customers. This position may have enabled 
allocative inefficiencies to form. The process of expansion of institutions may engender 
inefficiency similar to that indicated by Leibenstein (1966), who suggested that 
expansion to a larger scale of production provides greater opportunities for costs to 
expand and may allow individual workers and institutions to perform sub-optimally. 
Whilst this explanation is not proposed as a rejection of the potential cost efficiency 
benefits of depository institution expansion from sources such as economies of scale, the 
movement towards larger depository institutions through both internal expansion and 
external acquisition and merger may in itself result in technical and allocative 
inefficiency. 
c) A distinct productive technology employed by small institutions 
In chapter 9, it was reported that cost efficiency in small building societies appeared to be 
different form the cost efficiency of larger building societies. This finding may suggest 
that the smaller building societies have a different productive technology from larger 
societies. It is assumed that different productive technologies would result in greater 
specification error and possibly an overestimation of the dispersion of cost efficiency. 
d) The level of competition 
The level of competition may influence the efficiency of a depository institution in a 
number of ways. The impact of a low cost entrant on a depository institution's core 
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market may be substantial. A new entrant, with relatively low costs, would be expected to 
cause a degree of disturbance in the stability of market shares, the long-run equilibrium 
of the market and the subsequent profitability of incumbents. This would occur as it can 
be assumed that low cost new entrants would increase the levels of competition where " 
... competition causes efficient organisations to prosper at the expense of inefficient 
ones" (Vickers, 1995, p.! ). Such a disturbance may have been observed in the earlier part 
of the sample period (1990-1992) in the building society mortgage market where 
disequilibrium conditions were observed (see chapter 6). The degree to which these new 
entrants influenced the building society mortgage market, however, may be limited due to 
the relative stability of market shares over the sample period. 
The degree of competition may also influence the efficiency of depository institutions 
through the `sharpening' of incentives and monitoring of managers to ensure that the 
objectives of cost minimisation and efficiency maximisation are followed. Although a 
limited amount of empirical and anecdotal evidence exists supporting such a process (see 
Vickers, 1995 and Nickell, 1996, for a discussion of the literature), the methods of 
transmission of information about the differential performance of individual managers are 
less than clear. It has even been suggested that the level of competition has very little 
influence on the efficiency and productivity of the individual firm, where the existence of 
competition may be influential in providing a framework or environment in which many 
differing innovations, approaches or ideas may be employed. Nickell (1996) exploring 
this issue, suggested that " ... if there are 
lots of ways of doing things, competition 
allows many to be tried and then selects the best, something a monopoly finds hard to 
233 
replicate" (Nickell, 1996, p. 741). While this eventuality is not considered to be 
implausible, in chapter 6 evidence was put forward to show that both building societies 
and retail banks operate within long-run Chamberlinian equilibrium for at least some of 
the sample period. Under such conditions, these depository institutions will operate 
where average cost is tangential with the demand curve, a point not necessarily at 
minimum average costs. This position provides managers with an effective cost `cushion' 
(Berger and Hannan, 1998) enabling managers to follow objectives other than cost 
minimisation and efficiency maximisation and limiting the possible influence of 
competition in reducing `slack' in this industry. 
Further discussion of the existence of distinct productive technologies in the building 
society sector is contained in chapter 9. The potential sources of efficiency (see for 
example Berger and Mester, 1997 and Hermalin and Wallace, 1994) and the association 
between efficiency and the level of competition (see for example Vickers, 1995 and Hay 
and Liu, 1997) are areas where further research activity would be beneficial. 
11.5 A survey and assessment of the estimates of total factor productivity growth 
and technical change. 
In has been stated in both the literature review (chapter 4) and the relevant empirical 
chapters (chapter 8 and 10) that previous empirical studies concerned with estimating 
total factor productivity growth and technical change in depository institutions have often 
produced small or static estimates for the 1980s and 1990s. The empirical chapters 
(chapters 8 and 10) estimate the levels of technical change and total factor productivity 
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growth for UK retail banks and building societies and also find very low rates of change 
and growth. An econometric time-trend model (chapter 8) and an econometric cost 
function shift model (chapter 10) are used in these studies. 
The time-trend model and cross-sectional shift model both provide similar estimates. The 
general finding that technical change appears to be minimal and total factor productivity 
growth occurs only at low levels is reinforced. It was also shown that building societies 
with differing sizes had distinct experiences of technical change and total factor 
productivity growth during the sample period. 
The implications of low productivity growth for such a large commercial sector are both 
substantial and negative. The potential output of the national economy is reduced as more 
of depository institutions' resources are dedicated to low productivity activities. It 
follows that as potential output within the entire economy falls, a decline in the level of 
sustainable wage increases is experienced. This effect, may in turn, transmit into higher 
rates of inflation. Why minimal levels of technical change and total factor productivity 
growth have occurred in UK depository institutions during the 1980s and 1990s is 
therefore a question demanding greater discussion and explanation. 
The presence of zero or low levels of technical change and total factor productivity 
growth is, to a degree, at odds with the anecdotal evidence discussed in chapter 2. Banks 
and building societies have undertaken substantial change in terms of employment 
practice, the distribution of services and computerisation of a range of banking functions. 
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A number of potential causes or explanations of low productivity have been forwarded to 
explain why technical change and total factor productivity growth has been low. Possible 
sources or explanations that will be discussed include (a) levels of inefficiency in the 
sector, (b) the adoption of new technology and structural change in the industry, (c) the 
presence of low levels of competition, (d) the service industry `cost disease' and (e) mis- 
measurement. 
a) The level of inefficiency in the sector 
The presence of a static or low rate of technical change indicates either no improvement 
or only a slight increase in the level of productive technology. Total factor productivity 
growth is a construct of technical change, allocative, technical and scale economies. The 
presence of low total factor productivity growth and static technical change together with 
positive economies of scale (see chapters 7 and chapter 10) suggests that one of the other 
components of productivity growth may also be changing. This position supports the 
conclusion that either technical or allocative inefficiency or both are present in the sector. 
Such inefficiency may bias the results we have gained and disguise possible 
improvements in technical change or total factor productivity growth' that may have 
emerged over the sample period. 
More directly, the presence of cost inefficiency may have limited the level of potential 
productivity growth. Total factor productivity growth is dependent on an improvement in 
the efficiency of production. Any improvement from an inefficient position may therefore 
236 
be a `catching up' process, as inefficient firms become more efficient. This could provide 
a misleading interpretation of productivity growth and technical change. Such a difficulty 
was identified in US commercial banking by Berger and Humphrey (1992b) where "... it 
is also difficult to measure technical change and productivity growth because of the 
confounding effects of changes in inefficiency over time and the deregulation of the 
deposit side of banking. If inefficiency is not taken into account, then measures of 
technical change or productivity growth may confuse shifts in the minimum-cost 
technology with changes in the deviations from that technology" (p. 275). 
(b) The adoption of new technology and structural change 
The restructuring of UK depository institutions during the 1980s and 1990s has witnessed 
the introduction of a wide range of new technology. This investment has been used to 
assist production in several diverse areas, including distribution and information 
processing, in addition to reducing transaction costs. It can be initially stated that many 
upheavals, such as staff retraining and widespread disruption, must have been incurred 
over the sample period. Secondly, staff employed by depository institutions may have 
had to spend a considerable amount of time learning how to use new technology 
efficiently. This process of learning may be mis-interpreted as a decline in productivity. 
Thirdly, the management of new technology may also be problematic. Maclean (1997) 
suggested that " ... initially, technology is used 
largely to improve the way in which 
traditional tasks are performed. It takes greater familiarity with the potential of new 
technology before more fundamental changes in organisation and the production process 
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can be implemented to better exploit the technology" (p. 21). Lastly, the diffusion of new 
technology may be unequal across the sector as a whole, due to the high costs of 
purchasing new technology. This may be illustrated by the differential productivity and 
technical change estimates for different asset sizes of building society, observed in 
chapter 10. To summarise, high levels of investment and the associated disruptive activity 
may have adversely affected the level of total factor productivity growth in depository 
institutions in the short and medium term. Equally, the low productivity growth we have 
observed may represent productivity during a time of change and perhaps underestimate 
the true long-term total factor productivity growth. 
c) The presence of low levels of competition 
The low levels of total factor productivity growth may have resulted from low levels of 
competition within the sector. In chapter 6, it was suggested that the existence of low 
levels of competition may result in the management of depository institutions following 
objectives other than cost minimisation and efficiency maximisation. The moderate levels 
of market power in both the building society and banking core markets indicate that such 
behaviour could be a strong possibility in UK retail banks and building societies. The 
consequent low levels of efficiency, associated with such behaviour would in turn lead to 
low total factor productivity growth and low levels of technical change. It may be stated 
that the possible link between the levels of competition, productivity and efficiency is an 
area that requires greater consideration and inquiry. Further discussion of this and other 
related issues is provided by Hay and Liu (1997) (also see section 11.4). 
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(d) The service industry's `cost disease' 
The products of building societies and retail banks, such as mortgages, are composite 
products, which are `manufactured' using an amalgam of services and transactions 
(Baumol, 1991). The inclusion of `personal services' of customer care within products 
may reduce the potential for total factor productivity growth. Within such an 
environment, however much is spent on new technology will still leave the productive 
technology underpinning the service unchanged. This is assumed to lead to rising input 
costs, in turn associated with low productivity growth and technical change. This low 
productivity is therefore viewed as being as much a function of the limited scope of 
`improvement' possible with composite products. Whilst this argument certainly 
broadens understanding of the issue at hand, its conclusions have been considered by 
some to be premature. Maclean (1997), for example draws attention to Baumol's (1967) 
example of a horn quintet where " ... any attempt to 
increase productivity here is likely to 
be viewed with concern by critics and audience alike" (p. 416). Maclean indicated that 
this argument may be limited when new technology alters the nature of the service 
provided, where, " ... advances in sound production, recording and broadcasting allow 
one performance of the quintet to be heard by millions of people simultaneously, and re- 
heard over and over again. " (Maclean, p. 26). This conclusion suggests that an emphasis 
on the quality or convenience a product may bring to a customer may differ substantially 
between products, adopting differing types of new technology. 2 
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(e) Measurement problems 
The negligible rates of productivity growth and technical change observed in the 
empirical studies may result from a more fundamental problem. The presence of a global 
or western slowdown in productivity (see Griliches, 1994) or a process of international 
productivity convergence (Baumol et al, 1994) as differences in the technological 
sophistication of nations have declined, has been mooted by many commentators. The 
results we have observed may have been a part of this hypothesised global phenomenon. 
Productivity growth throughout white-collar work in the western world may have slowed 
significantly within the last twenty years. Reasons that have been forwarded to explain 
this phenomena have included data problems, the possibility of exogenous shocks on the 
industry and imprecise or abstract model assumptions. 
Griliches (1994) suggested that during the 1970s and 1980s the sources of productivity 
growth had become confused as productivity growth was seen to slow down. The 
characteristics of the productivity-growth decline were suggested to be concentrated 
particularly in the areas of construction, finance and services sectors, where output 
measurement is particularly difficult. Griliches indicated that the areas of agriculture, 
manufacturing and communication, where output measurement is less of an issue had not 
experienced such a major slowdown in productivity growth. This finding led to the 
conclusion that we may not have an adequate understanding of the mechanisms 
producing growth or adequate data to indicate whether there has been such a shift. 
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Associated with this conclusion is the possibility of mis-measurement of productivity and 
technical change of depository institutions. In chapter 3, the modelling of production in 
depository institution was discussed. It was suggested that measurement of most inputs 
and outputs has been problematic. Some commentators have emphasised that `huge' mis- 
measurement occurs due to the changing levels of quality and the impact of innovations 
on the form of products and services. For example, Nordhaus (1997) suggested that " ... 
constructing prices indices that adequately capture the impact on price of new 
technologies, especially radically new inventions, is beyond the practical capability of 
current techniques" (p. 1549). Other possible problems that may have negatively 
influenced the efficiency, productivity and technical change estimates include the use of a 
general price deflator (the Retail Price Index) in all the studies, as opposed to a price 
deflator specifically designed for UK depository institutions (to my knowledge, 
unavailable, although desirable). This general price deflator may have led to a bias in 
results. Compounding this problem is the large number of intermediate goods in bank 
production, which may experience bias from, for example, double deflation. 
More broadly, the definition of technical change may have omitted the degree of 
technical change that may be `embodied' in capital itself (see for example, Hulten, 1992) 
or the influence of past approaches on future innovations, proposed in the `path 
dependence' explanations of technical change (see Rutten, 1997 for a critical assessment 
of path dependence and other theories relating to the sources of technical change). 
Embodied capital has been suggested to be a significant and substantial determinant of 
the overall slowdown in productivity since 1973, with the effect on productivity varying 
241 
between nations from a low of 23 per cent in Japan to 69 per cent in France (Wolff, 
1996). 
11.6 Problems with our conception of the 'firm' 
A number of assumptions are made in the construction of all cost and production 
functions. These assumptions include the objective function of firms, the cost free 
dissemination of technology, the breadth of the efficiency concept considered, the 
replication of technology, homogeneity of factors of production and the homogeneity of 
production technology in relation to distinct products. 
The assumption of cost minimisation employed in the thesis may be questioned. 
Efficiency throughout the thesis relates to the minimisation of input costs in the 
production of output. Cost minimisation is therefore assumed in all the empirical studies. 
This conception could be viewed as unnecessarily narrow for a number of reasons. Firms 
within oligopolistic markets, for example, may seek objectives of sales maximisation 
(Baumol, 1959). The managers of depository institutions may seek expenses that add to 
their own utilities, over those which improve firm efficiencies and productivity (see 
Edwards, 1977, Mester 1989, Drake, 1995 for further explanation). Baumol (1990) 
broadens this argument by suggesting that all entrepreneurial activity is driven by profit. 
The sources of profit in any society are defined as the prevalent reward system which 
may or may not be associated with cost minimisation. Whilst these theories both 
acknowledge and forward explanations for sub-optimal behaviour, they still emphasise 
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the firm as a maximiser. This assumption that the firm will maximise may also be cast as 
a most significant criticism. The relaxation of maximisation within a firm context may 
emerge from a broad range of sources, such as inertia, insufficiently complete contracts, 
customs and standard procedures within the workplace (see North, 1990 and Streeck, 
1992 for further discussion). 
The conception of the firm as a command institution where maximisation is reproduced 
mechanically may additionally be questioned. Managers may be seen to adapt decision 
making to both their own and worker individualism, defining progress through collective 
decisions and as such are not in total control of the firm. Therefore, whilst the 
consideration of such factors shifts the emphasis of the analysis from the firm towards the 
individual level and away from the approaches adopted throughout the thesis, limitations 
when assuming firm maximisation are at least acknowledged. It is suggested that future 
research work, particularly about the corporate governance of depository institutions, 
may provide further insights and clarification of these criticisms. 
In chapter 5, the efficiency concept employed in the thesis was introduced. The 
assumptions on which the cost efficiency concept is based have experienced a diversity 
of criticism. Firms or institutions represented by production and cost functions are 
assumed to be able to replicate existing states of technology achieved by competing 
firms. In some cases (such as radial measures), assumptions of the construction of an 
infinite range of technologies is deemed to be both attainable and cost free. The 
assumptions have been viewed as assuming a `book of blueprints' for differing 
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productive states. It is assumed that such knowledge may be acquired and implemented at 
no cost to the institution. The homogeneity of factors of production is essential to the 
existence of a `book of blueprints' conception. It is acknowledged that this assumption 
may be inconsistent with many aspects of firm behaviour. 
Leibenstein (1966) indicated that in all production functions a certain `experimental 
element' will remain, where even if the existing relationship between inputs and outputs 
is understood, change in the input ratios would create uncertainty and limit our 
understanding. Attributes of skills and organisational knowledge and learning have been 
posited as potential exceptions to the suggested homogeneity of factors and may form 
this `experimental element'. Teece (1982) expands such a view where " ... in the exercise 
of individual skill, many actions are taken that are not the result of considered choices but 
rather are automatic responses that constitute aspects of the skill" (p. 40). Skill is thus 
viewed as a function of doing, and experience which may not be derived at zero costs. 
Organisational knowledge may be viewed as the knowledge that facilitates an 
organisation to co-ordinate production according to certain limits of technology. 
Organisational knowledge, conceptualised within a cost or production function, is 
achievable for all observed combinations and, for radial measures, for all potential 
permutations of observed technologies. This assumption applies both locally and 
globally. Difficulties with this assumption occur, in that, while an individual within an 
institution may fully understand his or her individual and team responsibilities and the 
importance and relation of such responsibilities within the entire institution, no individual 
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or sub-set of individuals within the institution is able to understand all the possible 
responsibilities and their relationship to each other. Such a property or attribute held by 
the organisation, by its intangibility, is difficult to quantify and exchange freely with 
other firms. 
Questions of the viability of the assumption of homogeneity of technology in relation to 
the production of distinct products may be posited as a further potential failing of this 
form of analysis. Emphasis is placed on institutions with experience in a general area of 
production that may diversify into the production of products or services with similar 
production technologies. The movement into the production of products with highly 
distinct production technologies is viewed as difficult. Teece (1982) suggested that " ... 
whereas the neo-classical firm selects, according to factor prices technologies off the 
shelf to manufacture a given end product" ... the conception of the firm that 
incorporates 
fungibility " ... selects an end product configuration, consistent with its organisation and 
technology which is defined yet fungible over certain arrays of final products. " (p. 42). 
11.7 Overall conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
In the thesis, a number of central themes have been developed. The UK depository sector 
has a noticeable dispersion of efficiency. Economies of scale appear to be present in both 
the retail banking and building society sectors. The rates of technical change and total 
factor productivity growth have been low to negligible and potentially constrained by a 
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broad array of factors, including the differential application and diffusion of technology, 
low levels of competition and the level of efficiency dispersion within the sector. 
In qualification of the thesis findings, a number of potential difficulties have been 
identified. Whilst the consideration of particular components of efficiency and 
productivity change, both in terms of their consistency of estimation, emphasis and 
scope, is essential for analysis of this sector, a clear demarcation between such 
components remains unclear. Additionally, the data used and variables applied in the 
analysis, demand continued attention both in terms of quality and breath of information 
provided. The sources of efficiency observed within both the retail banking and building 
society sectors remain unclear; it may only be assumed that the primary source of this 
inefficiency is poorly applied entrepreneurial and managerial behaviour. The best 
indications of possible sources of efficiency seem to emerge through the application of 
differing models and techniques and the link with the low levels of productivity growth, 
which may be related to the substantial re-structuring and the low levels of competition in 
the sector. The precise delineation of such an association remains unanswered. 
Additionally, the econometric cost function approach used throughout the thesis is 
limited in the scope of the `true' productive technology it may incorporate, assuming 
away potentially essential elements such as skill and differential product quality. 
Considering such limitations, there are a number of possible avenues for further 
investigation. The reliance on Diewert functional forms, such as the translog functional 
form could have overestimated economies of scale and led to more dispersed efficiency 
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results than may be present. The amendment for, or at least acknowledgement of, the 
potential for mis-specification is strongly suggested. The use of different efficiency 
concepts, such as profit efficiency, may enable the differing objectives of the firm to be 
assessed. For example, Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggested that both cost (or input) 
efficiency measures and profit (or output) efficiency measures may be contrasted to 
provide a greater understanding of the level of service intensity individual firms provide. 
In support of such a view, Braeutigam and Pauly (1986) employ an alternative cost 
function approach to quantify possible quality bias. The authors strongly argue that 
assuming away differential product quality may be " ... an omission" ... that may " ... 
seriously bias estimates of economically important parameters, for example, economies 
of scale" (p. 616). The use of both econometric and programming approaches in tandem 
may provide further insights into potential specification errors that could occur with 
either technique. Through the comparison of results, further insight into both the levels 
(Sudit, 1995, p. 450) and sources of efficiency within institutions may be provided. 
A noticeable rise in the number of products provided and outlets for the customer to use 
has occurred over the sample period. An acknowledgement of the diversity of production 
in institutions is therefore suggested. The associated increase in the level of 
specialisation, diversity and the ramifications of this change may be a starting point for 
such analysis. The importance and incorporation of risk taken by individual institutions 
within production may similarly be posited as another avenue for investigation. 
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A broader analysis of competitiveness and market power is deemed to be very important, 
perhaps considering more flexible techniques to incorporate issues such as regulation, 
market power and the dispersion of prices in core product markets. Empirical work on the 
form of competition or exercise of market power, considering both the structure-conduct- 
performance (SCP) (Berger, 1995 and Berger and Hannan, 1998) and the new economic 
industrial organisation (NEIO) paradigms (Bresnahan, 1989 and Vesala, 1995) provides a 
starting point for further work in this area. 
To conclude, the thesis has considered the competitiveness, efficiency and productivity of 
UK retail banks and building societies. The measurement of these economic 
characteristics has been the primary aim of the thesis. The type of analysis employed, 
previously termed " ... the industrial economics of 
banking" (Molyneux et at, 1996), is 
appropriate for questioning any of the assumptions made, and has, hopefully, provided a 
broader assessment of this subject area than has previously been available. 
1 This is possible as total factor productivity growth and technical change are estimated as average as 
opposed to extremal measures. 2 This point is associated with the mis-measurement issues also considered in this section. 
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